Introduction
The document which we publish below puts forward the position of the Marxist
tendency on the perspectives for the world revolution in a comprehensive way. It
analyses the global crisis of world capitalism, economic perspectives and the
stage reached by the class struggle in the developed capitalist countries, and
also the revolutionary developments in the former colonial countries, the
worldwide struggle against imperialism, the attitude of Marxists to war, the
situation inside the mass parties and trade unions of the working class, and the
tasks of the revolutionary tendency.
This document represents a finished programmatic statement of the followers
of Marxist.com internationally. It is the ideological basis on which we carry on
our fight for the creation of a mass Marxist movement on a world scale.
We ask all the readers and supporters of Marxist.com to translate it, publish
it and give it the widest possible circulation among workers and youth. We
welcome your comments and questions about our ideas. Finally, we appeal to all
those who agree with these ideas to join us in the struggle to build the forces
of Marxism and further the cause of the world socialist revolution.
London,
September 16, 2002
Part One
(See part two - three
- four)
On the current situation and our tasks
The world situation is characterised by increasing volatility at every
level. The revolt of the productive forces against the straitjackets of private
ownership and the national state is indicated by the present global crisis.
Unable to deny the facts any longer, the bourgeois economists have admitted that
the US economy is in recession. The fears of the strategists of capital are
expressed in one article after another. This represents a turning point in the
whole situation.
Marxism explains the historical process ultimately in terms of the
development of the productive forces. The motor-force of capitalism is the
production of commodities, and especially capital goods. In the last boom, the
bourgeois of America and all other countries invested colossal amounts on new
technology, new plant and machinery. Now there is massive overproduction
("over capacity") on a world scale. In Asia alone there is a huge
productive capacity, which cannot be used. Even when this is mopped up, it will
not be possible to go back to the type of feverish growth of the previous
period. A period of sluggish growth, accompanied by high unemployment in all
countries, will follow.
Nothing comparable to the present situation of global instability - a
combination of war and slump - has been seen since 1945. For a long time the
capitalist system experienced a powerful upswing, with full employment and
rising living standards in the advanced capitalist countries, and relative
stability in the relations between states. Now the world economy is entering
into the first simultaneous slump since 1974. This is an unprecedented situation
which is provoking deep concern among the strategists of capital.
Even after the crash of 1929, the slump did not affect all the main
capitalist countries simultaneously. America went first, followed by Germany and
Austria, then Britain, whilst France only really went down in 1934, when the USA
was already coming out of the slump. These are uncharted waters, and the
capitalists do not know what to expect. This is the reason for the growing alarm
of the ruling class, reflected in the constant reduction of interest rates.
The present crisis represents a turning point in the historical process.
After the collapse of the USSR ten years ago, the bourgeois felt that they were
no longer threatened by "Communism". The capitalist system (the
"free market economy") ruled supreme. The ruling class felt confident.
They dreamed of an economic boom that would last forever. The economists wrote
about a "new economic paradigm".
This situation affected the psychology of all classes. The middle class
(including the Labour bureaucracy) followed the bourgeoisie and its "market"
ideology. The working class saw no alternative and sought individual solutions
to its problems. Despite the extreme pressure on the workers, the debt, the long
hours of toil, the stress and exhaustion, it was possible for a temporary period
to obtain a relative amelioration of living standards. The strength of reformism
and particularly its right wing (Blair, etc.) and the isolation and weakness of
the forces of Marxism were both predicated on this.
In a period where the workers were not participating in struggle, the
pressures of capitalism on the workers' organisations, and especially the
tops, were increased tenfold. The reformist leaders and the apparatus of the
unions and the Social Democracy, liberated from the pressure of the class,
acquired an unprecedented level of "independence" - that is, dependence on
the bourgeoisie and its ideology. The degeneration of the mass workers'
organisations reached extremes. But now this process has reached its limits.
Over a period, major events will shake up the mass organisations. The whole
process will be thrown into reverse.
World economic crisis
Faced with the crude reality of economic recession, the spokesperson of
the bourgeoisie are striving to put the most optimistic interpretation on the
situation. Alan Greenspan asserts that: "the mildness and brevity of the
downturn are a testament to the notable improvement in the resilience and the
flexibility of the economy. The fundamentals are in place for a return to
sustained healthy growth: imbalances in inventories and capital goods appear
largely to have been worked off; inflation is quite low and is expected to
remain so; and productivity growth has been remarkably strong, implying
considerable underlying support to household and business spending as well as
potential relief from cost and price pressures." This is just wishful
thinking.
The temporary rallies in the first quarter of 2002 and in Stock markets in
the US and Europe in the month of August were merely episodic developments.
After recovering by 20% in August, the world's stock markets fell sharply
again in the beginning of September. In Japan the Nikkei index fell to its
lowest level since 1983. In New York, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by
more than 350 points. Similar negative results were posted in London and other
stock exchanges.
