Introduction
Lev Davidovich Trotsky was, alongside Lenin, one of the two greatest Marxists of the
twentieth century. His whole life was entirely devoted to the cause of the working class
and international socialism. And what a life! From his earliest youth, when he worked
through the night producing illegal strike leaflets which earned him his first spell in
prison and Siberian exile, until he was finally struck down by one of Stalin’s agents
in August 1940, he toiled ceaselessly for the revolutionary movement. In the first Russian
Revolution of 1905, he was the chairman of the Petersburg Soviet. Sentenced once again to
Siberian exile, he again escaped and continued his revolutionary activity from exile.
During the First World War, Trotsky adopted a consistent internationalist position. He was
the author of the Zimmerwald Manifesto which attempted to unite the revolutionary
opponents of the War. In 1917, he played a leading role as the organiser of the
insurrection in Petrograd.
After the October Revolution Trotsky was the first Commissar for Foreign Affairs and
was in charge of the negotiations with the Germans at Brest Litovsk. During the bloody
Civil War when Soviet Russia was invaded by 21 foreign armies of intervention, and when
the survival of the Revolution was in the balance, Trotsky organised the Red Army and
personally led the fight against the counterrevolutionary White armies, travelling
thousands of kilometres in the famous armoured train. Trotsky remained Commissar for War
until 1925. “Show me another man”, he (Lenin) said, thumping the table
“capable of organising in a year an almost exemplary army and moreover of winning the
esteem of the military specialists.” These lines reproduced in Gorky’s memoirs
accurately show the attitude of Lenin to Trotsky at this time.
Trotsky’s role in consolidating the first Workers’ State in the world was not
confined to the Red Army. He also played the leading role, together with Lenin, in the
building of the Third International, for the first four congresses of which Trotsky wrote
the Manifestos and many of the most important policy statements; the period of economic
reconstruction in which Trotsky reorganised the shattered railway systems of the USSR. In
addition, Trotsky, always a prolific writer, found time to write penetrating studies, not
just on political questions but on art and literature (Literature and Revolution)
and even on the problems faced by people in everyday life in the transitional period (Problems
of Everyday Life).
After Lenin’s death in 1924, Trotsky led the struggle against the bureaucratic
degeneration of the Soviet State—a fight that Lenin had already begun from his
death-bed. In the process of the struggle, Trotsky was the first to advocate the idea of
five-year plans, which was opposed by Stalin and his followers. Thereafter, Trotsky alone
continued to defend the revolutionary, democratic and international traditions of October.
He alone provided a scientific Marxist analysis of the bureaucratic degeneration of the
Russian Revolution in works like The Revolution Betrayed, In Defence of Marxism and
Stalin. His writings of the period 1930-40 provide us with a veritable
treasure-house of Marxist theory, dealing not only with the immediate problems of the
international labour movement (the Chinese revolution, the rise of Hitler in Germany, the
Spanish Civil War), but of all manner of artistic, philosophical and cultural questions.
This is more than enough for several lifetimes! Yet, if one were to examine the life of
Trotsky objectively, one would be compelled to agree with the appraisal which he himself
made of it. That is to say, despite all the extraordinary achievements of Trotsky, the
most important period of his life was its last ten years. Here one can say with absolute
certainty that he fulfilled a task which nobody else could have fulfilled—namely, the
fight to defend the ideas of Bolshevism and the spotless tradition of October in the teeth
of the Stalinist counterrevolution. Here was Trotsky’s greatest and most
indispensable contribution to Marxism and the world working class movement. It is an
achievement upon which we are building to this day. The present article does not pretend
to be an exhaustive account of Trotsky’s life and work. For that, not an article but
several volumes would be needed. But if this very insufficient outline serves to encourage
the new generation to read Trotsky’s writings for themselves, my purpose will have
been achieved.
The Early Beginnings
On 26th August 1879, just a few months before the birth of Trotsky, a small group of
revolutionaries, members of the underground terrorist organisation Narodnaya Volya,
announced the death sentence for the Russian Tsar, Alexander II. Thus began a period of
heroic struggles of a handful of youths against the whole of the state apparatus which was
to culminate on 1st March 1881 with the assassination of the Tsar. These students and
young intellectuals hated tyranny and were prepared to give their lives for the
emancipation of the working class, but they believed that all that was needed to
“provoke” mass mobilisations was the “propaganda of the accomplished
fact”. In reality, they attempted to substitute the bomb and the machine gun for the
conscious movement of the working class.
The Russian terrorists actually succeeded in assassinating the tsar. In spite of all
this, all the efforts of the terrorists led to nothing. Far from strengthening the mass
movement, the acts of terrorism had the opposite effect of strengthening the repressive
apparatus of the state, isolating and demoralising the revolutionary cadres and, in the
end, leading to the complete destruction of the Narodnaya Volya organisation. The
mistake of the “Populists” lay in a lack of understanding of the fundamental
processes of the Russian revolution. In the absence of a strong proletariat, the
terrorists looked for another social layer on which to base the socialist revolution. They
imagined that they had found this in the peasantry. Marx and Engels explained that the
only class which can carry out the socialist transformation of society is the proletariat.
In a backward semi-feudal society like tsarist Russia the peasantry will play an important
role as an auxiliary of the working class, but cannot substitute itself for it.
To begin with, the majority of youth in Russia in the 1880s were not attracted to the
ideas of Marxism. They had no time for “theory”: they demanded action. With no
understanding of the need to win over the working class by patiently explaining, they took
up arms to destroy Tsarism through individual struggle. Lenin’s elder brother was a
terrorist. Trotsky started his political life in a populist group and probably Lenin also
got involved in the same way. However, populism was already in a process of decline. By
the 1890s what had been an atmosphere permeated with heroism had become one of depression,
discontent and pessimism among the circles of intellectuals. And in the meantime, the
labour movement had entered the scene of history with the impressive strike wave of the
1890s. Within a few years, the superiority of the Marxist “theoreticians”
compared to the “practical” individual terrorists had been proved by experience
itself with the spectacular growth in the influence of Marxism in the working class.
Beginning first with small Marxist circles and discussion groups, the new movement
became more and more popular among the workers. Among the young activists of the new
generation of revolutionaries, was the young Lev Davidovich Bronstein, who began his
revolutionary career in March 1897, in Nikolaev, where he organised the first illegal
workers’ organisation, the South Russian Workers’ Union. Lev Davidovich was
arrested for the first time when he was only 19 years old and spent two and a half years
in prison, after which he was exiled to Siberia. But he soon escaped and, using a false
passport, succeeded in getting out of Russia and joining Lenin in London. In one of those
ironies in which history is so rich, the name on the passport was Trotsky, the name of one
of the gaolers which Lev Davidovich has chosen at random and was later to gain world-wide
fame.
Trotsky and Iskra
The young Social Democratic movement was still scattered and almost without any
organisation. The task of organising and uniting the numerous local Social Democratic
groups inside Russia was taken up by Lenin together with Plekhanov’s exiled
“Emancipation of Labour Group”. With Plekhanov’s backing Lenin launched a
new paper, the Iskra, which played the key role in organising and uniting the
genuine Marxist tendency. All the work of producing and distributing the paper and
maintaining a voluminous correspondence with Russia was carried out by Lenin and his
indefatigable companion Nadyezhda Krupskaya. Despite all the obstacles, they managed to
smuggle Iskra into Russia clandestinely, where it made an enormous impact. Very
quickly the genuine Marxists united around the Iskra, which by 1903 had already
become the majority tendency in the Russian Social Democracy.
In 1902 Trotsky turned up on Lenin’s doorstep in London, where he joined the staff
at Iskra, working closely with Lenin. Although the young revolutionary, who
had just arrived from Russia, was not aware of it, relations on the Editorial Board were
already tense. There were constant clashes between Lenin and Plekhanov over a series of
political and organisational questions. The truth of the matter was that the old activists
of the “Emancipation of Labour Group” had been seriously affected by the long
period of exile, when their work had been limited to that of propaganda on the fringes of
the Russian labour movement. It was a small group of intellectuals, who were undoubtedly
sincere in their revolutionary ideas, but who suffered from all the vices of exile and
small circles of intellectuals. At times, their methods of work were more those of a
discussion club, or of a circle of personal friends, than those of a revolutionary party
whose aim was that of taking power.
Lenin, who practically did the most important part of this work, with the help of
Krupskaya, struggled against these tendencies, but with very little results. He had placed
all his hopes in the calling of a Party Congress, in which the working class rank and file
would have put order “in their own house”. He placed a lot of hope on Trotsky
whose writing skills had earned him the nickname “Pero”—the Pen. In
the earliest edition of her Memoirs of Lenin, Krupskaya underlines the high opinion Lenin
had of the “Young Eagle”
Lenin was desperately looking for a capable young comrade from Russia to co-opt onto
the Editorial Board in order to break the deadlock with the old editors. The appearance of
Trotsky, recently escaped from Siberia, was eagerly seized upon by Lenin in order to make
the change. Trotsky, then only 22 years old, had already made a name for himself as a
Marxist writer, hence his party name Pero (the Pen). In the earliest editions of her
memoirs of Lenin, Krupskaya gives an honest description of Lenin's enthusiastic attitude
to Trotsky. Since these lines have been cut out of all subsequent editions, we quote them
here in full:
"Both the hearty recommendations of the 'young eagle' and this first conversation
made Vladimir Ilyich pay particular attention to the new-comer. He talked with him a great
deal and went on walks with him.
"Vladimir Ilyich questioned him as to his visit to the Yuzhny Rabochii [the Southern
Worker, which adopted a vacillating position between Iskra and its opponents].
He was well pleased with the definite manner in which Trotsky formulated the position. He
liked the way Trotsky was able immediately to grasp the very substance of the differences
and to perceive through the layers of well-meaning statements their desire, under the
guise of a popular paper, to preserve the autonomy of their own little group.
"Meanwhile, the call came from Russia with increased insistence for Trotsky to be
sent back. Vladimir Ilyich wanted him to remain abroad and to help in the work of Iskra.
"Plekhanov immediately looked on Trotsky with suspicion: he saw in him a supporter
of the younger section of the Iskra editorial board (Lenin, Martov, Potresov), and a pupil
of Lenin. When Vladimir Ilyich sent Plekhanov an article of Trotsky's, he replied: 'I
don't like the pen of your Pen.' 'The style is merely a matter of acquisition,' replied
Vladimir Ilyich, 'but the man is capable of learning and will be very useful'."
In March 1903, Lenin formally requested the inclusion of Trotsky as a seventh member of
the Editorial Board. In a letter to Plekhanov, he wrote: "I am submitting to all
members of the Editorial Board a proposal to co-opt
"Pero" as a full member of the Board. (I believe that for co-option not a
majority but a unanimous decision is needed.)
"We are very much in need of a seventh member both because it would simplify
voting (six being an even number) and reinforce the Board.
"'Pero' has been writing in every issue for several months now. In general he is
working for Iskra most energetically, delivering lectures (and with tremendous success)
etc. For our department of topical articles and items he will be not only very useful
but quite indispensable. He is unquestionably a man of more than average ability,
convinced, energetic, and promising. And he could do a good deal in the sphere of
translation and popular literature.
"We must draw in young forces: this will encourage them and prompt them to regard
themselves as professional writers. And that we have too few of such is clear-witness 1)
the difficulty of finding editors of translations; 2) the shortage of articles reviewing
the internal situation, and 3) the shortage of popular literature. It is in the sphere of
popular literature that 'Pero' would like to try his hand.
"Possible arguments against: 1) his youth; 2) his early (perhaps) return to
Russia; 3) a pen (without quotation marks) with traces of feuilleton style, too
pretentious, etc.
"Ad 1) 'Pero' is suggested not for an independent post, but for the Board. In it
he will gain experience. He undoubtedly has the 'intuition' of a Party man, a man of
our trend; as for knowledge and experience these can be acquired. That he is hardworking
is likewise unquestionable. It is necessary to co-opt him so as finally to draw him in
and encourage him…"
However, Plekhanov, guessing that Trotsky would support Lenin, placing him in a
minority, angrily vetoed the proposal.
