This document was written by Zimbabwean socialists in 1985 and deals in detail with the history of the struggle against colonialism, the character of the Mugabe regime and the tasks facing socialists in Zimbabwe at that time. We have decided to republish it here to give revolutionary activists in Southern Africa and in the rest of the world a better understanding of the background to the current crisis.
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This document, produced by Zimbabwean socialists a year ago, has recently came into our hands. We publish it to give it wider circulation, particularly among South African workers and youth.
Discussion on the way forward for Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwean revolution - and the tasks which flow from this for the South African movement - is made more urgent by developments of the recent period.
The apartheid regime's escalated economic and military aggression in Southern Africa, though directed particularly against Mozambique, in reality has Zimbabwe as its key target. With the MNK's "declaration of war" against Zimbabwe, it is South Africa that is engaged in a proxy war with the Mugabe regime.
The reasons for this are outlined in the accompanying document, especially in the introduction to it. Essentially, they are because Zimbabwe, with a stronger industrial base than any other Southern African country, is South African imperialism's immediate rival in the region.
What this means is that the future of the Zimbabwean and the South African revolution are increasingly linked together.
South African workers have the responsibility to give active support to Zimbabwean resistance to South African aggression.
This means struggling together with Zimbabwean workers, peasants and youth to weaken South African imperialism and defend the gains of the victory over the Smith regime.
It requires also the fullest encouragement of the struggle of workers and youth in Zimbabwe to end capitalism and achieve genuine democratic rule by the people on the basis of workers' power.
As this document explains, despite the achievement of political independence and of some reforms under the ZANU(PF) regime, the real power in Zimbabwe remains in the hands of the capitalist class which owns the big banks, factories, mines, and farms, and who dictate the policies of the government. The Zimbabwean state remains a capitalist state.
While vigorously defending Zimbabwe and its present government against threats or attacks by South Africa, youth and workers in South Africa ought also to make clear their criticism of a government in Zimbabwe which safeguards multinationals like Anglo-American, and which imprisons workers for striking.
The organised workers of South Africa have the responsibility of giving assistance to the Zimbabwean workers struggling for independent trade unions under workers' control. Direct links should be built, particularly at the factory level, and Zimbabwean workers invited to visit South Africa and participate in union conferences, etc.
South African workers' leaders should not sit in hotels during visits to trade union and other conferences in Zimbabwe, but establish contact with the workers' committees and make clear they condemn anti-worker laws and the detention of trade unionists.
Dealings with the Zimbabwean workers' movement should not be confined - as is largely the case at present - to "diplomatic" relations with the state-controlled ZCTU leadership. Most of these leaders have a very bad record of taking the bosses' side or failing to struggle for workers' interests.
Why should the enemies of the Southern African workers such as Lonrho and Anglo-American be protected in Zimbabwe? We need united action against these employers by the working class of the whole region.
When South African trade union leaders meet with the heads of Zimbabwean unions, the occasion should be used to appeal openly to the workers directly to join in a united struggle.
The Southern African revolution can only succeed finally with the overthrow of apartheid and capitalism in South Africa itself. But the further development of the Zimbabwean revolution is a vital component of this.
Not only in Zimbabwe, but throughout Southern Africa, a huge gulf is opening up between what capitalism can offer and what the masses demand - as revealed in the angry mass protests on the Zambian copperbelt against IMF-imposed food price rises of up to 100% which were violently repressed at the cost of at least ten lives. Governments carrying out these capitalist policies, whatever their pious "anti-apartheid" proclamations, are in no position to mobilise an effective fight against South African aggression.
The way forward in the struggle in Zimbabwe, Zambia, and throughout the region - depends on the socialist opposition growing among the working class in the trade unions and mass parties, around a programme to abolish capitalism.
South African workers must give these class brothers and sisters uncompromising support.
Since the Lancaster House agreement in late 1979, the people of Zimbabwe have experienced many important changes. Most important has been the achievement of black majority rule and the end of the war which cost the lives of 30,000 people.
In the period following, many peasants were able to build permanent houses for the first time in many years without fear that they would be pulled down again.
Families were reunited. Ex-combatants struggled to catch up with lost opportunities, particularly in education.
Under Mugabe's ZANU(PF) government, many social reforms were introduced, in the fields of education, health, etc.
Most of all, independence brought a feeling that the African people would at last have their people in government.
Yet the first elections since independence, held in July 1985, while producing an even bigger majority for ZANU(PF), at the same time revealed numerous signs of the growing disappointment among the masses that what they had expected from majority rule had not yet been achieved. The sore of tribal-national division between Shona and Ndebele was the most stark reflection that the Zimbabwean revolution had become stalled. What is the way forward?