Most economists now agree that the United States faces a so-called
"double dip" recession. This confirms what we have consistently
maintained: the rally that occurred earlier this year was only the prelude to a
further and steeper decline in the world economy. The present falls on the world
stock markets are merely the tip of the iceberg. The world economy is still
slipping downhill.
Throughout July and August, every new figure on the US economy was worse
than before. The net wealth held by American households (including shares, bonds
and property) has fallen over 20% in the last two years, since the "bear
market" in world stocks started in March 2000. The US Conference Board's
July index of consumer confidence fell from 106.4 to 97.1, its lowest level
since February. Consumers' expectations about the future took an even steeper
turn for the worse. The future expectations reading plummeted to 95.7 from
107.2. If we bear in mind that the world economy is extremely dependent on
consumption in the USA, these figures point to a serious downturn.
Sales in the shops are falling off. Indexes that measure confidence among
US manufacturers have also weakened and manufacturing output is dropping back
towards recession levels after a limited revival in the early part of this year.
Most significant, the figures for real gross domestic product in the US for the
second quarter of this year showed a rise of just 1.1% and previous quarters
were revised down to confirm that indeed in 2001 the US economy had fallen into
recession and only recovered briefly in the first quarter of this year.
Business investment has fallen for the seventh straight quarter. On the
other hand, the pace of consumer spending slowed to a crawl, advancing just 1.9%
after growing 3.1% in the first quarter. Only government spending shot up. And
of course, at least for the moment, with interest rates so low the property boom
continues, as it does in the UK, Australia and many other OECD countries.
There can be no real recovery for US capitalism until the level of
profits recover. The top 500 US companies recently reported their second quarter
earnings. These show that profits were up just 1% compared to the same time last
year, when they were at very low levels. In the last year over 2 million
American jobs have been lost. Unless profits improve significantly, there is no
realistic prospect of an increase in investments - the real motor-force of any
boom.
Things are no better in Europe. Most of European countries have reported
economic growth figures for the second quarter of this year. In fact, there was
almost no growth. Germany was up 0.3% and Italy was up 0.1%. Britain was best at
just 0.7%. In Japan, output is falling by 0.5-1.0% a year. Deflation remains the
order of the day with prices falling. The government is paralysed about what to
do after 12 years of recession. Even the services sector is continuing to slide
as unemployment hits post-war highs. Public debt is still relentlessly
increasing.
The economic and political chaos in Argentina continues with no sign of
escape. Now Brazil is also threatened with collapse. Similarly, despite huge
injections of IMF money, the Turkish capitalist politicians continue to
squabble, threatening to drive this key ally for the US in its so-called War on
Terror into economic depression.
World capitalism is also threatened by two bubbles. The first is the
strength of the US dollar. It has weakened a little in the last year but it will
go down further in the next period. Since the US is running a trade deficit of
$37 billion per month, the present level of the US currency is not sustainable.
At a certain point the $9 trillion of dollar assets held by foreign capitalists
will be unloaded, provoking a sharp fall in the value of the dollar. The second
great bubble still to burst is the property sector. The present price rises of
10% a year in America and 20% in Britain are not sustainable. A fall in the
housing market will have a negative effect on spending, dragging down the
economy still further.
And hanging like a black cloud over the world economy is the threat of
war in Iraq. Leaving aside the explosive political consequences, a US military
adventure in the Middle East will inevitably result in a steep increase in oil
prices. This will be the case even if the war goes well for America. If, as is
more likely, it is prolonged, it could seriously damage the world economy.
Despite the exaggerated claims of the bourgeois economists, economic
growth in the last period has been much weaker than in the immediate post-war
decades. In the US, from 1942 to 1966, the average annual real GDP growth rate
was 4.5%. From 1975 through 1999, it was only 3.2%. The average annual gain in
industrial production from 1942 to 1966 was 5.3%. From 1975 through 1999 it was
only 3.4%. At same time, consumer debt rose from 64% of annual disposable
personal income in 1966 to 97% in 1999.
The Federal Reserve, caught between fear of a world slump and fear of
inflation, has evidently decided to throw caution to the wind. The Reserve has
carried out eleven reductions in interest rates in less than twelve months - an
unprecedented situation. Interest rates in America now stand at 1.75 percent -
the lowest level since 1961. But there are limits to how far this can go - and
what it can achieve. It is clear that the rate of interest cannot be less than
zero - although, when measured against the consumer-price index, real rates of
interest are negative in the USA - a situation not seen since the Great
Depression of the 1930s.
Marx explains that credit is a means by which the capitalist system goes
beyond its normal limits. The market is artificially expanded for a time, but
only at the cost of reducing future demand, since credit must eventually be
repaid - with interest. Huge debts have been accumulated during the boom years
of the 1990s, especially in the USA. The actions of Greenspan and the Federal
Reserve in drastically cutting interest rates are panic measures, motivated by
fear of a global economic collapse. But they are not having the desired effect.