"Soon after," adds Krupskaya, "Trotsky went to Paris, where he began to
advance with remarkable success."
These lines by Lenin's lifelong companion are all the more remarkable for having been
written in 1930, when Trotsky was expelled from the Party, living in exile in Turkey and
under a total ban inside the Soviet Union. Only the fact that Krupskaya was Lenin's widow
saved her from Stalin's wrath, at least for the time being. Later on she was forced by
intolerable pressure to bow her head and accept, passively, the distortion of the
historical record, though to the end she steadfastly refused to join in the chorus of
glorification of Stalin, who, in the pages of her biography, plays a minimal role-which,
in truth, reflects the real situation. Unfortunately, this early collaboration between
Lenin and Trotskywas brought to an abrupt halt by the split at the Second Congress of the
Russian Social Democratic Labour Party.
The Second Congress
A lot of nonsense has been written about the famous Second Congress of the Russian
Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) without any of it explaining the reasons for the
split. Every revolutionary party has to go through a fairly long stage of propaganda work
and cadre building. This period, inevitably brings about a series of habits and ways of
thinking which, over a period of time, can become an obstacle to transforming the party
into a mass party. If the party proves incapable of changing these methods, when the
objective situation changes, then it becomes an ossified sect.
At the Second Congress the struggle between the two wings of the Iskra group,
which caught everyone by surprise, including those who were directly involved, was due to
the incompatibility between Lenin’s position, which was that of consolidating a
revolutionary mass party with some degree of discipline and efficiency, and that of the
members of the old “Emancipation of Labour Group”, who felt comfortable in their
routine, saw no need for any changes and who put down Lenin’s position to questions
of personality, a desire to be in the limelight, “bonapartist tendencies”,
“ultra-centralism” and all the rest of it.
Generally speaking it is a law of history that petit-bourgeois tendencies are
organically incapable of separating political questions from personal questions. Thus,
when Lenin, for entirely justified reasons, proposed removing Axelrod, Zasulich and
Potresov from the Editorial Board of Iskra, they took it as a personal insult and caused a
scandal. Unfortunately, the “old” activists managed to impress Trotsky, who,
being young and impressionable, did not understand the situation and accepted at face
value the accusations that were being made by Zasulich, Axelrod and the others. The
so-called “soft” tendency represented by Martov emerged as a minority and after
the Conference refused to abide by its decisions or to take part in the Central Committee
or the Editorial Board. All Lenin’s efforts to find a compromise solution after the
Congress failed because of the opposition of the minority. Plekhanov, who at the Congress
had supported Lenin, proved incapable of standing up to the pressures of his old comrades
and friends. In the end, in early 1904, Lenin found that he had to organise “majority
Committees” (Bolsheviks) to salvage something from the wreckage of the Congress. The
split in the party had become an accomplished fact.
Initially Trotsky had supported the minority against Lenin. This has led to the false
account that Trotsky was a “Menshevik”. However, at the Second Congress,
Bolshevism and Menshevism had not yet emerged as clearly defined political tendencies.
Only a year later, in 1904, did political differences begin to emerge between the two
tendencies, and these differences had nothing whatsoever to do with the question of
“centralism” or “no centralism”. They were about the key question
facing the Revolution: collaboration with the liberal bourgeoisie or class independence.
As soon as the political differences emerged, Trotsky broke with the Mensheviks and
remained formally independent from both factions until 1917.
Trotsky in 1905
On the eve of the Russo-Japanese war, the whole country was in a pre-revolutionary
ferment. A strike wave was followed by student demonstrations. The ferment affected the
bourgeois liberals who launched a campaign of banquets, based on the “Zemstvos”,
local committees in the countryside which served as a platform for the liberals. The
question arose as to what should be the position of the Marxists towards the
liberals’ campaign. The Mensheviks were in favour of total support for the liberals.
The Bolsheviks were radically opposed to any kind of support for the liberals and came out
with strong criticism of their press exposing them in the eyes of the working class.
Trotsky had the same position as the Bolsheviks, which led him to break with the
Mensheviks. As of that moment, up to 1917, Trotsky remained organisationally separate from
both tendencies, although on all political questions he was always much closer to the
Bolsheviks than to the Mensheviks.
The revolutionary situation was maturing rapidly. The military defeats of the Tsarist
army added to the growing discontent which erupted during the 9th January 1905
demonstration in St. Petersburg, which was brutally put down. Thus began the 1905
revolution in which Trotsky played an outstanding role. What role did Trotsky play in the
1905 Revolution, and in what relation did he stand to Lenin, and the Bolsheviks?
Lunacharsky, who at that time was one of Lenin’s right hand men, writes in his
memoirs: “I must say that of all the Social-Democratic leaders of 1905-06 Trotsky
undoubtedly showed himself, despite his youth, to be the best prepared. Less than any of
them did he bear the stamp of a certain kind of ÈmigrÈ narrowness of outlook. Trotsky
understood better than all the others what it meant to conduct the political struggle on a
broad national scale. He emerged from the revolution having acquired an enormous degree of
popularity, whereas neither Lenin nor Martov had effectively gained any at all. Plekhanov
had lost a great deal, thanks to his display of quasi-Cadet [i.e. liberal] tendencies.
Trotsky stood then in the very front rank.” (Lunacharsky, Revolutionary
Silhouettes, p. 61.)
This is not the place to analyse the 1905 revolution in detail. One of the best books
on this question is Trotsky’s 1905, a classical work of Marxism, the value of
which is enhanced by the fact that it was written by one of the most outstanding leaders
of that revolution. (Also see Alan Woods’ recent publication, Bolshevism—the
Road to Revolution )
Still only 26 years of age, Trotsky was the chairman of the Petersburg Soviet of
Workers’ Deputies, the foremost of those bodies which Lenin described as
“embryonic organs of revolutionary power”. Most of the manifestos and
resolutions of the Soviet were the work of Trotsky, who also edited its journal Izvestia.
On major occasions he spoke both for the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks and for the Soviet as a
whole. The Bolsheviks, in Petersburg, had failed to appreciate the importance of the
Soviet, and were weakly represented in it. Lenin, from exile in Sweden, wrote to the
Bolshevik journal Novaya Zhizn, urging the Bolsheviks to take a more positive
attitude to the Soviet, but the letter was not printed, and only saw the light of day,
thirty-four years later. This situation was to be reproduced at every major juncture in
the history of the Russian revolution; the confusion and vacillation of the Party leaders
inside Russia, when faced with the need for a bold initiative, without the guiding hand of
Lenin.
In 1905, Trotsky took over the journal Russkaya Gazeta and transformed it into
the popular revolutionary paper Nachalo, which had a mass circulation, to put over
his views on the revolution, which were close to those of the Bolsheviks and in direct
opposition to Menshevism. It was natural that, in spite of the acrimonious dispute at the
Second Congress, the work of the Bolsheviks and Trotsky in the revolution should coincide.
Thus, Trotsky’s Nachalo and the Bolshevik Novaya Zhizn, edited by
Lenin, worked in solidarity, supporting each other against the attacks of the reaction,
without waging polemics against each other. The Bolshevik journal greeted the first number
of Nachalo thus:
“The first number of the Nachalo has come out. We welcome a comrade in the
struggle. The first issue is notable for the brilliant description of the October strike
written by Comrade Trotsky.”
Lunacharsky recalls that when someone told Lenin about Trotsky’s success in the
Soviet, Lenin’s face darkened for a moment. Then he said: “Well, Comrade Trotsky
has earned it by his tireless and impressive work.” In later years, Lenin more than
once wrote positively about Trotsky’s Nachalo in 1905.
As Chairman of the famous St. Petersburg soviet, Trotsky was arrested together with the
other members of the soviet and exiled once more to Siberia after the defeat of the
revolution. From the accused bench, Trotsky delivered a rousing speech from the dock which
turned into an indictment of the tsarist regime. He was finally sentenced to
“perpetual deportation” but in fact remained in Siberia for only eight days
before escaping. In 1906 he again went into exile, this time to Austria, where he
continued his revolutionary activity, launching a paper from Vienna called Pravda.
With its simple and attractive style, Trotsky’s Pravda soon achieved a
popularity which no other Social Democratic publication could match at the time.
The years of reaction following the defeat, were probably the most difficult period in
the history of the Russian labour movement. The masses were exhausted after the struggle.
The intellectuals were demoralised. There was a generalised mood of discouragement,
pessimism and even of desperation. There were many cases of suicide. On the other hand, in
this generalised reactionary situation, mystical and religious ideas spread like a black
cloud over the intellectual circles, finding an echo inside the labour movement in a
series of attempts to revise the philosophical ideas of Marxism. In these difficult years,
Lenin dedicated himself to an implacable struggle against revisionism, for the defence of
Marxist theory and principles. But it was Trotsky who provided the necessary theoretical
basis upon which the Russian revolution could resurrect itself from the defeat of 1905 and
go on to victory.
The Permanent Revolution
The experience of the 1905 Revolution brought out sharply the differences between
Bolshevism and Menshevism—that is, the difference between reformism and revolution,
between class collaboration and Marxism. The crux of the matter was the attitude of the
revolutionary movement to the bourgeoisie and the so-called “liberal” parties.
It was on this issue that Trotsky broke with the Mensheviks in 1904. Like Lenin, Trotsky
poured scorn on the class collaborationism of Dan, Plekhanov and others, and pointed to
the proletariat and peasantry as the only forces capable of carrying through the
revolution to the end.
Even before 1905, during the discussions on the question of class alliances, Trotsky
had developed the general lines of the Theory of the Permanent Revolution, one of the most
brilliant contributions to Marxist theory. What did this theory consist of? The Mensheviks
argued that the Russian revolution would be of a bourgeois-democratic nature and thus the
working class could not aspire to taking power, but would have to support the liberal
bourgeoisie. With this mechanical way of thinking, the Mensheviks were making a parody of
the ideas of Marx on the development of society. The Menshevik theory of
“stages” put off the socialist revolution to the distant future. In the meantime
the working class was to behave as an appendix to the “liberal” bourgeoisie.
This is the same reformist theory which many years later was to lead to the defeat of the
working class in China in 1927, in Spain in 1936-39, in Indonesia in 1965 and in Chile in
1973.
Already in 1848, Marx noted that the German bourgeois “revolutionary
democracy” was unable to play a revolutionary role in the struggle against feudalism,
with which it preferred to do a deal out of fear of the revolutionary movement of the
workers. It was at this point that Marx himself first advanced the slogan of
“Permanent Revolution”. Following in the footsteps of Marx, who had described
the bourgeois “democratic party” as “far more dangerous to the workers than
the previous liberals”, Lenin explained that the Russian bourgeoisie, far from being
an ally of the workers, would inevitably side with the counterrevolution.
“The bourgeoisie in the mass,” he wrote in 1905, “will inevitably turn
towards the counter-revolution, towards the autocracy, against the revolution, and against
the people, as soon as its narrow, selfish interests are met, as soon as it
‘recoils’ from consistent democracy (and it is already recoiling from
it!).” (Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 9, p. 98.)
What class, in Lenin’s view, could lead the bourgeois-democratic revolution?
“There remains ‘the people’, that is the proletariat and the peasantry.
The proletariat alone can be relied on to march on to the end, for it goes far beyond the
democratic revolution. That is why the proletariat fights in the forefront for a republic
and contemptuously rejects stupid and unworthy advice to take into account the possibility
of the bourgeoisie recoiling.” (Ibid.)
Whom are these words directed against? Trotsky and the Permanent Revolution? Let us see
what Trotsky was writing at the same time as Lenin: “This results in the fact that
the struggle for the interests of all Russia has fallen to the lot of the only
now existing strong class in the country, the industrial proletariat. For this
reason the industrial proletariat has tremendous political importance, and for this reason
the struggle for the emancipation of Russia from the incubus of absolutism which is
stifling it has become converted into a single combat between absolutism and the
industrial proletariat a single combat in which the peasants may render considerable
support but cannot play a leading role.” (Trotsky, Results and Prospects, p.
198.)