The draft of this document was written at the time of those elections, to address that central question. Revisions were subsequently made to the draft, circulated in early 1986, to clarify its arguments, rather than to update it. In fact, judged against the broad sweep of subsequent events, its projection of likely developments in Zimbabwe, and the tasks for Zimbabwean workers, youth and peasants, has stood the test of time.
At the same time, in one respect at least, events have served to highlight more sharply a crucial determining factor in Zimbabwean perspectives. What has become clearer is that Zimbabwe forms the key target in the overall destabilisation strategy of the South African regime in Southern Africa.
Zimbabwe and South African imperialism
Of South Africa's neighbours, Zimbabwe has the most developed industrial base. It is therefore more able to resist South African pressures, and to provide a potential counterweight around which other Southern African states can rally against the apartheid regime.
The elections early in March 1980 which brought Mugabe to power were followed within days by the formation of SADCC. These two events devastated the strategy of a "Constellation of Southern African States" which Botha had put forward in 1979.
Despite Mugabe saying at that time that his government would not be directly involved in the struggle in South Africa, the ZANU(PF) victory and the relatively developed capitalist base placed Zimbabwe in the objective position of principal obstacle to South Africa's imperialist ambitions.
The utopian plans of SADCC for the economic disengagement of the Southern African states would appear absolutely ridiculous if it were not for Zimbabwe's participation. There is at least some limited scope for interlinking these economies around the axis of Zimbabwean industry, although that could not overcome the enormous preponderance of South African economic power.
Zimbabwean capitalism would like to take over domination of the Southern African market for itself. This (even to the limited extent it would proceed) is an objective basis of conflict between Zimbabwe and South Africa, despite the extensive penetration of Zimbabwe by South African capital.
Most of Zimbabwe's foreign trade passes through South Africa. But the Pretoria regime cannot use this leverage in quite the same way as it squeezes or threatens Lesotho, Mozambique or Botswana - because South Africa's own trade routes to Zambia and Malawi are heavily dependent on smooth passage through Zimbabwe.
There are features of an uneasy stand-off in relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa. There is a constant struggle - now more open, now more hidden - in which Harare strives to lessen South African pressure on it, especially in trying to develop or maintain alternative transport routes to those through the South African ports.
Inevitable confrontation
The inevitable confrontation between Zimbabwe and South Africa has been partly concealed by secret negotiations between security officials, by Mugabe's outright support for the Nkomati Agreement, and by both sides realising how much damage they could inflict on each other.
For some time after Zimbabwe achieved independence it appeared that South Africa was forced to hold back from attempts to destabilise Zimbabwe. South African support for the "dissidents" in Matabeleland was half-hearted; the Preferential Trade Agreement with Zimbabwe was renewed regularly; and the secret security talks continued.
At that time it was important to stress that the prospect of revolution at home would force the apartheid regime to lash out wildly and make "peaceful relations between the two countries impossible."
It is now clear that a key element in the South African destabilisation strategy has been to undermine Zimbabwe's potential leadership role in the region by forcing its trade through South African ports.
Once this is clearly grasped it becomes easier to see why South Africa continued to give active support to MNR counter-revolutionary banditry in Mozambique despite all the concessions made to Botha by Samora Machel in the 1984 Nkomati Agreement.
Despite incidents such as the military attack on Harare in May this year and the provocation of holding up transport at the Beit Bridge border in August, the main direct thrust of South African aggression against Zimbabwe remains within Mozambique.
The Botha regime's policy of further weakening the FRELIMO government through maintaining or increasing the pressure of the MNR, has a central aim: to try and ensure that all Zimbabwean trade through Maputo will have to go via South Africa and that the Beira line to the sea will never be secure.
This policy has succeeded to the extent that Zimbabwean trade through Mozambique has been reduced from 54% in 1983 to 5% in 1986. This has occurred despite the higher freight charges through South Africa, and despite Zimbabwe's efforts in support of the FRELIMO government against the MNR.
South African destabilisation policies have succeeded in making SADCC states now more dependent on South Africa than in 1980.
Mugabe has responded to the process of slow strangulation by sending in troops to defend the Beira line and by launching a diplomatic offensive to raise funds for the "Beira corridor".
He and FRELIMO have succeeded in getting the British and US governments to support the rehabilitation of the Beira and Nacala-Malawi railway lines. In the case of the Thatcher government this support includes important military assistance to FRELIMO.
On an issue such as the Beira line the policies of British and US imperialism and those of the Botha regime can diverge.
The Western imperialist powers are concerned to stabilise Southern Africa for capitalism; South African imperialism to destabilise and weaken Southern African resistance to its domination. London and Washington would like to see a capitalist counter-weight in Southern Africa to act as a pressure for reform on the Botha regime; Pretoria wants no obstacles to its freedom of manoeuvre and repression at home or in the region.