Given the overhang of debt, it will not help matters to incur new debts and
deficits. They will get the worst of all worlds if they go down this road -
ending up with a mixture of stagnation and inflation which can act as a drag on
the US economy for a long time. Furthermore, corporate earnings are in a
freefall. They are 44.9% lower than one year earlier. The last time earnings
plunged this much was in the third quarter of 1938 and the fourth quarter of
1932 (the Great Depression).

In practice they will all have high state deficits in the next period,
anyway. But this will solve nothing and only exacerbate the crisis. In 1939 they
"resolved" the contradiction through a world war. But this avenue now
seems closed to them. Under these conditions, no amount of deficit financing
will help. It will only make things worse - as the example of Japan shows.
In Japan, the interest rate is really zero, but this has had no effect,
other than to increase the public debt to an unprecedented and unsustainable
limit. And in America the high levels of private debt means that individuals and
companies will not be eager to take on new credit, even where the interest rates
are so low.

That does not mean that the bourgeois will not use Keynesian policies in
an attempt to drag themselves out of the crisis. However, the Japanese
experience shows that under present conditions Keynesian methods would not solve
the fundamental problem, but only lead to severe distortions, ending in stagflation
- a mixture of stagnation and inflation - the worst of all worlds.
In effect, Japan - once the former star performer of the world economy -
has passed from one recession to another without ever experiencing a boom. A
similar situation can be created in the USA, affecting the entire global economy
for a protracted period. Japan is now in a state of outright deflation, after
being stuck in recession for a decade. There are clear parallels with the
situation in Japan ten years ago. The decisive factor is the unprecedented level
of indebtedness that Japan inherited from the last boom in the 1980s. This has
prevented the recovery of the Japanese economy for a period of ten years. Over
the last two years the Japanese government has invested a sum of money
equivalent to the total GDP of France, to no avail.
The exact nature of the slump - its depth and duration - is difficult to
determine. But in all probability it will be the most serious since 1974, and
possibly since the Second World War. It is not excluded that it could turn into
a depression like the one that followed 1929. If the intensity of the slump and
the struggle for markets that will result from it leads to generalised
protectionism, that is even a likely perspective. But even if this is not the
case, it is probable that the USA will only get out of the slump with great
difficulty and then enter into a period of extremely low growth, like Japan
after the recession of 1990-91. The reasons are similar: the colossal hangover
of debts accumulated in the previous period. This is precisely an expression of
the fact that capitalism went beyond its normal limits in the previous period.
Despite the obvious seriousness of the situation, the bourgeois
economists persist in putting the most optimistic gloss on the picture. There is
a constant campaign in the press to keep up the spirits of investors. Every bit
of positive information is presented as light at the end of the tunnel.
Impressionable investors are deceived by this, not realising that the light
which they perceive may be that of a train coming in the opposite direction. The
violent swings of the stock exchange up and down are an indication of a general
nervousness and volatility among the stock market investors (among whom there
are always a number of gamblers willing to take a risk). This perfectly mirrors
the general situation and mood that is developing in society, and which tomorrow
will find a political expression.
However, the movements on the stock market, as is well known, do not
mirror the movement of the real economy, which is stubbornly downwards. At the
same time that Wall Street was registering a relative recovery, after the
immediate shock of September 11 and the Afghan war had worn off, Fords was
warning that losses in the fourth quarter would be four times higher than even
the earlier gloomy estimates of analysts. The Detroit company is due to make a
new restructuring plan that will undoubtedly mean more factory closures and
sackings.
There has been an avalanche of company profit warnings. Even the biggest
companies are threatened with bankruptcy. On December 2nd, 2001, Enron,
America's seventh biggest company, filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy. Its shares
collapsed from $89 to just one dollar and were already classified as "junk"
before the company went under. Since most workers held shares, thousands of
workers will lose both their jobs and retirement savings. This was followed by a
whole series of bankruptcies and scandals, including the giant WorldCom company,
that involved unprecedented financial scandals. These scandals have created a
general backlash and a questioning of the whole system of corporate capitalism
in the USA.
Overproduction
As Marx explains, the final cause of every real crisis of capitalism is
overproduction: the contradiction between the unlimited greed of the capitalists
for surplus value and the limited consuming power of the masses. The present
crisis is no exception. The massive overproduction of high-technology products,
particularly computers and memory chips, is the main cause of the crisis in the
USA and Asia. There is a limit to the amount of new technology which people can
buy. But the anarchic, unplanned nature of capitalist production takes no
account of this.
This also applies to other commodities. Overproduction in the car
industry has led to a ferocious price war, with Fords and other big companies
furiously discounting in order to get rid of their surplus products. This has
led to a temporary rise in car sales. The increase in US retail sales, which
rose by a record 7.1 percent in one month (October, 2001) was driven mainly by
car sales (26.4 percent). This is part of the "Keep America Rolling"
campaign, which offers discounts and interest-free loans. But this boom in car
sales has only been achieved at the cost of reducing future sales and cutting
profit margins to a point that is unsustainable - thus deepening the crisis of
the car industry on a world scale.