Again: “Arming the revolution, in Russia, means first and foremost arming the
workers. Knowing this, and fearing this, the liberals altogether eschew a militia. They
even surrender their position to absolutism without a fight just as the bourgeois Thiers
surrendered Paris and France to Bismarck simply to avoid arming the workers.” (Ibid.,
p. 193.)
On the question of the attitude to the bourgeois parties the ideas of Lenin and Trotsky
were in complete solidarity as against the Mensheviks who hid behind the bourgeois nature
of the revolution as a cloak for the subordination of the workers’ party to the
bourgeoisie. Arguing against class collaboration, both Lenin and Trotsky explained that only
the working class, in alliance with the peasant masses, could carry out the tasks of the
bourgeois-democratic revolution.
But how was it possible for the workers to come to power in a backward, semi-feudal
country like tsarist Russia? Trotsky answered this argument in the following manner:
“It is possible [wrote Trotsky in 1905] for the workers to come to power in an
economically backward country sooner than in an advanced country…In our view, the
Russian revolution will create conditions in which power can pass into the hands of the
workers…and in the event of the victory of the revolution it must do so…before
the politicians of bourgeois liberalism get the chance to display to the full their
talents for governing.” (Trotsky, Results and Prospects, p. 195.)
Did this mean, as the Stalinists later claimed, that Trotsky denied the bourgeois
nature of the revolution? Trotsky himself explains: “In the revolution at the
beginning of the twentieth century, the direct objective tasks of which are also
bourgeois, there emerges as a near prospect the inevitable, or at least the probable,
political domination of the proletariat. The proletariat itself will see to it that this
domination does not become a mere passing ‘episode’, as some realist philistines
hope. But we can even now ask ourselves: is it inevitable that the proletarian
dictatorship should be shattered against the barriers of the bourgeois revolution? Or is
it possible in the given world-historical conditions, that it may discover before
it the prospect of breaking through these barriers? Here we are confronted by questions of
tactics: should we consciously work towards a working-class government in proportion as
the development of the revolution brings this stage nearer, or must we at that moment
regard political power as a misfortune which the bourgeois revolution is ready to thrust
upon the workers, and which it would be better to avoid?” (Trotsky, Results
and Prospects, pp. 199-200, our emphasis.)
In 1905 Trotsky alone was prepared to defend the idea that it was possible that the
socialist revolution would triumph in Russia before it did in Western Europe. Lenin still
had an unclear position. In general, Trotsky’s position was very close to that of the
Bolsheviks, as Lenin himself was later to admit. However, in 1905 only Trotsky was
prepared to pose the need for the socialist revolution in Russia in such a clear and bold
manner. Twelve years later history was to prove him right.
Reunification
In the period of revolutionary upswing, the two wings of the movement had united once
again. But unity had been more formal than real. But with the new lull in the movement,
the tendency of the Mensheviks towards opportunism re-emerged once more, finding a clear
echo in Plekhanov’s famous statement: “The workers should not have taken up
arms.” The differences between the two tendencies once more emerged sharply. And
again Trotsky found himself in a political position very similar to that of the
Bolsheviks.
The real difference between Lenin and Trotsky in this period was not over politics but
over Trotsky’s “conciliationist” tendency. To use an unkind expression,
Trotsky was a “unity-monger”. However, he was by no means alone in this. Trotsky
had consistently advocated reunification in his journal Nachalo, and had attempted
to remain apart from the factional struggle, but was arrested and imprisoned for his role
in the Soviet before the Fourth (Unity) Congress took place in Stockholm. The
progress of the revolution had given a tremendous impulse to the movement for the
reunification of the forces of Russian Marxism. Bolshevik and Menshevik workers fought
shoulder to shoulder under the same slogans; rival Party committees merged spontaneously.
The revolution pushed the workers of both factions together.
Throughout the latter half of 1905 there had been a continuous and spontaneous process
of unity from below. Without waiting for a lead from the top, Bolshevik and Menshevik
Party organisations simply merged. This fact partly expressed the workers’ natural
instinct for unity, but also the fact, as we have already seen, that the Menshevik leaders
had been pushed to the left by pressure from their own rank and file. Finally, at the
suggestion of the Bolshevik Central Committee, including Lenin, moves were set afoot to
bring about reunification. By December 1905 the two leaderships had effectively re-united.
There was now one united Central Committee.
The Unity Congress was convened in May 1906 in Stockholm, but already by this time the
revolutionary wave was ebbing, and with it, the fighting spirit and “Left”
speeches of the Mensheviks. A conflict was
inevitable between the consistent revolutionaries and those who were already abandoning
the masses and accommodating themselves to the reaction. The defeat of the Moscow
insurrection in December marked the beginning of the end of the 1905 Revolution. The
December events also marked a decisive shift in the attitude of the so-called
“liberals”. The bourgeoisie to a man (and woman) united in opposition to
December “madness”. In point of fact, the Liberals had already passed over to
reaction in October, after the tsar had conceded a new constitution. But now they emerged
in their true colours. It was, of course, not the first time in history that we have seen
such a phenomenon. Exactly the same thing occurred in the 1848 revolution, as Marx and
Engels explained.
In effect, the Mensheviks stood for capitulation to the Liberal bourgeoisie which in
practice had gone overt to constitutional Monarchism and surrendered to the autocracy. The
essence of Lenin’s difference with the Mensheviks was precisely this: “The right
wing of our party does not believe in the complete victory of the present, i.e. bourgeois
democratic revolution in Russia; it dreads such a victory; it does not emphatically and
definitely put the slogan of such a victory before the people. It is consistently being
misled by the essentially erroneous idea which is really a vulgarisation of Marxism, that
only the bourgeoisie can independently “make” the bourgeois revolution, or that
only the bourgeoisie should lead the bourgeois revolution. The role of the proletariat as
the vanguard in the struggle for the complete and decisive victory of the bourgeois
revolution is not clear to the Right Social Democrats.” (Lenin, Collected Works,
vol. 10, pp. 377-8.)
Like Trotsky, Lenin was in favour of organisational unity, but did not for a moment
abandon the ideological struggle, maintaining a firm position on all on basic questions of
tactics and perspectives. In practice, while the Party was formally united, from the
outset it was divided into two opposing tendencies—the revolutionary and the
opportunist wings. Reformism or revolution, class collaboration or an independent
proletarian policy. These were the basic questions which separated Bolshevism from
Menshevism. The basic differences immediately emerged over the attitude to the Duma and to
the bourgeois parties. On these fundamental questions, the position of Lenin and Trotsky
was identical—as Lenin himself pointed out at the Fifth (London) Congress of the
RSDLP (1907). In the course of the debate on the attitude to the bourgeois parties, Lenin
commented:
“Trotsky expressed, in print [his agreement with the view] about the economic
community of interests between the proletariat and the peasantry in the present revolution
in Russia. Trotsky acknowledged the permissibility and usefulness of a Left bloc against
the liberal bourgeoisie. These facts are sufficient for me to acknowledge that Trotsky has
come closer to our views… [thus] we have here solidarity on fundamental points in the
question of the attitude towards bourgeois parties.” (Lenin, Collected Works,
vol. 12, p. 470, Lawrence and Wishart 1962 edition.)
Proceeding from a different standpoint, Trotsky was fighting for the same thing as
Lenin. His paper Pravda based in Vienna enjoyed a great deal of popularity. A
number of Bolshevik leaders favoured using Pravda for the purpose of bringing about
a fusion of Bolsheviks and Pro-Party Mensheviks. In this Paris meeting, Kamenev and
Zinoviev, now Lenin’s closest collaborators proposed the closing down of Proletary
and moved that Pravda should be accepted as the official organ of the Central
Committee of the RSDLP. This position was also supported by others like Tomsky. The
proposal was, in effect, passed against the opposition of Lenin, who counter-proposed the
setting up of a popular Bolshevik paper and monthly theoretical journal. In the end, a
compromise was reached whereby Proletary would still come out, but not more than
one a month. Meanwhile it was agreed to enter into negotiations with Trotsky with a view
to making the Vienna Pravda the official organ of the RSDLP CC. This incident shows
the strength of the conciliationist tendencies in the ranks of the Bolsheviks, and also
tells us quite a lot about the attitude of the Bolsheviks towards Trotsky in this period.
Trotsky’s fundamental error in this period, as we have pointed out, lay in his
“conciliationism”—the idea of the possibility of unity between Bolsheviks
and Mensheviks. This was what was called “Trotskyism”. Trotsky used his paper,
the popular Viennese Pravda for this purpose and for a time appeared to be on the
point of succeeding. Many Bolshevik leaders were in agreement with him on this question.
On the CC, the Bolsheviks N.A. Rozhkov and V.P. Nogin were conciliators, as also were the
members of the editorial board of Sotsial Demokrat, Kamenev and Zinoviev.
Lenin’s heated denunciation of “Trotskyism” (i.e. conciliation) at this
time were aimed at those Bolsheviks who were inclined to this position. See letter to
Zinoviev 11 (24) August 1909. In these and other writings of this period, Lenin refers to
Trotsky in very harsh terms.
It is not generally realised that the main reason for the sharpness of Lenin’s
tone when polemicising against Trotsky during this period and right up to the February
Revolution was precisely the persistence of such tendencies inside the Bolshevik Party. In
reality, what was known as “Trotskyism” was precisely conciliationism. This was
the charge which Lenin, not unjustly, directed against Trotsky at this time. The sharpness
of Lenin’s language in these polemics was dictated by the fact that, under the guise
of “Trotskyism”, he was really attacking conciliationist tendencies in the
leadership of his own faction.
Trotsky had irritated Lenin by his refusal to join the Bolshevik tendency, although
there were no real political differences separating them. He clung to the opinion that,
sooner or later, a new revolutionary wave would push the better elements in both
tendencies to join forces. By holding on to this “conciliationist” position
Trotsky made the most serious mistake of his life, as he himself admitted much later.
However, we should not forget that things were not so clear at the time. Lenin himself, on
more than one occasion, tried to reach a rapprochement with certain layers within the
Mensheviks. In 1908 he reached an agreement with Plekhanov and, according to Lunacharsky,
he “dreamed of an alliance with Martov”. But experience was to prove this
impossible. The two tendencies—the revolutionary and the reformist—were evolving
in two opposite directions. Sooner or later a total break was inevitable.
On Trotsky’s initiative the move towards unity gave rise to a special Plenum to
kick out the right wing liquidators and the ultra-left otzovists and establish unity
between the Bolsheviks and left Mensheviks. Lenin opposed this. He opposed the
participation in a Plenum of elements who, de facto, had placed themselves outside the
party. In the end, Lenin’s scepticism was shown to be well-founded. The
Mensheviks’ rightward drift had gone too far. The left wing Mensheviks (Martov)
refused to break with the right wing and the attempt at unity soon broke down as a result
of irreconcilable differences. Trotsky later honestly admitted his mistake on this
question. Lenin drew the necessary conclusions and decisively broke with the Mensheviks in
1912—the true date of the establishment of the Bolshevik Party.
In 1911 a new period of struggles had opened up that continued until the outbreak of
the First World War. The newly awakened working class rapidly gravitated to the left wing.
Under these circumstances, the link with the Mensheviks was a hindrance to the development
of the Party. Lenin’s decision to break with the Mensheviks and organise a separate
party was entirely justified by events. Very soon the Bolsheviks represented the decisive
majority of the working class: in the period 1912-14, four fifths of the organised workers
of St. Petersburg supported the Bolsheviks. A central role was played by the launching of
a Bolshevik daily paper, which took the name of Pravda, a move which further
embittered relations with Trotsky. But all his protests were in vain. As far as the
majority of active workers were concerned, the Mensheviks had been discredited by their
policy of collaboration with the bourgeoisie.
Trotsky once again came out against the split, attempting, without success, to work for
unity. It was this mistake that separated him from Lenin. However, it was an honest
mistake, the mistake of a genuine revolutionary with the interests of the movement at
heart. Many years later, Trotsky frankly dealt with his mistake. In 1924, Trotsky wrote to
the Bureau of Party History :
“As I have many times stated, in my disagreements with Bolshevism upon a series of
fundamental questions, the error was on my side. In order to outline, approximately in a
few words, the nature and extent of those former disagreements of mine with Bolshevism, I
will say this: During the time when I stood outside the Bolshevik party, during that
period when my differences with Bolshevism reached their highest point, the distance
separating me from the views of Lenin was never as great as the distance which separates
the present position of Stalin-Bukharin from the very foundations of Marxism and
Leninism.”
