| Argentina: The attitude of revolutionary Socialists towards the Kirchner government |
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| By El Militante (Argentina) Editorial Board | |
| Thursday, 05 June 2003 | |
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The measures adopted and announced by the Kirchner government during
its first few weeks in power have triggered a very lively debate within
the labour movement. Many are unclear as to the character of the new
regime and what attitude to have towards it. In addition to this, there is
also another debate within the left itself on the nature of the current
stage of the mass movement that began with the "Argentinazo"
uprising in December 2001.
Raised hopes There is no doubt that the new government has raised the hopes of many workers. In his inaugural speech, Kirchner's criticism of the "neoliberal" policies of the last 25 years, with their accompanying corruption, de-industrialisation, massive impoverishment and "impunity", was greeted warmly by the masses. The appointment to the government and other sections of the administration of politicians with a certain "progressive" image has also backed up the sentiment that his presidency represents a break with the past. Furthermore, the eyebrow-raising presence, on the day of Kirchner's swearing-in ceremony, of Lula, Chavez and especially Fidel Castro (political leaders who enjoy much prestige amongst Latin American workers), whose speeches all endorsed the new president's accession to power, also backed up this feeling. In addition, the new government's promises and initial measures, especially some of them, have also received a favourable welcome, e.g. the purge of a major part of the hated military and police leaderships (part of which was still linked to the genocidal dictatorship of 1976-1983 and with former President Menem), the resolution of the long-standing teachers' dispute in Entre Ríos and San Juan, with the payment of all back-pay owed (although this was done with a special loan from the World Bank), and the announcement of a major housing and infrastructure building project etc. Furthermore, the government announced that there would be no immediate hike in the prices of public services, that the Senate's extension by 90 days of a law banning mortgage foreclosures would be respected and that certain contracts signed with private companies would be reviewed. Lastly, in the domain of international relations, the desire to increase Latin American integration with the strengthening of the MERCOSUR pact and relations with Brazil was reiterated, in defiance of pressure from US imperialism which wants to impose its FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) policy. Kirchner crowned this by declaring that his policies would henceforth be based on the concept of "national capitalism". After one and half years of intense struggle and sacrifice, increasing poverty, massive suffering and threats from the reactionary forces, it was to be expected that millions of workers, housewives and youth would welcome the withdrawal of Menem, who they rightly blame for the corrupt and anti-social policies of the last decade. Capitalising on this sentiment and following his initial speeches and measures, Kirchner has been able to carve out a certain level of support for himself amongst the masses, although few expected him to be able to do this after he won only 22% in the first round of the presidential elections in April. There is no doubt that many of these measures have been implemented with the clear intention of beefing up his level of support in the population. It is quite understandable why many workers and youth have had their hopes raised by the Kirchner government during its first few weeks at the helm. However, the following questions must now be answered: is there any justification for such hopes? Will the measures announced and implemented by Kirchner to solve the problems of unemployment, low wages, job insecurity, the high costs of living, poverty, impunity and police repression actually work? These are the questions that we hope to answer in the following article. Divisions within the ruling class In order to understand the character of the measures announced and adopted by Kirchner, we must at first look at the deep divisions that exist within the heart of the ruling class itself, which stem from the differences over how the capitalists believe that the future of Argentine capitalism should be managed (or more precisely, how it should be saved) and how economic power should be shared out between them. These divisions have grown sharper over the last year and were reflected in the recent presidential elections by the large number of different candidates fighting it out. One section of the ruling class, formed by the banks, the financial sector, the majority of the agricultural produce exporters, the privatised companies and some major Argentine companies, is represented by individuals such as Menem and Lopez Murphy. This section is linked directly to US imperialism. Most of its businesses has siphoned-off a huge amount of profits abroad in recent years, thanks mainly to the peso/dollar parity policy. This was the sector that benefited the most from the policies of the last decade thanks to its direct connections with the political and legal authorities, which helped it expand its operations massively. In opposition to this section of the ruling class stands the section formed by the majority of the domestic industrial sector, which has benefited in the recent period from the peso's devaluation and which is more focused on the internal Argentinean market. This is the layer of the ruling class that supports Kirchner. This layer is formed, amongst others, by the construction sector and businessmen belonging to employers' organisations such as Unión Industrial Argentina (UIA) and Asociación Empresaria Argentina (AEA). Members of this last organisation alone generate some $120 billion in sales, equivalent to 38% of Argentine GDP. Clearly, far from being a marginal section of the Argentine