Companies are compelled to write off assets acquired during the boom,
retrench, cut costs, and sack workers, in a desperate attempt to maintain profit
margins. The same is true of debt. Big companies like Hynix Semi-conductors in
South Korea find themselves unable to sell their products and heavily in debt.
The credit which the big banks extended so merrily in the period of rapid
expansion is now being called in. Now everybody wants ready cash. This forces a
company like Hynix to merge with Micron Technology, the big US firm, in the hope
of getting access to the US market and more funds. If it goes through, this
merger will create the world's biggest memory-chip company. Thus, the process
of concentration of capital and monopolisation which reached unheard-of limits
in the boom, continues unabated during the slump.
The crisis in manufacturing inevitably affects the service sector sooner
or later. The shock of September 11 undoubtedly contributed to the crisis in
sectors like air travel, hotels and tourism. In the USA alone, over 100,000
workers were laid off in the air line industry alone. This does not express the
real depth of the crisis, since many other industries depend on the air line
sector. In Belgium the crisis of Sabena caused sharp labour conflicts.
WalMart, the big US cut-price retail chain has announced a record sales
increase of 15.5 percent in the third quarter of 2001, pushing profits up to
$1.5 billion. But this reflects the fact that more Americans are reacting to the
crisis by buying more cheaply. This tendency will further depress profit margins
in the long run, as other retailers are forced to cut prices. On the other hand,
the luxury-goods companies are suffering losses, as happens early on in every
slump.
Despite the official mythology, September 11 was not the cause of
the crisis in the service sector, which is part of the general crisis. A further
220,000 jobs were lost in businesses unrelated with airlines or tourism. Workers
clocked in fewer hours on average, and weekly earnings fell.
The dire state of the economy is reflected in a slump in advertising. The
British advertising company Cordiant Communications announced its third profit
warning in four months in December 2001 and predicted the situation would get
worse still. It announced further job losses, bringing the total to 1,100 in the
course of the year: one tenth of the workforce. Lloyds of London, the huge
insurance company, announced losses (after reinsurance) of £1.7 billion ($2.7
billion). This was $600 million more than originally forecast, and represents
the biggest loss in Lloyd's 300 year history. For the first time in years,
London has been officially declared to be in recession. This reflects a crisis
in the service sector, which is only a manifestation of the general reduction in
economic activity.

Confirmation of the seriousness of the situation can be seen in the price
of oil. Normally when there is instability and the threat of war in the Middle
East, the price of oil rises sharply because of the fear of disruption to oil
supplies. But since September 11 the price of oil has fallen well below the
preferred price of OPEC - which is between $22 and $28 a barrel. Now, despite
the efforts of OPEC to restrict production, the price of a barrel of oil dropped
to below $20, before recovering slightly. That is a measure of the fall in
global demand.
Despite the propaganda emanating from the USA to the effect that the
recession will be short, an increasing number of economists are now pessimistic
about the future. The Economist warned at the close of 2001: "Unfortunately,
the case for optimism is less than solid. There are few signs that corporate
America is nearing the end of its retrenchment. Despite the collapse in capital
spending - it fell by an annualised 12 percent in the third quarter, after an
annualised 14.6 percent drop in the second - firms still have a lot of excess
capacity and big financing gaps. The excesses of the late 1990s investment binge
will take time to work off. Meanwhile, the world environment continues to grow
greyer. Europe is stagnant, while Japan is in its fourth recession in a decade."
Protectionism
The main danger for the capitalist system is not the prospect of slump.
The boom-slump cycle has been a constant feature of capitalism for the last 200
years. They know that sooner or later, they can get out of even the deepest
slump. The real danger is the threat of the unravelling of free trade and the
rise of protectionism as a result of the slump. This is what turned the
slump of 1929-33 into a world depression which lasted until the Second World
War. The expansion of world trade has played a vital role in the last half
century, and particularly the last twenty years. It has enabled the capitalists,
partially at least and for a temporary period, to overcome the limitations of
the nation state. But the basis on which this rests is quite fragile and can
easily be destroyed, especially under conditions of world slump in which they
are all fighting for limited markets.
Already there are tensions between Europe and America over trade which
led to the breakdown of the Seattle talks. Although some issues have been
resolved, new conflicts are emerging all the time. Particularly in the USA,
protectionist tendencies are building up. America is the biggest economy in the
world and is prepared to use its muscle to gain access to foreign markets, while
protecting its own. It has benefited from lower trade barriers more than any
other country, hence its public enthusiasm for free trade. But the Republicans
in Congress (and the Democrats also) are ready to sacrifice the principle of
free trade in order to protect American agricultural and manufacturing
interests. We already see this with the introduction of protectionist measures
in relation to steel, agricultural produce, textiles, softwoods and other areas
of the US economy.