Thus, straightforwardly, honestly, Trotsky reveals, and explains his own mistakes and
points out that on the question of conciliationism, Lenin had been right all along.
However, far bigger developments were soon to render the old differences between Lenin and
Trotsky irrelevant. The split in Russia was only an anticipation of another bigger split
which was to take place two years later on an international level. And on this decisive
question, Lenin and Trotsky were once again on the same side.
The First World War
The decision of the leaders of the parties of the Socialist International to support
“their” bourgeoisie in 1914 was the biggest betrayal in the history of the world
workers’ movement. It came like a thunderbolt, profoundly shocking and disorienting
the ranks of the International. The position of the leaders of the Second International
towards the First World War signified the de facto collapse of the International. From
August 1914 onwards the war question concentrated the attention of socialists in all
countries.
Very few people succeeded in keeping their bearings at this time. Lenin in Russia and
Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht in Germany, the leaders of the Serbian Social
Democrats, James Connolly in Ireland and John Maclane in Scotland were exceptions to the
rule. From the very beginning Trotsky adopted a clear revolutionary position against the
war, as expressed in his book The War and the International. At the Zimmerwald
Conference in 1915, which brought together all the socialists who opposed the war, Trotsky
was put in charge of drafting the Manifesto, which was adopted by all the delegates, in
spite of the differences between them.
In Paris, Trotsky published a Russian journal that defended the principles of
revolutionary internationalism, Nashe Slovo. They had only a handful of
collaborators and even less money, but with enormous sacrifices they managed to publish
the journal on a daily basis, a unique achievement, unequalled by any other tendency in
the Russian movement, including the Bolsheviks at the time. For two and a half years,
under the watchful eye of the censor, Nashe Slovo led a precarious existence until
the French authorities, under pressure from the Russian government, closed down the
journal. During a mutiny in the Russian fleet at Toulon, copies of Trotsky’s paper
were found in the possession of some of the sailors, and using this as an excuse, the
French authorities deported Trotsky at the end of 1916. After a short period spent in
Spain, where Trotsky got to know the inside of Spanish prisons, he was again deported to
New York, where he collaborated with Bukharin and other Russian revolutionaries in the
publication of the paper Novy Mir. He was still working on this paper when the
first confused reports came through of an uprising in Petrograd. The second Russian
revolution had begun.
Lenin and Trotsky in 1917
Revolutionary politics is a science. The study of past revolutions is a method by which
we prepare ourselves for the future. Theory is not an optional extra but a vital guide to
action. When, prior to the First World War, Trotsky defended the idea of the possibility
of a proletarian revolution in Russia before the revolution in Western Europe, nobody took
him seriously. Only in October 1917 was the superiority of Trotsky’s Marxist method
demonstrated. At the outbreak of the February revolution Lenin was in Switzerland and
Trotsky was in New York. Although they were very far from the revolution, and from each
other, they drew the same conclusions. Trotsky’s articles in Novy Mir and
Lenin’s “Letters from afar” are practically identical as far as the
fundamental questions concerning the revolution are concerned: the attitude towards the
peasantry and the liberal bourgeoisie, the provisional government and the world
revolution.
Despite all the attempts of the Stalinists to falsify the real situation by building a
Chinese wall between Lenin and Trotsky, the facts speak for themselves: At the decisive
moment of the revolution itself “Trotskyism” and Leninism were one and the same
thing. For Lenin, as for Trotsky, the year 1917 marked the decisive
turning-point, which rendered all the old polemics with Trotsky irrelevant. That is why
Lenin never had occasion to refer to them after 1917. Lenin, in his last word to the
Russian Communist Party (the famous Suppressed Testament, which was hidden for decades by
the Stalinists)warned that Trotsky’s non-Bolshevik past should not be held against
him. This was Lenin’s last word on Trotsky and his relation to the Bolshevik Party,
before 1917.
With the sole exception of Lenin, the other Bolshevik leaders had not understood the
situation and they were overwhelmed by the events. It is a historical law that during a
revolutionary situation the party, and above all its leadership, always comes under the
enormous pressure of the class enemy, of bourgeois “public opinion”, and even of
the prejudices of the working masses. None of the Bolshevik leaders in Petrograd were
capable of resisting these pressures. None of them posed the need that the proletariat
should take power as the only way of taking the revolution forward. All of them had
abandoned a class outlook and had adopted a vulgar democratic position. Stalin was in
favour of “critically” supporting the Provisional Government and fusing with the
Mensheviks. Kamenev, Rykov, Molotov and the others held the same position.
Only after the arrival of Lenin did the Bolshevik Party change its position, after an
internal struggle around Lenin’s “April Theses” published in Pravda
under his signature. No one was prepared to identify themselves with this position. The
truth of the matter is that they had not understood the method of Lenin and they had
transformed the slogans of 1905 into a fetish. Trotsky’s “crime” consisted
in the fact that he had foreseen all of this long before the events unfolded. In 1917 the
theory of the Permanent Revolution was proved to be correct by the events themselves.
From this moment onwards there was nothing that separated Trotsky from Lenin
politically. All the differences of the past ceased to exist. When Trotsky arrived back in Petrograd in May
1917, Lenin and Zinoviev attended the welcoming ceremony organised by the Mezhrayontsy
(Inter-District Committee). At this meeting Trotsky declared that he no longer stood for
the unity of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Only those who had broken with social patriotism
should now unite under the banner of a new International. In fact, from the moment of
Trotsky’s arrival, he spoke and acted in solidarity with the Bolsheviks. Commenting
on this, the Bolshevik Raskolnikov recalled that:
“Leon Davidovich [Trotsky] was not at that time formally a member of our party,
but as a matter of fact he worked within it continually from the day of his arrival from
America. At any rate, immediately after his first speech in the Soviet, we all looked upon
him as one of our party leaders.” (Proletarskaya Revolutsia, 1923, p. 71.)
On the controversies of the past, the same writer remarked: “The echoes of the
past disagreements during the pre-war period had completely disappeared. No differences
existed between the tactical line of Lenin and Trotsky. That fusion, already observable
during the war, was completely and definitely achieved from the moment of Trotsky’s
return to Russia. From his first public speech all of us old Leninists felt that he was
ours.” (Ibid., p. 150.)
If Trotsky did not immediately formally join the Bolshevik Party, it was not out of any
political disagreements (he had announced his willingness to join immediately in
discussion with Lenin and his colleagues), but because Trotsky wished to win over the
organisation of the Mezhrayontsi (“Inter-District group”) which comprised
about 4,000 Petrograd workers and many prominent Left figures such as Uritsky, Joffe,
Lunacharsky, Ryazanov, Volodarsky and others who later played prominent roles in the
Bolshevik Party leadership. As he explained in his testimony to the Dewey Commission:
“I was working together with the Bolshevik Party. There was a group in Petrograd
which was the same programmatically as the Bolshevik Party, but organisationally
independent. I consulted Lenin about whether it would be good that I enter the Bolshevik
Party immediately, or whether it would be better that I enter with this good workers’
organisation which had three or four thousand revolutionary members.” (The Case of
Leon Trotsky, p. 21.)
On the all-Russian Congress of Soviets held in the beginning of June, which was still
dominated by Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries, E. H. Carr, referring to Trotsky and
the Mezhrayontsy, observes that: “Trotsky and Lunacharsky were among the ten
delegates of the ‘united social-democrats’ who solidly supported the Bolsheviks
throughout the three weeks of the congress.” (Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution,
vol. 1, p. 89.)
In order to speed up the accession of the Mezhrayontsi to the Bolsheviks, which
was being opposed by some of the leadership, Trotsky wrote in Pravda the following
statement: “There are in my opinion at the present time [i.e. July] no differences
either in principle or in tactics between the Inter-District and the Bolshevik
organisations. Accordingly there are no motives which justify the separate existence
of these organisations.” (our emphasis)
In May 1917, even before Trotsky had formally joined the Bolshevik Party, Lenin
proposed that he be made editor-in-chief of Pravda, and in passing recalled the
first-rate quality of the Russkaya Gazeta (the paper that Trotsky had taken over
and transformed into Nachalo in 1905). This fact was made known in 1923 in Krasnaya
Letopis No. 3 (14). Although the proposal was not accepted by Pravda’s
editorial committee, it accurately shows Lenin’s attitude to Trotsky at this time. He
was so anxious that Trotsky and his supporters should join the Bolsheviks that he was
prepared to offer them leading positions in the Party and put no conditions on them.
When the “Mezhrayontsi” fused with the Bolshevik Party their membership of
the Bolshevik Party was backdated to when they had first joined the
“Mezhrayontsi”, which was a public admission that there had not been important
differences between the two groups. A note to
the works of Lenin published in Russia after the revolution states: “On the war
question the Mezhrayontsi occupied an internationalist position, and in their tactics were
close to the Bolsheviks.” (Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 14, p. 448.)
After the July Days, the initiative passed to the forces of reaction for a time. In the
most difficult days, when the Party was driven underground, when Lenin and Zinoviev were
forced to leave for Finland, when Kamenev was in jail and the Bolsheviks subjected to
shameless calumnies as “German agents”, Trotsky spoke out publicly in their
defence, and identified his position with theirs. At this difficult and dangerous time,
Trotsky wrote a letter to the Provisional Government, which it is worth quoting in full,
in view of the light it sheds on the relations between Trotsky and the Bolsheviks in 1917.
The letter is dated 23rd July, 1917:
“Citizen Ministers:
“I have learned that in connection with the events of July 16-17 (old calendar), a
warrant has been issued for the arrest of Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, but not for me. I
should like, therefore, to call your attention to the following:
(1) I agree with the main thesis of Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, and have advocated it
in the journal Vpered and in my public speeches.
(2) My attitude toward the events of July 16-17 was the same as theirs.
(a) Kamenev, Zinoviev, and I first learned of the proposed plans of the Machine-Gun and
other regiments at the joint meeting of the Bureau’s [Executive Committees] on July
16th. We took immediate steps to stop the soldiers from coming out. Zinoviev and Kamenev
put themselves in touch with the Bolsheviks, and I with the ‘interward’
organisation [i.e. Mezhrayontsi] to which I belong.
(b) When however, notwithstanding our efforts, the demonstration did take place, my
comrade Bolsheviks and I made numerous speeches in front of the Tauride Palace, in which
we came out in favour of the main slogan of the crowd: “All Power to the
Soviets”, but we, at the same time, called on those demonstrating, both the soldiers
and civilians to return to their homes and barracks in a peaceful and orderly manner.
(c) At a conference which took place at the Tauride Palace late in the night of July
16-17 between some Bolsheviks and ward organisations, I supported the motion of Kamenev
that everything should be done to prevent a recurrence of the demonstration on July 17th.
When, however, it was learned from the agitators, who arrived from the different wards,
that the regiments and factory workers had already decided to come out, and that it was
impossible to hold back the crowd until the government crisis was over, all those present
agreed that the best thing to do was to direct the demonstration along peaceful lines and
to ask the masses to leave their guns at home.
(d) In the course of the day of July 17, which I spent in the Tauride Palace, I and the
Bolshevik comrades more than once urged this course on the crowd.
(3) The fact that I am not connected with Pravda and am not a member of the
Bolshevik Party is not due to political differences, but to certain circumstances in our
party history which have now lost all significance.
(4) The attempt of the newspapers to convey the impression that I have ‘nothing to
do’ with the Bolsheviks has about as much truth in it as the report that I have asked
the authorities to protect me from the ‘violence of the mob’, of the hundreds of
other false rumours of that same press.
“From all that I have said, it is clear that you cannot logically exclude me from
the warrant of arrest which you have made out for Lenin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev. There can
also be no doubt in your minds that I am just as uncompromising a political opponent as
the above-named comrades. Leaving me out merely emphasises the counter-revolutionary
highhandedness that lies behind the attack on Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev.” (From The
Age of the Permanent Revolution, pp. 98-9, our emphasis.)