ruling class, this layer forms an important part of the bourgeoisie and national oligarchy. The state apparatus For a number of years the Argentine state apparatus had fallen under the direct influence of the first section of the ruling class mentioned above, through the politicians that it controlled. To keep things simple, we will call this layer, the "Menemist" section (although it also includes those who support Lopez Murphy). Parliament and the courts had the task of providing a "legal" cover for the business dealings of this section as well as for the bleeding of national wealth that took place during the privatisation programme. The widespread corruption of the highest civil servants in Buenos Aires and the provinces, in conjunction with the clientelist policies of buying votes and favours, led to the squandering of a massive amount of state resources. In parallel, mass tax evasion and the increase in foreign debt massively reduced state income, which in turn sharpened the economic crisis that surfaced at the end of the 1990's, increasing factory closures and the huge flight of capital abroad. It was only a matter of time before the state itself would be declared bankrupt. From a purely capitalist point of view, this situation could not go on forever. For capitalism to function "normally", it needs clear rules that are, in theory, applied equally to all sectors of the economy. The progressive decomposition of Argentine capitalism over the last 25 years, reflected in the dismembering of the industrial sector, the massive dependence on foreign capital and the appearance of a rentier and parasitical economy, ended in the biggest economic crisis in Argentine history and the popular uprising of December 2001 known locally as "el argentinazo". The aim of the measures announced by Kirchner is to save the capitalist system, by attacking the interests of the most parasitic sector of the economy. He wants to do this by "cleaning up" and "reorganising" the state apparatus in order to mould it to the interests of the sector of the bourgeoisie that he represents. For Kirchner's policies to work, it is absolutely vital to boost state revenues in order to "square the circle": e.g. pay off the foreign debt and maintain state spending levels. Kirchner intends to keep the 20% tax on livestock, agricultural and oil exports, which will inevitably bring him into conflict with this section of the bourgeoisie. In order to fight the tax dodgers, who pilfer an astronomical amount $30 billion a year (equal to 10% of GDP and 45% of the state's budget), he wants to create special courts. However, the Kirchner government has no intention of raising taxes for the rich and big business. He only wants them to "respect" the rules of the game and convince them to at least pay their "legal" taxes. These measures will "hit" the most parasitic sector of the economy the most (agriculture-livestock, privatised industry and the banks). In doing this, the government's objective is to transfer a small part of the profits of these sectors to the state in order to underpin its economic policy, which is more favourable to the industrial sector, and help with the implementation of the already announced programme of public works. The struggle between these sections of the ruling class has manifested itself in other ways within the state apparatus, particularly on the issue of how to deal with the protest movement. In the recent period, the "Menemist" sector has become increasingly arrogant, wanting to "criminalise" the mass movement and use the "hard line". The military and police also favoured this policy. However, the "pro-Kirchner" lobby (and before him the pro-Duhalde supporters), which is far more intelligent, is aware of the fact that given the social situation and in spite of the relative calm in the class struggle, a wave of repression against the movement would be counter-productive and might even trigger an upsurge in the movement, as proved by the events that followed the killings of activists by the police at Puente Pueyrredon in June 2002. In this context of "easy money" and widespread corruption in the state apparatus, the leaderships of the military and police began to operate as a sort of state within a state. The cowardly policies of the bourgeois political establishment towards the tops of the army and the police since the end of the dictatorship (1976-1983) has given the latter an almost "untouchable" status. The Supreme Court, undeniably in the hands of the "Menemists", used its power during Duhalde's presidency to "sabotage" attempts to suspend it by pronouncing a number of demagogic rulings with populist overtones, such as the unconstitutionality of the "Final Point and Due Obedience" laws (leyes Obediencia Debida y Punto Final) and the illegality of the freezing of bank accounts (el "Corralito"), amongst others. It unashamedly used its authority with the sole aim of protecting its own privileges by targeting the capitalists and the government with these rulings and the threat of future "rulings". Therefore Kirchner's decision to purge a part of the state apparatus (Armed Forces, police and Supreme Court) is aimed, as we said above, at partially "cleansing" this organ in order to be able to control it better and make it serve the interests of the section of the ruling class that he represents. There are also other more personal, although by no means decisive, reasons behind these measures to "cleanse" the state's forces of repression. Unlike Menem or Lopez Murphy, who are of bourgeois origin and conscious representatives of their class, and for whom the state apparatus is a special instrument designed to perpetuate the domination of the ruling class by repressing the mass movement, Kirchner is a petit bourgeois, who as a young man was actually involved in the "left-wing" of the Peronist party. Like all petit-bourgeois elements, he is imbued with the mystical idea of the "democratic" state acting to smooth over contradictions in society, rising above the social classes and subject to the "democratic" control of the people. It is therefore