At the moment the capitalists are driving on with "free trade"
by proposing a new round of reductions in trade restrictions at the WTO meeting
in Dohar. The last Uruguay Round took a decade to achieve. This one will be
still born. The development of world recession will inevitably lead to an
increase in protectionist tendencies which will threaten the fragile structure
of world trade so carefully constructed over the past half century. This is the
main fear of the strategists of capital. They have understood what the Marxists
have long ago explained: namely, that the main motor-force of the world economy
has been the growth of world trade ("globalisation").
Even in the period of the boom there has been a tendency for the world to
fragment into rival blocs. US imperialism has created Nafta, including Canada
and Mexico, which aspires to control the whole American continent, north and
south of the Rio Grande. Europe has created the EU which strives to control
North Africa, the Balkans and Eastern Europe. In Asia, Japan has created a
weaker yen bloc. As the slump deepens, the contradictions between these rival
trading blocs will increase. The tensions between Europe and America, and
between America and Japan, will intensify under these conditions. America will
attempt to export unemployment to Europe and Japan, provoking retaliation. The
prospect opens up of trade wars and competitive devaluations which will deepen
and prolong the crisis.
The European Union
The European capitalists, only a year ago, were boasting that they would
avoid the recession. Now these boasts are shown to be hollow. Ironically, the
worst affected sector is the communications industry (mobile phones), which was
supposed to be the main motor of a new period of expansion for European
capitalism.
Vodafone, the big British mobile phone company, announced pre-tax losses
of £8.4 billion ($12 billion) in the six months to the beginning of December
2001. Profits at Siemens, the German engineering giant, fell by 76 percent to
the end of September, including restructuring charges and a write-down of assets
in its mobile and fixed-line telephone divisions. German unemployment now stands
officially at 8 percent of the workforce.
We have already dealt with the reasons why the EU was formed in earlier
documents. It is true that we underestimated the degree to which the European
capitalists could arrive at a compromise and push towards greater economic and
monetary unification. We did not think that the Euro would succeed to the degree
that it has. This was only possible on the basis of the prolonged world boom,
which benefited Europe and enabled the different capitalists to put aside their
differences (temporarily).
Now the Euro has been introduced as a common currency in 12 of the EU
states. This is an important development. A common currency is the first
condition towards European integration. It ought to boost internal trade and
thus act as a powerful stimulus to the development of the productive forces. But
the Euro has been launched at the worst possible moment. Under conditions of
world crisis, rising unemployment and a struggle for markets, the rigid
framework of the Maastricht agreement will aggravate the crisis and increase the
contradictions between the states of the EU.
The Economist drew a negative balance of the Euro's
achievements: "When the Euro was conceived a decade ago, there was much
heady talk of how it
would boost competition in Europe, of all the structural reforms it
would
promote, even of how Europe would displace America as the world's
economic
dynamo. Yet, as a recent report by the European Commission concluded,
the gap
between Europe and America in both productivity and GDP per head has
widened
rather than narrowed over the past decade. This year's theory that,
thanks to
the Euro, Europe would largely escape the effect of a global recession
has also
proved false, as its biggest economy, Germany, has shuddered to a halt.
As if to
trumpet Europe's failings, the Euro has spent most of its first three
years of
ethereal life testing new lows against the dollar." (The Economist,
1/12/2001)
The recent improvement of the euro in relation to the dollar is more a
reflection of the weakness of the latter than the strength of the
former.
Contrary to the hopes of the European bourgeois, the Euro has been a weak
currency from birth. The need to maintain its level is one of the reasons why
interest rates in Europe have not been reduced as fast as in America. This will
aggravate the crisis in Europe and increase unemployment in the coming months.
Paradoxically, the Germans, who were the most adamant in demanding strict
adherence to the Maastricht rules, are now suffering the consequences in the
shape of four million unemployed. The German economy, which ought to act as the
main motor-force for Europe, is stalled.
The stubborn refusal of Duisenberg and the European Bank to lower
interest rates has set the stage for conflict between the Bank and the European
governments. They would like to see a further fall in the Euro to boost exports
- the main reason for the relative success of the countries of the Euro zone in
the last period. But despite this success, the performance of the core
countries, especially Germany and Italy has been miserable, and their problems
will now increase. Unemployment is beginning to climb again.
One effect of the introduction of a common currency will be to increase
cross-border competition. The aim is to increase productivity by eliminating
weak companies. But this places countries like Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal
at a disadvantage. Increased competition spells more bankruptcies, factory
closures and unemployment. From this, new contradictions arise. In the past,
Italy got out of difficulties by devaluing the currency. But this is now ruled
out by the Maastricht agreement. Devaluations by nation states are not allowed,
and neither is any other state permitted to help Italy. Therefore, the full
weight of the crisis will be placed on the shoulders of the working class. The
Italian employers are already putting pressure on Berlusconi to take action. The
stage is thus being set for an explosion of the class struggle in one European
country after another.