Throughout this whole period, Trotsky, on dozens of occasions, expressed his agreement
with the position of the Bolsheviks. As a result, he was once again imprisoned.
Trotsky and the October Revolution
It is not possible here to do justice to Trotsky’s role during the October
Revolution. Today his role is universally recognised. However what we can say is that the
experience of the Russian revolution demonstrates the enormous importance of the
subjective factor (i.e. the leadership) and of the role of the individual in history.
Marxism is determinist, but not fatalist. The old Russian populists and terrorists were
“voluntarists” and utopian. They imagined that the whole of history depended on
the will of the individuals, “great men” and heroes, independent of the
objective situation and of the laws of history. Plekhanov and the Russian Marxists carried
out an implacable struggle against this idealistic interpretation of history.
Having said this, there are, however, moments in the history of society, when all the
objective factors necessary for the revolution have developed and thus the subjective
factor, the leadership, becomes the decisive factor. In these moments the whole historical
process depends on the activities of a small group of individuals and, even of one single
person. Engels explained that there are historical periods in which 20 years are as one
day, during which seemingly nothing happens and, however much activity there is, the
situation does not change. But he also pointed out that there are other periods in which
the history of 20 years can be concentrated in the space of a few weeks or even days. If
there is no revolutionary party with a revolutionary leadership that can take advantage of
the situation, this moment can be lost and it may take 10 or 20 years before another
opportunity presents itself.
In the short space of nine months, between February and October 1917, the importance of
the question of the class, the party and the leadership emerged clearly. The Bolshevik
Party was the most revolutionary party ever seen in history. However, in spite of its
enormous experience and the accumulated strength of the leadership, at the decisive moment
the Petrograd leaders wavered and entered into a crisis. In the last analysis, the fate of
the Revolution fell on the shoulders of two men: Lenin and Trotsky. Without them the
October revolution would never have taken place.
At first sight, this statement seems to refute the Marxist understanding of the role of
the individual in history. But that is not so. In the situation that ensued, without the
party, Lenin and Trotsky would have been totally powerless. It had taken nearly two
decades of work, of building and perfecting this instrument, gaining authority within the
working class and laying deep roots among the masses, in the factories, in the army
barracks and in the working class districts. A single individual, however great he may
have been, could never have taken the place of this instrument, which can never be created
through improvisation.
The working class needs a party to change society. If there is no revolutionary party,
capable of giving a conscious leadership to the revolutionary energy of the class, this
energy can be wasted, in the same way that steam is lost if there is no machine that can
use its power. On the other hand, each party has its conservative side. In fact, sometimes
revolutionaries can be the most conservative of people. This conservatism develops as a
consequence of years of routinist work, which is absolutely necessary, but can lead to
certain habits and traditions that, in a revolutionary situation, can act like a brake, if
they are not overcome by the leadership. At the decisive moment, when the situation
demands a sharp change in the orientation of the party, from routine work to the seizing
of power, the old habits can come into conflict with the needs of the new situation. It is
precisely in such a context that the role of the leadership is vital.
A party, as an organ of struggle of one class against another, bears some comparison to
an army. Thus the party also has its generals, its lieutenants, its corporals and its
soldiers. In a revolution, as in warfare, timing is a question of life or death. Without
Lenin and Trotsky, the Bolsheviks would undoubtedly have corrected their mistakes. But at
what cost? The revolution cannot wait years for the party to correct its mistakes and the
price of wavering and delays is defeat. This was clearly demonstrated in Germany in 1923.
To understand the key role played by Trotsky in 1917 it is sufficient to read any
newspaper of the period, or read any contemporary memoir or history, whether friendly or
hostile. Take for example the following lines, written just twelve months after the
Bolsheviks came to power:
“All practical work in connection with the organisation of the uprising was done
under the immediate direction of Comrade Trotsky, the President of the Petrograd Soviet.
It can be stated with certainty that the Party is indebted primarily and principally to
Comrade Trotsky for the rapid going over of the garrison to the side of the Soviet and the
efficient manner in which the work of the Military Revolutionary Committee was
organised.”
The above passage was written by Stalin on the occasion of the first anniversary of the
October Revolution. Later the same Stalin could write: “Comrade Trotsky played no
particular role either in the party or the October insurrection, and could not do so being
a man comparatively new to our party in the October period.” (Stalin’s Works,
Moscow, 1953 edition.)
Later still, not only Trotsky but all of Lenin’s general staff were accused of
being agents of Hitler, bent on restoring capitalism in the USSR. In the event, seventy
four years after October, as predicted by Trotsky, it was the heirs of Stalin who carried
out the liquidation of the USSR and all the gains of the Revolution.
As a matter of fact, even Stalin’s earlier appraisal does not do justice to the
role played by Trotsky in the October Revolution. Since in the key period from September
to October, Lenin was still mostly in hiding, the main burden of carrying out the
political and organisational preparations for the uprising was in Trotsky’s
shoulders. Most of Lenin’s old followers—Kamenev, Zinoviev, Stalin—were
either opposed to taking power or at least had a vacillating and ambiguous position. In
the case of Zinoviev and Kamenev, their opposition to the October insurrection went so far
as publishing the plans for the uprising in the non-Party press. The most superficial
reading of Lenin’s correspondence with the Central Committee is sufficient to see
what a struggle he had to overcome the resistance of the Bolshevik leadership. At one
point he even threatened to resign and appeal to the Party rank and file over the heads of
the Central Committee. In this struggle, Trotsky and the Mezhrayontsy resolutely supported
Lenin’s revolutionary line.
One of the most celebrated works on the Russian Revolution is John Reed’s Ten
Days that Shook the World. Lenin, in his Introduction, described this book as “a
most truthful and vivid exposition” and recommended that it be republished in
“millions of copies and translated into all languages.” Yet under Stalin
John Reed’s book disappeared from the publications of the Soviet and foreign
Communist Parties. The reason is not difficult to see. A glance at the contents page shows
that the author mentions Lenin 63 times, Trotsky 53 times, Kamenev eight times, Zinoviev
seven times, Bukharin and Stalin, only twice. This more or less accurately reflects the
real state of affairs.
The internal Party struggle lasted up till October and beyond. The main argument of the
conciliators was that the Bolsheviks must not take power on their own, but must form a
coalition with other “socialist” parties—meaning the Mensheviks and SRs.
But this was tantamount to a policy of handing power back to the bourgeoisie, as happened
in Germany after November 1918. John Reed describes the kind of heated arguments in which
the so-called Old Bolsheviks clashed repeatedly with Lenin and Trotsky:
“The Congress was to meet at one o’ clock, and long since the great
meeting-hall had filled, but by seven there was yet no sign of the presidium… The
Bolshevik and Left Social Revolutionary factions were in session in their own rooms. All
the livelong afternoon Lenin and Trotsky had fought against a compromise. A considerable
part of the Bolsheviks were in favour of giving way so far as to create a joint
all-socialist government. ‘We can’t hold on!’ they cried. ‘Too much is
against us. We haven’t got the men. We will be isolated and the whole thing will
fall.’ So Kamenev, Riazanov and others.
“But Lenin, with Trotsky beside him, stood firm as a rock. ‘Let the
compromisers accept our programme and they can come in! We won’t give way an inch. If
there are comrades here who haven’t the courage and the will to dare what we dare,
let them leave with the rest of the cowards and conciliators! Backed by the workers and
soldiers we shall go on’.” (Ten Days that Shook the World, pp. 168-9.)
Such was the degree of unity between Lenin and Trotsky, and the total identity between
them in people’s minds, that the Bolshevik Party was frequently known as the Party
of Lenin and Trotsky. At a meeting of the Petrograd Committee on November 14th, 1917,
Lenin spoke on the danger of conciliationist tendencies in the Party leadership which
constituted a threat even after the October Revolution. On November 14th, eleven days
after the successful insurrection, three members of the Central Committee (Kamenev,
Zinoviev, Nogin) resigned in protest against the policies of the Party, and issued an
ultimatum demanding the formation of a coalition government including the Mensheviks and
the SRs “otherwise the only course that remains is to maintain a purely Bolshevik
Government by means of political terror.” They ended their statement with an appeal
to the workers for “immediate conciliation” on the basis of their slogan
“Long live the government of all Soviet parties!”
This crisis in the ranks seemed likely to destroy the whole of the gains made by
October. In response to a dangerous situation, Lenin advocated the expulsion of the
leading miscreants. It was in this situation that Lenin delivered the speech which ends
with the words: “No compromise! A homogeneous Bolshevik government.” In the
original text of Lenin’s speech the following words occur: “As for coalition, I
cannot speak about that seriously. Trotsky long ago said that a union was impossible.
Trotsky understood this, and from that time on there has been no better Bolshevik.”
After Lenin’s death, the ruling clique: Stalin, Kamenev and Zinoviev began a
systematic campaign of falsification, designed to belittle Trotsky’s role in the
revolution and to boost their own. To do this, they had to invent the legend of
“Trotskyism”, to drive a wedge between the position of Trotsky and that of Lenin
and the “Leninists” (i.e. themselves). The hack historians burrowed through the
accumulated rubbish of old polemics which had long been forgotten by those who
participated in them: forgotten, because all the questions which had been raised then
were resolved by the experience of October and therefore could have nothing but an
abstract, historical interest. But a serious obstacle in the path of the
falsifiers was the October Revolution itself. This obstacle was removed by
gradually deleting Trotsky’s name from the history books, by re-writing history, and
finally by the outright suppression of all, even the most innocuous mention, of
Trotsky’s role.
Trotsky and the Red Army
Neither Lenin nor Trotsky knew much about military tactics before the Revolution.
Trotsky was asked to take control of military affairs at a time when the Revolution was in
extreme danger. The old tsarist army had collapsed and there was nothing to put in its
place. The young Soviet Republic had been invaded by 21 imperialist armies of
intervention. At one stage, the Soviet state was reduced to the territory of the old
Muscovy—the area surrounding Moscow and Petrograd. Yet the situation was turned
round, and the workers’ state survived. This success was due in no small measure to
Trotsky’s indefatigable work in creating the Red Army.
In September 1918, when the Soviet power, in Trotsky’s words, had reached its
lowest point, the government passed a special decree declaring tat the socialist
fatherland was in danger. At this difficult time, Trotsky was dispatched to the decisive
eastern front, where the military situation was catastrophic. Simbirsk, and then Kazan,
had fallen to the Whites. Trotsky’s armoured train could only get as far as Simbirsk,
on the outskirts of Kazan. The enemy forces were superior both in numbers and
organisation. Some White companies were composed exclusively of officers and proved more
than a match for the poorly trained and ill-disciplined Red forces. Panic spread among the
troops who were retreating in disorder before the triumphant Counter-revolution. “The
soil itself seemed to be infected with panic,” Trotsky later recalled in his
autobiography. “Fresh Red detachments, arriving in vigorous mood, were immediately
engulfed by the inertia of retreat. A rumour began to spread among the local peasantry
that the Soviets were doomed. Priests and tradesmen lifted their heads. The revolutionary
elements in the village went into hiding. Everything was crumbling. There was nothing to
hold onto. The situation seemed hopeless.”
That was the situation when Trotsky and his agitators arrived. Yet in one week, Trotsky
was returning victorious from Kazan, after the first decisive military victory of the
Revolution. In a speech to the Petrograd
Soviet, appealing for volunteers for the Red Army, he describes the situation at the
front:
“The picture just now came up before my eyes. It was one of the saddest and most
tragic nights before Kazan, when raw young forces retired in a panic. That was in August,
in the first half, when we suffered reverses. A detachment of Communists arrived: there
were over fifty of them, fifty-six, I think. Among them were such as had never had a rifle
in their hands before that day. There were men of forty or more, but the majority were
boys of eighteen, nineteen, or twenty. I remember how one such smooth-faced,
eighteen-year-old Petrograd Communist appeared at headquarters at night, rifle in hand,
and told us how a regiment had deserted its position and they had taken its place, and he
said: “We are Communards.” From this detachment of fifty men twelve returned,
but, comrades, they created an army, these Petrograd and Moscow workmen, who went to
abandoned positions in detachments of fifty or sixty men and returned twelve in number.