no surprise that he would be unhappy with the presence of people with past links to the dictatorship, of the corrupt cliques of the Menemists and their "conspirational" groups and arrogant military, police and judicial figures who try to influence the policies of the government that effect them directly. He probably wants to make sure that everyone knows who "calls the shots" from now so that these sorts of elements keep a low profile. In this respect, all sections of the ruling class (through their "mouthpieces" in the editorial columns of the newspapers Clarín, La Nación and others) showed their dislike of the "excessive" and "unnecessary" nature of what they have come to call the "military purge". These sections are openly expressing the feelings of their class. They are aware of the fact that this "military purge" destroys the myth that the tops of the military are "untouchable". The exaggerated "fear of the army" amongst the population has also taken a hard knock. It has reduced many people's fear and dread of an instrument of repression that in this country has always not hesitated to use the most extreme violence and cruelty against the working class and other sections of the masses. Most of the measures that have recently been causing a stir and whose aim is to hoodwink the workers are, in class terms, "free" in that they cost the capitalists nothing in material terms. Kirchner is focusing his activity on the main objective of securing victory for the faction of the bourgeoisie that he represents. These measures have been designed to satisfy a fundamental requirement of Argentine capitalism: to win back the masses' trust in the regime's institutions, to cleverly divert their attention towards parliamentary debate, to confine all conflict to within the arena of state bodies and generally pacify them after the very volatile months that followed December 2001, when this trust began to melt as quickly as snow in the sun. Furthermore, the state, as an instrument of class domination, cannot continue to bear the hallmarks of "Menemism" if it wants to give the impression to the masses that it is "impartial" and "democratic". It must therefore be cleansed and window-dressed. The sector of the bourgeoisie that Kirchner represents wants to reduce the drain on state resources as well as show the masses that the state can be both impartial and trustworthy, whilst of course maintaining it firmly under its control. Is national capitalism possible? If Kirchner really wanted to govern in the interests of the workers,
increase state spending to meet the needs of the population and implement
a genuine programme of public works that would transform the country and
eliminate unemployment, he would have to start by tearing up the
agreements signed with IMF and refusing to pay the foreign debt. This
would earn the state the billions of dollars required to make these
policies reality. Therefore to talk, like Chavez and a number of other "left-wing" nationalists in our country do, of the possibility of Latin American unity on a "national capitalist" basis is pure pie in the sky. The idea of a meeting on "Latin American unity" with Fidel and Chavez talking together with the rotten, pro-imperialist oligarchies of Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina and Paraguay is just laughable. The Latin American oligarchy is in fact very comfortable with present situation, disposing of the resources of each country as it pleases, with a helping hand of course from the US and European capitalists. We have already described above that the only way to build a serious challenge to imperialism and the local oligarchy is through a socialist revolution led by the working class. We, as Socialist revolutionaries, are firmly in favour of Latin American unity. However, we realise that there is only one way of achieving this, namely through a Socialist Federation of Latin America. This would be a very powerful force that would not only be able to defeat any attempts on the part of imperialism to crush the revolution and successfully integrate and plan the resources of the whole continent in a harmonious manner, with the aim of improving the economic, social and cultural conditions of our peoples, but it would also get the support of the working class in America itself and the rest of the capitalist world, thus sapping the bases for an imperialist intervention and widening the struggle for socialism to more and more countries. The mood in the working class and perspectives We think it appropriate to discuss this last point, despite the fact that we went over it in detail in the last article about the elections, as we would like to underline a number of points that we think important. Many activists on the left were disappointed and disorientated by the results of the presidential elections in April. This disappointment and disorientation has only increased with the majority support for Kirchner and his government revealed by recent opinion polls. They are also unsettled by the "popular", or at least not openly reactionary, measures taken during the first weeks of his government. Some activists and leaders from the most important left groups are even talking about a "swing to the right" in society and that the movement born of the "Argentinazo" is over and that there is no sense in talking about the existence of a "revolutionary process". We do not share the pessimistic conclusions that come from this type of analysis. We believe that there has neither been "a swing to the right" in society nor that there is a feeling of profound disillusionment or defeat within the working class. Admittedly the vanguard of the movement, comprised of tens of thousands of activists from left groups, the piqueteros, militant trade unions, popular assemblies and the youth, fought with great passion over the last year and half of massive social upheaval in the country. Unfortunately, due to the depth of the capitalist economic crisis and the refusal of the trade union leaders to lead a mass movement, the activists remained relatively isolated from the majority of the working class, which in general remained passive during this period. It is also true to say that this extraordinary movement of the vanguard has ebbed quite significantly over the last few months. All this is true. However we believe that it would be an error to confuse the mood of the activists with that of the whole of the working class, which always takes a certain period of time for mobilising. The real mood of the working class is reflected in a distorted fashion