This will lead, not to European integration, but to increased tensions
and antagonisms between the national states. In the end, it is probable that the
Euro experiment will break down amidst mutual recriminations. Already there are
indications of conflict between the states in the Euro zone, as each government
tries to protect its own capitalists against foreign competition. Of course, if
the perspective was one of uninterrupted capitalist upswing for the next 20
years, it would be possible for European capitalists to obtain further economic
integration. But this is not our perspective.
Two years ago, at the Lisbon Summit, the EU heads of government agreed to
a programme of further liberalisation with the aim of making the EU the world's
most competitive economy by 2010. What has happened? France has implemented only
minimal energy liberalisation and blocked the setting of any deadline for a
total opening-up of the market. Full competition in the postal services has been
delayed. Germany has put its boot through an EU directive on take-overs that
took 12 years to work out and then introduced new rules to protect German
owners. The Lamfalussy Plan to liberalise wholesale financial services has been
sabotaged by procedural manoeuvring in the European parliament, even though it
was unanimously endorsed in Stockholm in March. An agreement on a EU-wide patent
regime has been prevented by disagreements on language policy. And so on and so
forth.
53. What this shows is that each national government, while paying lip
service to the "ideal of European integration", is mainly concerned with the
defence of "national interests" - that is to say, the interests of its own
bourgeoisie. Thus, Germany's decision to sabotage the law on take-overs was
dictated by its desire to protect its domestic companies against foreign
take-overs - such as Vodafone's bid for Mannesmann. The French opposition to
energy liberalisation has been designed to support its state-owned giant,
Electricité de France. The French government protects its national monopoly,
which is meanwhile pursuing an aggressive policy of taking over the companies of
states with more open markets.
Behind the "European" rhetoric stands the interests and ambitions of
the most powerful European states, especially Germany and France, which seek to
dominate Europe. Only the smaller countries take the rhetoric about the European
ideal seriously, since they are too weak to stand on their own and foolishly
imagine that they can be important players on the European scene. In addition,
they have their own selfish interests to defend.
Belgium benefits from being the main seat of the "European institutions"
- which brings in a tidy sum to the national exchequer. They are therefore the
most convinced "Europeans". The weaker economies like Greece, Portugal,
Ireland and Spain are enthusiastic "Europeans" only to the extent that they
have done very well out of European subsidies. But when these are sharply
reduced or abolished, which is already happening, their enthusiasm will cool
rapidly. And that is inevitable in the next period when the economic crisis
begins to bite and Germany, which pays most of the bills, gets tired of this
role.
The truth is that the smaller states of Europe count for very little.
This was shown recently in the aftermath of September 11. Britain (a
semi-satellite of America) decided everything together with France and Germany.
The others were not even invited to dinner in London. The Italians protested
loudly. The others grumbled also: "We are being treated like candidates to
join the EU. Decisions are made and then we are just informed." But that is
just the real state of affairs. Only it is not supposed to be made public. Only
Blair's characteristic crudity made it too obvious. The recent row at Laeken
over the distribution of secondary EU institutions led to Berlusconi vetoing all
decisions. When the Swedish Prime Minister complained that his country had got
no institution, Chirac said maybe they "would like the headquarters for EU
model agencies as they had such "pretty girls"! Such is the contempt shown
for the smaller EU countries by the big Four.
A further expansion of the EU will exacerbate the problem. Does anyone
seriously believe that Germany, France and Britain will accept that they cannot
have a discussion without inviting 22 other European leaders? The German
capitalists are pushing for the entry of their client states in Eastern Europe:
Poland and the Czech Republic. France, which is opposed to this, proposes the
entry of Romania. This is yet another example of the conflict of interests
between Germany and France. In the end, it is likely that the expansion will go
ahead. But in that case, the bigger EU states will find a way of dominating the
show anyway.
The ambiguous attitude of the British bourgeoisie to Europe and the Euro
is explained by several factors. There is a sharp division between the
manufacturing sector which trades with Europe and does not want a continuation
of the high pound, and the parasitic finance sector based on the City that has
grown immensely in power in recent years. Having lost its empire and being
reduced to a second-rate power off the coast of Europe, the British ruling class
is reluctant to relinquish its dreams of being a world power, and is hesitating
between a role in Europe and that of a satellite of US imperialism. But the
weakness of the Euro and doubts about its future are undoubtedly important
factors in its calculations.
The developing crisis will intensify the contradictions between the
nation states of Europe, and particularly between Germany and France, with
Britain manoeuvring between them. But it is unlikely that the EU will break up,
because of the need to compete with the USA. The European capitalists must hang
together, for fear of hanging separately. But the dream of a united Europe on a
capitalist basis remains what Lenin said it was: a reactionary utopia.