They perished nameless, as the majority of heroes of the working class generally do. Our
problem and duty is to endeavour to re-establish their names in the memory of the working
class. Many perished there, and they are no
longer known by name, but they made for us that Red Army which defends Soviet Russia and
defends the conquests of the working class, that citadel, that fortress of the
international revolution which our Soviet Russia now represents. From that time, comrades,
our position became, as you know, incomparably better on the eastern front, where the
danger was the greatest, for the Czechoslovaks and White Guards, moving forward from
Simbirsk to Kazan, threatened us with a movement on Nijny in one direction, and, in
another, with one toward Vologda, Yaroslavl, and Archangel, to join up with the
Anglo-French expedition. That is why our chief efforts were directed to the eastern front,
and these efforts gave good results.” (Leon Trotsky Speaks, p. 126.)
After the liberation of Kazan, Simbirsk, Khvalynsk and the other cities of the Volga
region, Trotsky was given the task of co-ordinating and directing the war on many fronts
in this vast country. He energetically re-organised the armed forces of the Revolution,
and even composed the Red Army oath, in which every soldier swore allegiance to the world
revolution. But his most remarkable achievement was to obtain the collaboration of a large
number of officers from the old tsarist army. Without this, there could have been no
question of finding the necessary military cadres to staff more than fifteen armies on
different fronts. Some, of course, proved to be traitors. Others served grudgingly or out
of routine. But a surprisingly large number were won over to the side of the Revolution
and served loyally. Some, like Tukhachevsky—a military genius—became convinced
Communists. Almost all of them were murdered by Stalin in the Purge of 1937.
The extent of Trotsky’s success with the old officers came as a surprise even to
Lenin. When Lenin asked Trotsky during the Civil War whether it was best to replace the
old Tsarist officers which were controlled by political commissars, with other Communists,
Trotsky replied:
“But do you know how many of them we have in the army now?
“No.
“Not even approximately?
“I don’t know.
“Not less than thirty thousand.
“What?
“Not less than thirty thousand. For every traitor there are a hundred dependable;
for every one who deserts there are two or three that get killed. How are we to replace
them all?”
A few days later Lenin was making a speech on the problems of constructing the
socialist commonwealth. This is what he said: “When comrade Trotsky recently informed
me that in our military department the officers are numbered in tens of thousands, I
gained a concrete conception of what constitutes the secret of making proper use of our
enemy… of how to build communism out of the bricks that the capitalists had gathered
to use against us.” (My Life, pp. 464-5.)
Trotsky’s achievements was recognised even by declared enemies of the Revolution,
including German officers and diplomats. Max Bauer paid tribute to Trotsky as “a born
military organiser and leader, and added: “How he set up a new army out of nothing in
the midst of severe battles and then organised and trained his army is absolutely
Napoleonic.” and General Hoffmann came to the same conclusion: “Even from a
purely military standpoint one is astonished that it was possible for the newly recruited
Red troops to crush the forces, at times still strong, of the White generals and to
eliminate them entirely.” (Quoted in E.H. Carr in The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-23,
Vol. 3, p. 326.)
Despite his hostility to Bolshevism, Dimitri Volkogonov is compelled to pay tribute to
Trotsky’s role in the Civil War: “He was ubiquitous,” writes Volkogonov,
“his train travelling from one front to another; he worked hard to secure supplies
for the troops, and his personal involvement in the use of military commissars at the
front brought positive results. The army chiefs, moreover, saw in him the ‘second
man’ of the Soviet Republic, a major political and state official, a man with
enormous personal authority. His role in the sphere of strategy was therefore political,
rather than military.” (Dmitri Volkogonov, Trotsky—The Eternal Revolutionary,
p. 140.)
Let us give the final word on Trotsky’s role in the Russian Revolution and Civil
War to Lunacharsky, the veteran Bolshevik who became the first Soviet Commissar for
Education and Culture: “It would be wrong to imagine,” he wrote, “that the
second great leader of the Russian revolution is inferior to his colleague [i.e. Lenin] in
everything: there are, for instance, aspects in which Trotsky incontestably surpasses
him—he is more brilliant, he is clearer, he is more active. Lenin is fitted as no-one
else to take the chair at the Council of People’s Commissars and to guide the world
revolution with the touch of genius, but he could never have coped with the titanic
mission which Trotsky took upon his own shoulders, with those lightening moves from place
to place, those astounding speeches, those fanfares of on-the-spot orders, that role of
being the unceasing electrifier of a weakening army, now at one spot, now at another.
There is not a man on earth who could have replaced Trotsky in this respect.
“Whenever a truly great revolution occurs, a great people will always find the
right actor to play every part and one of the signs of greatness in our revolution is the
fact that the Communist Party has produced from its own ranks or has borrowed from other
parties and incorporated into its own organism sufficient outstanding personalities who
were suited as no others to fulfil whatever political function was called for.
“And two of the strongest of the strong, totally identified with their roles, are
Lenin and Trotsky.” (A. Lunacharsky, Revolutionary Silhouettes, pp. 68-9.)
Trotsky’s fight against Bureaucracy
The October revolution was the most important event in human history. For the first
time—if we exclude the short experience of the Paris Commune—the oppressed
masses began to take their destiny into their own hands and took upon themselves the task
of rebuilding society. The socialist revolution is totally different from all the other
revolutions in history, because the subjective factor becomes, for the first time, the
motor force of social development. The explanation for this is to be found in the
different productive relations. Under capitalism the market forces function in an
uncontrolled manner, without any planning or state intervention. The socialist revolution
puts an end to the anarchy of production and imposes control and planning on the part of
society. As a result, after the revolution, the subjective factor, the conscience of the
class, is also the decisive factor. In the words of Engels, socialism is “the leap
from the realm of necessity to that of freedom”.
But the consciousness of the masses is not something separate from the material living
conditions, from the level of culture, from the working day… It was not for nothing
that Marx and Engels insisted that the material prerequisites for socialism were dependent
on the development of the productive forces. When the Mensheviks protested against the
October revolution, arguing that the material conditions for socialism were absent in
Russia, there was an element of truth in what they said. However, the objective conditions
did exist on a world level.
Internationalism for the Bolsheviks was not a sentimental question. Lenin repeated
hundreds of times that either the Russian revolution would spread to other countries or it
would be smashed. In fact, after the Russian revolution there was a wave of revolutionary
and pre-revolutionary situations in many countries (Germany, Hungary, Italy, France…)
but without the presence of revolutionary mass parties they were defeated or, to be more
precise, they were betrayed by the Social democratic leadership. Because of the betrayal
on the part of the Social democratic leaders in Germany and in other countries, the
Russian revolution was isolated in a backward country, where the living conditions of the
masses were atrocious. In one year alone six million people died of hunger. At the end of
the civil war the working class was exhausted.
In this situation reaction was inevitable. The results achieved did not correspond to
the hopes of the masses. An important layer of the more conscious and militant workers had
been killed during the civil war. Others, absorbed in the tasks of administering industry
and the state, became gradually divorced from the rest of the class. In an atmosphere of
growing tiredness, discouragement and disorientation of the masses, the state apparatus
gradually raised itself above the working class. Each step backwards on the part of the
working class further encouraged the bureaucrats and careerists. In this situation, a
bureaucratic caste emerged that was satisfied with its own position and who disagreed with
the “utopian” ideas of world revolution. These elements enthusiastically latched
on to the idea—first put forward in 1923—of “socialism in one
country”.
Marxism explains that ideas do not fall out of the sky. If an idea is put forward and
manages to get mass support, this idea by necessity will reflect the interests of a class
or social caste. Nowadays bourgeois historians try to present the struggle between Stalin
and Trotsky as a “debate” over theoretical questions, in which, for obscure
reasons, Stalin won and Trotsky lost. However, the determining factor in history is not
the struggle between ideas, but between class interests and material forces. The
victory of Stalin was not due to his intellectual superiority (in fact, of all the
Bolshevik leaders, Stalin was the most mediocre in questions of theory), but to the fact
that the ideas he defended represented the interests and privileges of the new
bureaucratic caste which was in the process of being formed, whereas Trotsky and the Left
Opposition defended the ideas of October and the interests of the working class which was
being forced to retreat in the face of the offensive launched by the bureaucracy, the
petit-bourgeoisie, the kulaks…
The ideas and actions of Stalin were also not developed and planned in advance. In the
early stages he did not know where he was going, and, in fact, if he had known in 1923
where the process he himself was leading was to take him, the most likely thing is that he
would never have started on that road. Lenin was aware of the danger and tried to warn
against the danger of Bureaucracy. At the Eleventh Congress, Lenin placed before the Party
a searing indictment of bureaucratisation of the state apparatus:
“If we take Moscow,” he said, “with its 4,700 Communists in responsible
positions, and if we take the huge bureaucratic machine, that gigantic heap, we must ask:
who is directing whom? I doubt very much whether it can be truthfully said that the
Communists are directing that heap. To tell the truth, they are not directing, they are
being directed.” (Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 288, our emphasis.)
To carry out the work of weeding bureaucrats and careerists out of the state and party
apparatus, Lenin initiated the setting up of RABKRIN (the Workers’ and Peasants’
Inspectorate) with Stalin in charge. Lenin saw the need for a strong organiser to see that
this work was carried out thoroughly; Stalin’s record as a party organiser appeared
to qualify him for the post. Within in a few years, Stalin occupied a number of
organisational posts in the Party: head of RABKRIN, member of the Central Committee and
Politburo, Orgburo and Secretariat. But his narrow, organisational outlook and personal
ambition led Stalin to occupy the post, in a short space of time, as the chief spokesman
of bureaucracy in the party leadership, not as its opponent.
As early as 1920, Trotsky criticised the working of RABKRIN, which from a tool in the
struggle against bureaucracy was becoming itself a hotbed of bureaucracy. Initially, Lenin
defended RABKRIN against Trotsky. His illness prevented him from realising what was going
on behind his back in the state and party. Stalin used his position, which enabled him to
select personnel to leading posts in the state and party to quietly gather round himself a
bloc of allies and yes-men, political nonentities who were grateful to him for their
advancement. In his hands, RABKRIN became an instrument for building up his own position
and eliminating his political rivals.
Lenin only became aware of the terrible situation when he discovered the truth about
Stalin’s handling of relations with Georgia. Without the knowledge of Lenin or the
Politburo, Stalin, together with his henchmen Dzerzhinsky and Ordzhonikidze, had carried
out a coup d’Ètat in Georgia. The finest cadres of Georgian Bolshevism were
purged, and the party leaders denied access to Lenin, who was fed a string of lies by
Stalin. When he finally found out what was happening, Lenin was furious. From his sick-bed
late in 1922 he dictated a series of notes to his stenographer on “the notorious
questions of autonomisation, which, it appears, is officially called the question of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics”.
Lenin’s notes are a crushing indictment of the bureaucratic and chauvinist
arrogance of Stalin and his clique. But Lenin does not treat this incident as an
accidental phenomenon but the expression of the rotten, reactionary nationalism of the
Soviet bureaucracy. It is worth quoting Lenin’s words on the state apparatus at
length.
“It is said that a united state apparatus was needed. Where did that assurance
come from? Did it not come from the same Russian apparatus, which, as I pointed out in one
of the preceding sections of my diary, we took over from Tsarism and slightly anointed
with Soviet oil?
“There is no doubt that that measure should have been delayed until we could say,
that we vouched for our apparatus as our own. But now, we must, in all conscience, admit
the contrary; the state apparatus we call ours is, in fact, still quite alien to us; it
is a bourgeois and Tsarist hotchpotch and there has been no possibility of getting rid of
it in the past five years without the help of other countries and because we have been
‘busy’ most of the time with military engagements and the fight against famine.
“It is quite natural that in such circumstances the ‘freedom to secede from
the union’ by which we justify ourselves will be a mere scrap of paper, unable to
defend the non-Russians from the onslaught of that really Russian man, the Great-Russian
chauvinist, in substance a rascal and a tyrant, such as the typical Russian bureaucrat is.