by its attitude to the Kirchner government. This mood has nothing to do
with defeat but is actually characterised by the enormous hopes that
workers have placed in the new president. Kirchner, in relatively
demagogical fashion, made a number of gestures to "his left", even
before he was elected, in order to boost his social power base, and he is
still doing this, relatively successfully. On the contrary, this does not
signify a mood of defeat amongst the workers, but a mood of hope and a
certain level of expectation. Without this mood in the population,
Kirchner would have never been able to carry out his "purge" of
the military leadership. This actually demonstrates the very weak basis of
support for reaction in Argentina, despite the fact that many on the left
never lost an opportunity, at certain moments of the struggle, to frighten
everybody with talk of a possible coup d'état. The enormous expectation created by the visit of Fidel is good proof of the mood. Leaving aside the criticisms that we may have of certain aspects of the Cuban regime, there is no doubt about the support and sympathy that Castro attracts in wide layers of the workers and the youth of Latin America, as well as the whole world. If there had been a mood of defeat and retreat, there would have never have been so many people turning up spontaneously to Castro's meeting, which gathered nearly 20,000 people (undoubtedly followed by tens of thousands more on TV). The coming to power of Kirchner, in the context described in this article, and the effect produced by his initial measures, has been the "accident" which is tearing from their lethargy wide layers of workers and youth with no previous political experience and who, up to now, have been absent from the movement. They are starting to get interested in politics, which, combined with their previous experience, will prepare the conditions for their entry into the class struggle itself. Admittedly, at the moment, they are doing this in an expectant fashion, waiting on each decision of the government, but tomorrow they will go on to the offensive if the president fails to translate the letter of his promises into concrete actions. The Kirchner government will therefore be subject to two pressures; the working class on one side urging him on to fulfil his promises and the various sections of the capitalist class on the other side egging him on to implement the policies most in line with their interests. The presence in his government of people openly related to big business such as Beliz and others will open up splits and divisions sooner or later between those who believe that more concessions should be given to prevent a social explosion and those who think that enough is enough, fearing that the workers will ask for more and more. Peronism is in fact a heterogeneous mixture of different interests and political points of view. Sooner or later it will explode into pieces. In this respect, it is noteworthy that while the support and hopes for Kirchner are a reality, Peronism as a political movement generates absolutely no enthusiasm amongst the mass of the working class at all. This is extremely positive. It is precisely due to this lack of political alternative, that the hopes of millions of workers and youth have been focused on Kirchner. This is one of Kirchner's major strengths (and of the section of bourgeoisie that supports him) at the moment. However, it is also his weakness in that he will not be able to satisfy the hopes placed in him. Tomorrow when these hopes are dashed by stark reality, for the reasons that we have explained above, the mass of the working class will move into action to try and fulfil his promises through direct action, if he is not able to do so. This will take the form of strikes, marches, factory occupations etc. Through its experience, the working class will see the limitations of petit bourgeois politicians like Kirchner who try to reconcile the irreconcilable: i.e. the interests of the capitalists with those of the workers. The workers will understand the necessity of having their own political tool, i.e. their own party to fulfil their own objectives. They will push the union leaders into action on both the industrial and political fronts. Sooner or later, the idea will appear of creating a workers' party based on the trade unions to fight the anti-working class policies of the various bourgeois governments that will now follow. This would be a major conquest for the Argentine working class, which never before has been represented by a mass party. When this time comes, left activists will have to make a choice: either participate actively in this mass experience side by side with the workers to raise and spread the genuine ideas of socialism and revolution or remain at the wayside of this process, isolated in small groups with no connection with the mass of the working class and youth. We, in El Militante, have already chosen the first option. Although the Argentine ruling class has been able to regain control of the situation in the wake of the revolutionary process that followed the "argentinazo" popular uprising in December 2001, it has been able to solve nothing. The next few months and years will be decisive for the working class and youth of Argentina. Through their very own experience, successes and errors, more and more and wider and wider layers of youth and workers will come to the conclusion that a radical change in society is necessary and they will look to the programme of revolutionary socialism as a way of carrying this out. June 5, 2003. See the original in Spanish. |