War and the world economy
After the fall of the Berlin Wall there was a lot of talk in the West of
a "Peace Dividend". The perspective was put forward of a new world order in
which the whole world would enter a long period of peace and prosperity under
the aegis of the USA. But things worked out very differently. In fact, there was
some reduction in arms spending in the USA as a result of the disappearance of
the Soviet Union. Under Clinton, US defence outlay fell from 6.2 percent of GDP
to 3.8 percent, although in absolute terms, the US arms budget remained huge.
Now all that is bound to change. American commentators are already talking of a
probable increase by at least one percent of US GDP. Given the fact that the US
is once more in deficit, this money will have to be found at the expense of
other, less necessary, items, like schools and hospitals.
US imperialism is in the process of arming itself to the teeth. Even
before the present crisis, the United States spent every year for every American
citizen $804 on arms. France is next in line, with an annual expenditure of $642
per head on arms. Britain, which despite its total loss of economic and
industrial power, likes to pretend that it is still mighty, spends $484 - an
absurd figure for a country which long ago lost its empire and industrial
superiority. These figures reflect the real situation of the epoch in which we
now live: a period of crises, wars, revolution and counter-revolution. The
consequence of this will be a general tendency towards the militarisation of the
planet. Once again, the refrain of all governments will be "guns before butter".
Some have argued that the world will escape recession because of the huge
increase in military spending in the USA. The historical examples cited are the
Second World War, the Korean War and the Vietnam War. But in reality, such
historical parallels prove nothing. It is true that American imperialism is
using the present crisis to push through big increases in arms expenditure. This
was already its intention before September 11, but the Republicans had to
proceed cautiously for fear of opposition. Now they have what amounts to a blank
cheque.
As soon as he was elected, Bush began to beat the drum for rearmament. In
a speech he made in September 1999 - that is, before the US economy went into
recession - Bush blamed Clinton for the "weakness" of America's armed
forces and demanded a programme of re-armament: "The last seven years have
been wasted in inertia and idle talk," he declared. "Now we must shape the
future with new concepts, new strategies, new resolve." (BusinessWeek,
December 24, 2001).
Even before September 11, the Pentagon had plans to spend no less a sum
than $340 billion on 3,700 manned fighters: Lockheed Martin Corp's F-22 Raptor
and Joint Strike Fighter and Boeing's Superhornet. But these are really
antiquated toys in comparison to the new weapons of mass destruction that are
being developed all the time. BusinessWeek (December 24, 2001) reports:
"Precision-guided munitions will be a priority as well. In addition to
laser-guided bombs, which clouds can blind, the US is deploying the Joint Direct
Attack Munitions (JDAMs) which use global-positioning systems (GPS) to find
their targets in any weather." Boeing have recently created a unit to start
making unmanned combat aircraft like the Predator, which, in addition to
reconnaissance, can also fire missiles.
The disappearance of the USSR has created a new situation on a world
scale that has compelled the US military planners to develop new strategies.
Instead of an army intended to confront massive Soviet conventional forces in
Europe, they are developing smaller, more flexible forces that can be deployed
rapidly anywhere in the world, and also smaller, technologically advanced, "smart"
weapons. The development of precision-guided bombs and unmanned areal vehicles
(UAVs) has given such terrifying firepower to the USA that some defence analysts
like Alexander Saevliev of the Russian Academy of Sciences have argued that "the
character of war has changed".
However, history shows that the character of war has been constantly
changing for over 2,000 years. What is different here is not the new technology,
but the balance of forces on a world scale. The fall of the USSR has meant that
there is only one super-power. Yet despite its colossal military might, the
character of war has not fundamentally changed. In the last analysis, wars are
won or lost, not by bombing alone but by soldiers fighting on the ground. It is
an astonishing fact that a handful of men armed with knives and cardboard
cutters could inflict such terrible damage on the world's greatest super power,
and the war in Afghanistan, which is being fought with decidedly low-tech
methods (the most efficient method of transportation is the donkey) is still far
from being successfully resolved.
The defence spending policies of the USA are thus determined not mainly
by economics but by political and strategic considerations. This is not a branch
of the Fed, to be manipulated for the benefit of the economy, but an expression
of the requirements of the US military establishment and the world role of US
imperialism. Although military expenditure can assist a section of the economy
(the so-called military economic complex), and partially alleviate the crisis in
that sector, it merely diverts capital and resources from other sectors of the
economy. It will do nothing to restore the general level of corporate
profitability, without which no real economic recovery is possible. In the long
run it will have inflationary consequences and make the situation worse. In any
case, the effect will not be what some people imagine.
The present world situation is quite different to that of 1941, 1952 or
1964. In 1941, America was already coming out of recession, and the vast arms
programme of the War played a decisive effect in mopping up unemployment and
boosting production. At present, the US economy has just entered into recession
after a long boom. The perspectives for the world economy do not suggest a quick
recovery. On August 7, 1964, when Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution,
backing increased US involvement in Vietnam, the economy had already recovered
from a 10-month recession that ended in early 1961. Military spending during the
Vietnam War helped to keep this expansion going (and in the process fuelled
inflation), but did not cause the recovery.