There is no doubt that the infinitesimal percentage of Soviet and sovietised workers
will drown in that tide of chauvinistic Great-Russian riff-raff like a fly in milk.”
(Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 36, p. 605, our emphasis.)
After the Georgian affair, Lenin threw the whole weight of his authority behind the
struggle to remove Stalin from the post of General Secretary of the party which he
occupied in 1922, after the death of Sverdlov. However, Lenin’s main fear now more
than ever was that an open split in the leadership, under prevailing conditions, might
lead to the break-up of the party along class lines. He therefore attempted to keep the
struggle confined to the leadership, and the notes and other material were not made
public. Lenin wrote secretly to the Georgian Bolshevik-Leninists (sending copies to
Trotsky and Kamenev) taking up their cause against Stalin “with all my heart”.
As he was unable to pursue the affair in person, he wrote to Trotsky requesting him to
undertake the defence of the Georgians in the Central Committee. During his last period of
illness, to fight the process of bureaucratisation and even asked Trotsky to form a bloc
with him to struggle against Stalin at the XXI Party Congress. But Lenin died before being
able to act on his plans. His Letter to the Congress, in which he describes Trotsky as the
most able member of the Central Committee and demands the removal of Stalin as Party
General Secretary, was suppressed by the leading clique and remained unpublished for
decades.
“Socialism in One Country”
Even with the participation of Lenin, the process could not have unfolded differently.
The causes were not to be found in individuals, but in the objective situation of a
backward and starving country, isolated by the delay of the socialist revolution in the
West. After Lenin’s death, the leading group (“The Troika”), composed
initially of Kamenev, Zinoviev and Stalin, ignored Lenin’s advice and instead began a
campaign against so-called Trotskyism, which in practice signified the repudiation of the
ideas of Lenin and the October revolution. Unconsciously, they were reflecting the
pressure of the rising stratum of privileged officials who had done well out of the
Revolution and wished to call a halt to the period of storm and stress and workers’
democracy. The petit-bourgeois reaction against October found its expression in the
campaign against “Trotskyism” and above all in the anti-Leninist theory of
“socialism in one country”.
The fact that Russia was a backward country would not have been a problem if such a
revolution was a prelude to a successful world socialist revolution. That was the aim of
the Bolshevik Party under Lenin and Trotsky. Internationalism was no sentimental gesture,
but was rooted in the international character of capitalism and the class struggle. In the
words of Trotsky: “Socialism is the organisation of a planned and harmonious social
production for the satisfaction of human wants. Collective ownership of the means of
production is not yet socialism, but only its legal premise. The problem of a socialist
society cannot be abstracted from the problem of the productive forces, which at the
present stage of human development are world-wide in their very essence.” (History
of the Russian Revolution, p. 1237.) The October Revolution was regarded as the
beginning of the new world socialist order.
The anti-Marxist theory of “Socialism in One Country,” expounded by Stalin in
the autumn of 1924, went against everything the Bolsheviks and the Communist
International, had preached. How was it possible to construct a national socialism in a
single country, let alone an extremely backward country like Russia? Such a thought never
entered the heads of any Bolshevik, including Stalin’s up until 1924. In April 1924
Stalin could still write in his book The Foundations of Leninism “For the
overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the efforts of one country are enough—to this the
history of our own revolution testifies. For the final victory of socialism, for the
organisation of socialist production, the efforts of one country, especially a peasant
country like ours, are not enough—for this we must have the efforts of the
proletarians of several advanced countries.” But within a few months, these lines
were withdrawn and the exact opposite put in their place. “After consolidating its
power and leading the peasantry in its wake the proletariat of the victorious country can
and must build a socialist society.” (Stalin, The Foundations of Leninism, p.
39. Peking, 1975.)
Such a formulation, which flies in the face of everything Marx, Engels and Lenin ever
wrote, would have been unthinkable while Lenin was still alive. It showed just how far the
bureaucratic reaction against October had gone. This produced a crisis in the ruling
triumvirate. Alarmed by this turn in events, Kamenev and Zinoviev broke with Stalin and
formed an alliance with Trotsky, the United Left Opposition. In 1926, during a meeting of
the Opposition, Lenin’s widow, Krupskaya, commented bitterly: “If Vladimir were
here, he would be in prison”. The main reason for the defeat of Trotsky and the
Opposition was to be found in the mood among the masses, who sympathised with the
Opposition but were exhausted and worn down by long years of War and revolution.
The emergence of a new ruling caste had deep social roots. The isolation of the
revolution was the main reason behind the rise of Stalin and the bureaucracy, but at the
same time this became the cause of new defeats of the international revolution: Bulgaria
and Germany (1923); the defeat of the General Strike in Britain (1926); China (1927) and
the most terrible defeat of all, that of Germany (1933). Each defeat of the international
revolution, deepened the discouragement of the working class and further encouraged the
bureaucrats and careerists. After the terrible defeat in China in 1927—the blame for
which can be placed directly on the shoulders of Stalin and Bukharin—began the
expulsion of the Opposition. Even before that, supporters of the Opposition were
systematically persecuted, sacked from their jobs, ostracised and, in some cases, driven
to suicide.
The monstrous actions of the Stalinists were in complete contradiction to the
democratic traditions of the Bolshevik Party. They consisted of the breaking-up of
meetings by hooligans, a vicious campaign of lies and slander in the official press, the
persecution of Trotsky’s friends and supporters which led to the deaths of numbers of
prominent Bolsheviks such as Glazman (driven to suicide by blackmail) and Joffe, the
famous Soviet diplomat who was denied access to necessary medical treatment and committed
suicide. At Party meetings, Oppositionist speakers were subject to the systematic
hooliganism of gangs of quasi-fascist thugs organised by the Stalinist apparatus to
intimidate the opposition. The French Communist paper, Contre le Courant in the
twenties reported the methods whereby the Stalinists conducted their “nation-wide
Party discussion”:
“The bureaucrats of the Russian party have formed all over the country gangs of
whistlers. Every time a party worker belonging to the Opposition is to take the floor,
they post around the hall a veritable framework of men armed with police-whistles. With
the first words of the Opposition speaker, the whistles begin. The charivari last until
the Opposition speaker yields the floor to another.” (The Real Situation in Russia,
p. 14, footnote.)
Given the isolation of the Revolution under conditions of terrible backwardness, the
exhaustion of the working class and its vanguard, the victory of the Stalinist Bureaucracy
was a foregone conclusion. This was not a result of Stalin’s cleverness or foresight.
On the contrary. Stalin foresaw nothing and understood nothing, but proceeded empirically,
as the constant zig-zags in his policy show. Stalin and his ally Bukharin steered a course
to the right, attempting to base themselves on the “strong peasants” (i.e., the
Kulaks). Trotsky and the Left Opposition insistently warned of the danger of such a
policy. They advocated a policy of industrialisation, Five Year Plans and collectivisation
by example. At a plenary session of the Central Committee in April 1927, Stalin poured
scorn on this proposal. He actually compared the Opposition’s electrification plan
(the Dnieperstroi scheme) to “offering a peasant a gramophone instead of a cow”.
The Opposition’s warnings were shown to be correct. The Kulak danger, manifested
in a grain strike and sabotage, threatened to overthrow the Soviet power and place
capitalist counterrevolution on the order of the day. In a panic reaction, Stalin was
compelled to break with Bukharin and launch on an ultra-left adventure. Having
contemptuously rejected Trotsky’s proposal of a Five Year Plan to develop the Soviet
economy , he suddenly did a 180 degree somersault in 1927, and began to advocate the
madness of a “Five Year Plan in four years” and the “liquidation of the
kulaks as a class” through forced collectivisation.. This sudden turn disoriented
many Oppositionists, who imagined that Stalin had adopted the policies of the Opposition.
But Stalin’s policy was only a caricature of the Opposition’s policies. It ruled
out any return to the norms of Leninist Soviet democracy and led to the consolidation of
the Bureaucracy as a ruling caste.
Beginning with Zinoviev and Kamenev, one former Oppositionist after another capitulated
to Stalin, in the hope of being accepted back into the Party. This was an illusion. Their
recantation only paved the way for new demands and new capitulations, ending in the final
humiliation of the Moscow Trials, where Kamenev, Zinoviev and other Old Bolsheviks pleaded
guilty to the most monstrous crimes against the Revolution. Even this did not save them.
They went to their deaths at the hands of Stalin’s executioners, having previously
covered their own heads with filth.
Trotsky stood his ground, although he was under no illusion that he could win this
fight, given the overwhelmingly unfavourable balance of forces. But he was fighting to
leave behind a banner, a programme and a tradition for the new generation. As he explains
in his biography:
“The leading group of the Opposition faced this finale with its eyes wide open. We
realised only too clearly that we could make our ideas the common property of the new
generation not by diplomacy and evasions but only by an open struggle which shirked none
of the practical consequences. We went to meet the inevitable debacle, confident,
however, that we were paving the way for the triumph of our ideas in a more distant
future.” (Trotsky, My Life, p. 531.)
The International Left Opposition
In 1927, Trotsky was exiled to Turkey. Stalin had not sufficiently consolidated his
position to be able to simply kill him. From his places in exile [first internal exile
then deportation from the Soviet Union itself] between 1927 and 1933 Trotsky dedicated his
energies to organising the International Left Opposition, with the aim of regenerating the
USSR and the Communist International. Stalin’s ultra-left turn in the Soviet Union
found its expression in the international field in the theory of the so-called Third
Period and “social fascism”. This was supposed to usher in the “final
crisis” of capitalism on a world scale. The Comintern, on instructions from Moscow,
declared all parties except the Communist Parties to be fascist. This applied above all to
the Social Democratic parties which were dubbed “Social Fascists.” This madness
had particularly disastrous results in Germany, where it led directly to the victory of
Hitler.
The catastrophic world slump of 1929-33 had its most disastrous effects in Germany.
Unemployment soared to 8 million. Large sections of the middle class were ruined. But
having been disappointed by the Social democrats in 1918 and by the Communists in 1923,
the despairing middle class of Germany now looked to Hitler’s Nazi Party for a way
out. In the elections of September 1930, the Nazis got nearly six and a half million
votes. From his place of exile in Turkey, Trotsky insistently warned of the danger of
fascism in Germany. He demanded that the German Communists should form a united front with
the Social democrats to stop Hitler. This message was hammered home in a series of
articles and documents such as The Turn in the Communist International and the German
Situation. This was a call for a return to the Leninist policy of the united front.
But it fell on deaf ears.
Although the German Labour Movement was the mightiest in the western world, it was
paralysed in the moment of truth by the policies of its leaders. In particular, the
leaders of the Stalinised German Communist Party played a pernicious role in splitting the
workers’ movement in the face of the Nazi menace. They even launched the slogan
“Beat the little Scheidemanns in the schoolyards!”—an incredible incitation
of the children of Communists to beat up the children of Social Democrats. This madness
reached its extreme point in the so-called Red Referendum. When in 1931 Hitler organised a
referendum aimed at bringing down the Social Democratic government in Prussia, the
Communist Party, under orders from Moscow, directed its followers to support the Nazis. As
late as 1932, the British Stalinist paper, The Daily Worker, wrote:
“It is significant that Trotsky has come out in defence of a united front between
the communist and social democratic parties against Fascism. No more disruptive and
counterrevolutionary class lead could possibly have been given at a time like the
present.”
In 1933, the German Communist Party had about six million supporters, while the Social
Democrats numbered about eight million. Their combined militias had about one million
members—a far bigger number than the Red Guard in Petrograd and Moscow in 1917. Yet
Hitler could boast that “I have come to power without breaking a window pane”.
This was a betrayal of the working class comparable to that of August 1914. Overnight, the
mighty organisations of the German proletariat were reduced to rubble. The workers of the
entire world—and above all the Soviet Union—paid a terrible price for that
betrayal.