On the other hand the scale of military spending is not at all comparable
to the situation in 1939-45. During World War Two, spending on arms in the USA
peaked in 1944, when it accounted for an incredible 60-70 percent of America's
pre-war GDP. At the peak of the Korean War in 1952, US military spending
accounted for 11 percent of America's GDP. At the peak of the Vietnam War, it
stood at 2 percent of GDP. But during the Gulf War ten years ago, it was only
0.3 percent of US GDP, and most economists agree that this expenditure played
little or no role in the economic recovery that started one year later, which,
in any case, had an extremely sluggish character.
On August 7, 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the US economy fell into an
eight month recession. The USA was badly affected by rising oil prices, and the
modest and temporary increase in military spending was not enough to provide a
serious boost to the economy. Only the stimulus provided by the rest of the
world, particularly the Asian "tigers" which were then experiencing rapid
growth, prevented the recession from turning into a depression. Robert J. Barro,
writing in the BusinessWeek (5/11/01) comments: "The analysis from the
other three wars suggests that little of the recovery stemmed from the Gulf War."
The situation now is more similar to that of ten years ago than to the
cases of World War Two, Vietnam or Korea. Except that the world economic context
is far worse. Already before September 11, it was clear that the United States
was enduring a sharp downturn, and that the longest period of expansion in
history had already come to an end. The attack on the World Trade Centre merely
acted as a catalyst to accelerate and exacerbate these recessionary tendencies.
The present "war against terrorism" is a most peculiar kind of "war".
Whereas the Second World War, and to a lesser degree the Korean and Vietnam
wars, involved the destruction of a lot of tanks and other equipment that had to
be replaced, the only items that have so far been used up in Afghanistan are
bombs. This is not likely to act as much of a stimulus to production, even in
military terms. And certainly not enough to offset the effects of a general
world crisis of overproduction. The measures taken by Bush may look spectacular
on paper, but fall far short of the massive sums pumped into the US economy by
general mobilisation in 1941, and will not even reach the level of the Vietnam
War.
The results will be correspondingly limited. In the words of Harvard
university economics professor N. Gregory Mankiw, quoted by the Moscow Times
(October 10, 2001): "My guess is that this is not going to be all that similar
to previous wartime economies. Unless the fiscal stimulus ends up being a lot
bigger than I expect, the differences will be greater than the similarities to
the past."
World relations
The long period of economic upswing, together with the division of the
world between US imperialism and the USSR, provided the material basis for this
relative stability in world relations. The reason why they could get this
so-called peace was because the balance of terror between mighty Stalinist
Russia on the one hand and mighty American imperialism on the other. But now
everything has changed. The emergence of US imperialism as the sole major world
power has created an unprecedented world situation.
As we have explained in previous documents a new balance of forces has
been developing over the past decade. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union
the two super powers, the USA and the USSR balanced each other out and this
provided a relative stability to the world situation. There could have been no
question of the USA daring to attack Iraq or bomb Yugoslavia. The disappearance
of the Soviet Union as a super power has allowed the United States to emerge as
the sole world power and given it the confidence to develop a more aggressive
foreign policy.
Now this imperialist arrogance has been increased to the nth degree. The
war in Afghanistan represents a new twist in the world crisis of capitalism. The
chief concern of US imperialism is to use the terrorist outrage in America as a
pretext for strengthening its position on a world scale. This involves a
reminder to the world of its military power. After the attack on Afghanistan
will come other "reprisals" against Iraq, and maybe Sudan and Somalia.
America is the mightiest imperialist power in world history. It holds in
its hands the most diabolical and sophisticated means of destruction. Yet it
stands on feet of clay. After September 11, US imperialism blundered into a war
with no clear strategy or aim. Of course, the most fundamental questions are
determined by objective factors and broad historical processes, not individual
personalities. However, in wars and revolutions, the role of the individual (the
leadership) is by no means unimportant. It can, and does, exert a powerful
influence in the short term, producing all kinds of distortions and
cross-currents that affect the context in which the class struggle unfolds. At
the present moment, the leadership of the most powerful country on earth is the
most stupid and short-sighted in history. Bush intended to display the might of
American imperialism, but has only succeeded in aggravating all the
contradictions. In reality what the Afghan adventure showed was the limitations
of American power.
It is always impossible to calculate accurately the bloody equation of war
and to predict precisely the outcome. Trotsky thought that the Second World War
would be over quickly. But war has its own logic which is impossible to
determine beforehand. The same is true of the war in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan
- despite all their military might - the American imperialists are in a no-win
situation. Even if they achieve their formally declared war aims, they will
ultimately lose, because by their actions they have destabilised the whole
region and other parts of the world. |