Trotsky hoped that a defeat on this scale would serve to shake the Communist
International to its roots and open up a debate in the ranks of the Communist Parties
which would regenerate them and exonerate the Opposition. However, things worked out
differently. The Comintern and its Parties were so Stalinised that there was no debate, no
self-criticism—only a reiteration of the same discredited policies. The line of the
German Communist Party (and therefore of Stalin, the Great Leader and teacher) was
solemnly ratified as the only correct one. Incredibly, the German Communist leaders
launched the slogan: “After Hitler, Our Turn!”. Worse still, the following year,
when the French fascists of the Croix de Feu and other groups attempted to overthrow the
government of the Radical Deladier, the Stalinists actually instructed their members to
demonstrate alongside the fascists against the “Radical-fascist” Deladier.
A party and an International which is incapable of learning from its mistakes is
doomed. The terrible defeat of the German working class as a result of the policies both
of the Stalinists and the Social Democrats, followed by the complete lack of any
self-criticism or discussion on the question inside the parties of the Communist
International, convinced Trotsky that the Comintern had irremediably degenerated. Whereas
in the early years, the bureaucracy had not yet consolidated itself as a ruling caste, now
it had become clear that it was no longer an historic aberration that could be corrected
through criticism and discussion, but it represented a triumphant counter-revolution that
had destroyed all the elements of workers’ democracy that had been established by the
October Revolution. Trotsky therefore raised the slogan of a new International—the
Fourth International.
The Moscow Trials
The clearest expression of the new situation were the notorious “Moscow
Trials”, which Trotsky described as “a unilateral civil war against the
Bolshevik Party.” Between 1936 and 1938, all the members of the Central Committee
from the time of Lenin, who were alive in the USSR, were assassinated. “The trial of
the 16” (Zinoviev, Kamenev, Smirnov, etc.); “The trial of the 17” (Radalev,
Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, etc.); “The secret trial of the army officers”
(Tukhachevsky, etc.); “The trial of the 21” (Bukharin, Rykov, Rakovsky, etc.).
Lenin’s old comrades were accused of having committed the most grotesque crimes
against the revolution. Usually they would be accused of being Hitler’s agents (in
the same way that the Jacobins were accused of being agents of England in the period of
Thermidorian reaction in France).
The aims of the bureaucracy were simple: to completely destroy all those who could have
become a rallying point for the discontent of the masses. They even went as far as
arresting and murdering thousands of people, who had been totally loyal to Stalin, whose
sole crime was their direct link to the experience of the October revolution. It was
dangerous to be friend, neighbour, father or son of any of those arrested. In the
concentration camps there were to be found whole families, including the children. General
Yakir was assassinated in 1938. His son spent 14 years with his mother in the
concentration camps. There were many such cases.
The main defendant was not present at the trials. Leon Trotsky, after having been
denied the right to asylum by all the countries of Europe, was in Mexico where he
organised an international protest campaign against the Moscow trials. Why was the
Stalinist bureaucracy so afraid of one man? The October revolution had established a
regime of workers’ democracy which gave the workers the greatest freedom. On the
other hand, the usurping bureaucracy could only govern by destroying workers’
democracy and by installing a totalitarian and deformed regime. It could not tolerate the
least amount of freedom of expression or criticism, whether in politics, art, science or
literature.
On the surface, Stalin’s regime was similar to those of Hitler, Franco or
Mussolini. But there was one fundamental difference: the new ruling caste in the USSR
based itself on the new property relations, established by the October revolution. Thus,
it found itself in a contradictory situation. In order to defend its own power and
privileges, this parasitic caste had to defend, at the same time, the new forms of the
nationalised planned economy, that embodied great historical gains for the working class.
The privileged bureaucrats who had destroyed the political gains of October and
annihilated the Bolshevik Party, were forced to maintain the fiction of a “Communist
Party”, “Soviets”, etc. They also had to develop the productive forces,
basing themselves on the nationalised planned economy. Thus they played a relatively
progressive role, by developing industry, although at a price ten time higher than that of
the bourgeoisie in other countries in the past.
Marxists do not defend democracy for sentimental reasons. As Trotsky explained, a
planned economy needs democracy in the same way that the human body needs oxygen. The
asphyxiating control of an all-powerful bureaucracy is incompatible with the development
of a planned economy. The existence of the bureaucracy inevitably generates all kinds of
corruption, mismanagement and swindles at all levels. This is the reason why a
bureaucracy, as opposed to the bourgeoisie, could not tolerate any independent criticism
or thought, not only in politics but in literature, music, art or philosophy. Trotsky was
a threat to the Bureaucracy because he remained as a witness and a reminder of the genuine
democratic and internationalist traditions of Bolshevism.
In the 1930s Trotsky analysed this new phenomenon of the Stalinist bureaucracy in his
classical work The Revolution Betrayed and explained the need for a new revolution,
a political revolution, in order to regenerate the USSR. In the same way as all ruling
classes or castes of history, the Russian bureaucracy was not going to
“disappear” of its own accord. As early as 1936, Trotsky warned that the ruling
Stalinist Bureaucracy represented a mortal threat to the survival of the USSR. He
predicted, with uncanny accuracy, that, unless the Bureaucracy was removed by the working
class, it would inevitably end up in a capitalist counterrevolution. With a delay of some
fifty years, Trotsky’s prediction has now been borne out. Not satisfied with their
bloated privileges derived from the plunder of the nationalised planned economy, the
children and grandchildren of the Stalinist officials are now striving to turn themselves
into the private owners of the means of production in Russia and thereby plunging the land
of October into a new Dark Age of barbarism and collapse—as Trotsky also warned.
Stalin and the privileged caste he represented could never forgive Trotsky for exposing
them as usurpers and the gravediggers of October. The work of Trotsky and his
collaborators, represented a mortal danger for the bureaucracy, that responded with a
massive campaign of assassinations, persecutions and slander. One would search in vain in
the annals of modern history to find a parallel for the persecution suffered by the
Trotskyists at the hands of Stalin and his monstrous murder-machine. It would be necessary
to go back to the persecution of the early Christians or the infamous work of the Spanish
Inquisition to find such a parallel. One by one Trotsky’s supporters in the Soviet
Union were silenced by Stalin’s executioners. Comrades, friends and family all ended
up in that infernal meat-grinding machine that was Stalin’s Gulag.
Even in these hell-holes, the Trotskyists remained firm. They alone maintained their
organisation and discipline. They contrived to follow international affairs, organised
meetings and Marxist discussion groups and fought to defend their rights. They even
organised demonstrations and hunger strikes, such as the strike in the Pechora camps in
1936 which lasted 136 days. “The strikers protested against their transfer from
previous places of deportation and their penalisation without open trial. They demanded an
eight hour day, the same food for all inmates (regardless of whether they fulfilled
production norms or not), separation of political and criminal prisoners, and the removal
of invalids, women, and old people from sub-Polar regions to areas with a milder climate.
The decision to strike was taken at an open meeting. Sick and old age prisoners were
exempted; ‘but the latter categorically rejected the exemption’. In almost every
barrack non-Trotskyists responded to the call, but only ‘in the shanties of the
Trotskyists was the strike complete’.
“The administration, afraid that the action might spread, transferred the
Trotskyists to some half-ruined and deserted huts twenty-five miles away from the camp. Of
a total of 1,000 strikers, several died and only two broke down; but these two were not
Trotskyists. In March 1937, on orders from Moscow, the camp administration yielded on all
points; and the strike came to an end.” (I. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, p.
416.)
But the prisoners’ triumph was short-lived. Yezhov’s Terror soon reached new
heights of frenzy. The prisoners’ already meagre rations were reduced to just 400
grams of bread a day, and the GPU armed common prisoners with clubs and incited them to
beat Oppositionists. The number of arbitrary shootings increased. Stalin had decided on
the “Final Solution”. Towards the end of March 1938, the Trotskyists were
marched out of the Vorkuta camp in groups of twenty five into the frozen wasteland—to
their death. For months the shootings continued. The GPU butchers did their work,
murdering men, women and children above the age of twelve. No-one was spared. One
eye-witness relates how the wife of an Oppositionist walked on her crutches to the place
of execution. “‘Throughout April and part of May”, the eye-witness
reports,” the executions went on. Every day or every other day thirty or forty people
would be called out…’ CommuniquÈs were broadcast over loudspeakers: ‘For
counterrevolutionary agitation, sabotage, banditry, refusal to work, and attempts to
escape, the following have been executed…’ ‘Once a large group, about a
hundred people, mostly Trotskyists, were taken out …As they marched away, they sang
the Internationale; and hundreds of voices in the shanties joined in the
singing’.” (Ibid., p. 418.)
One Man against the World
For the leader of October there was no refuge and no safe resting place on earth. One
after another the door was slammed firmly shut. Those states that called themselves
democracies and liked to compare themselves favourably with the Bolshevik
“dictators” showed no more tolerance than all the others. Britain, which had
earlier given refuge to Marx, Lenin and Trotsky himself, now under a Labour government,
refused him entry. France and Norway behaved, in essence, no differently, placing such
restrictions on Trotsky’s movements and activities that “sanctuary” became
indistinguishable from imprisonment. Finally, Trotsky and his faithful companion Natalia
Sedova found refuge in Mexico under the government of the progressive bourgeois Lazar
Cardenas.
Even in Mexico, Trotsky was not safe. The arm of the GPU was long. By raising his voice
against the Kremlin clique, Trotsky remained a mortal danger to Stalin, who, it has now
been demonstrated, ordered all Trotsky’s writings to be placed on his desk each
morning. He extracted a terrible revenge on his opponent. As long ago as the 1920s,
Zinoviev and Kamenev had warned Trotsky: “You think Stalin will answer your ideas.
But Stalin will strike at your head!”
In the years prior to his assassination, Trotsky had witnessed the assassination of one
of his sons and the disappearance of the other; the suicide of his daughter, the massacre
of his friends and collaborators inside and outside the USSR, and the destruction of the
political gains of the October revolution. Trotsky’s daughter Zinaida committed
suicide as a result of Stalin’s persecution. After the suicide of his daughter, his
first wife, Alexandra Sokolovskaya, an extraordinary woman who perished in Stalin’s
camps, wrote a despairing letter to Trotsky: “Our children were doomed. I do not
believe in life any more. I do not believe that they will grow up. All the time I am
expecting some new disaster.’ And she concludes: “It has been difficult for me
to write and mail this letter. Excuse my cruelty towards you, but you should know
everything about our kith and kin.” (Quoted by Deutscher, op. cit. p. 198.)
Leon Sedov, Trotsky’s eldest son, who played a key role in the International Left
Opposition, was murdered while recovering from an operation in a Paris clinic in February
1938. Two of his European secretaries, Rudolf Klement and Erwin Wolff, were also killed.
Ignace Reiss, an officer of the GPU who publicly broke with Stalin and declared in favour
of Trotsky, was yet another victim of Stalin’s murder machine, gunned down by a GPU
agent in Switzerland.
The most painful blow came with the arrest of Trotsky’s younger son Sergei, who
had stayed behind in Russia, believing that, as he was not politically active, he would be
safe. Vain hope! Unable to take his revenge on the father, Stalin resorted to that most
refined torture—applying pressure on parents through their children. No-one can
imagine what torments were suffered at this time by Trotsky and Nataliya Sedova. Only in
recent years did it emerge that Trotsky even contemplated suicide, as a possible way of
saving his son. But he realised that such an act would not save Sergei and would give
Stalin just what he wanted. Trotsky was not wrong. Sergei was already dead, shot it seems
in secret in 1938, having steadfastly refused to denounce his father.
One by one, Trotsky’s old collaborators had fallen victim to Stalin’s Terror.
Those who refused to recant were physically liquidated. But even capitulation did not save
the lives of those who surrendered. They were executed anyway. The last of the leading
figures of the Opposition inside the USSR who had held out was the great Balkan Marxist
and veteran revolutionary Christian Rakovsky. When Trotsky heard of Rakovsky’s
capitulations he wrote the following passage in his diary:
“Rakovsky was virtually my last contact with the old revolutionary generation.
After his capitulation there is nobody left. Even though my correspondence with Rakovsky
stopped, for reasons of censorship, at the time of my deportation, nevertheless the image
of Rakovsky has remained a symbolic link with my old comrades-in-arms. Now nobody remains.
For a long time now I have not been able to satisfy my need to exchange ideas and discuss
problems with someone else. I am reduced to carrying on a dialogue with the newspapers, or
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