The Western powers are concerned lest South African pressure on the SADCC states induces them to turn towards the USSR and Eastern Europe. Last, and not least, the big capitalist powers are out to secure the Southern African markets for themselves.
The SADCC leaders base their whole strategy on trying to exploit these divergences in policy between the different imperialisms. But this cannot provide the way forward for the development of Southern Africa.
Already South Africa and Zimbabwe are engaged in a proxy war in Mozambique. Mugabe has announced after the death of Samora Machel that he will not tolerate the MNR coming to power; South Africa's puppet "declared war" on Zimbabwe in response.
As a commentator recently wrote: "The MNR's declaration of war has effectively widened the range of options that Pretoria has at its disposal." (Financial Times, 30 October 1986) This "declaration of war" would be a joke were it not for South Africa's backing and the frequent MNR attacks on the Beira line.
Facts of South African power
The South African generals have the power to cripple the Beira line at almost any time if they feel decisive action is needed. These are the facts of South African power, and Zimbabwean and Mozambican workers and peasants can put no trust in the tactical divisions between Western imperialism and the Botha regime.
An effective defence against South African aggression which the workers and youth are striving towards, demands new methods.
Zimbabwean youth and workers in the townships, factories, schools, villages, mines, and farms, should be armed to repel any South African incursion. This would also free larger sections of the army to engage against the South African sponsored MNR and defend the Mozambican revolution.
But the ultimate guarantee of success against the counter-revolution is not by military means alone. What is needed is the elimination of the breeding grounds of support for, or passive submission to, the MNR - in the starvation and destitution of the Mozambican peasantry which has yet to experience the benefits of the state control of the economy.
Zimbabwe is in an excellent position to repay the debts of gratitude incurred during the liberation struggle. The granaries are full to overflowing with maize which is desperately needed in Mozambique. Industry could be turned around to process raw materials from Mozambique. The textile industry in Zimbabwe, for example, has the capacity to clothe the whole population of Southern Africa apart from South Africa. Simple spare parts and consumer goods could be supplied on a cooperative basis.
But the productive forces in Zimbabwe can only be directed to the social and military tasks of defence against counter-revolution if the capitalist grip on the banks, monopolies, and farms is broken and industry reorganised by the workers and peasants on the basis of a national and regional plan.
A Socialist Federation of Zimbabwe and Mozambique, in short, is the only effective answer to counterrevolution.
Political direction
These fundamental tasks of the Southern African revolution raise the question of which direction the Mugabe government is taking. As explained in the document, the most productive land is still in the hands of white capitalist farmers, and the ownership of the factories and mines by the monopolies remains unchanged.
Although there is a black government and civil service, this state fundamentally defends capitalist interests against the demands for change by the workers, peasants, and youth.
None of the tasks of the Zimbabwean revolution have been carried through to completion on the basis of capitalism. Although white minority rule has been ended, what democratic freedoms were achieved after independence are now under threat.
Yet the leadership does everything in its power to deny the reality that the capitalists dictate their policies. All the policies of the Mugabe government, including (for example) cuts in the state budget, are carried out in the name of socialism! But calling capitalist policies "socialist" does not solve the problems of the masses. Rather, it ends up discrediting socialism.
A large state bureaucracy is growing in Zimbabwe which extols the virtues of Stalinist regimes such as the USSR, China, Eastern Europe and North Korea. What in reality they admire in these regimes is the privileged life-style of the ruling bureaucracies, which have a basis of stability unmatched in the crisis-ridden capitalist countries especially of the "Third World". That "stability" has been established on the advantages of state ownership and economic planning, and is maintained through so-called "Marxist-Leninist" party apparatuses - which rule by totalitarian methods.
In Zimbabwe, the "socialist" bureaucracy models ZANU(PF) in this way in order to maintain its privilege, not on the basis of the state ownership and planning of the economy, but by defending capitalism!
This leads to bizarre contradictions. Thus, although both ZANU(PF) and ZAPU have declared their parties "Marxist-Leninist", one of the ZANU(PF) leaders Nkala, recently admitted that "debate is in full blast within ZANU(PF) whether or not socialism is the best ideological path for Zimbabwe." (Prize Africa, December 1985)
Because of the contradiction between "socialist" policies and capitalist reality we have a "Marxist-Leninist" party which is not sure whether it is committed to socialism! This means that at least a section of the bureaucracy favours openly abandoning even the pretence of "socialism", in order the better to get on with enriching itself.
These glaring contradictions produce doubts and scepticism in the minds of the masses and a growing political crisis within the leadership.
Developments on these lines are predicted in the document. However, it even understated the absurdity with which they are working themselves out.
"Adopted capitalism"
In June this year, one of the top leaders of ZANU(PF), Maurice Nyagumbo, was forced to admit that Zimbabwe did not have a socialist government, "as we now appear to have adopted capitalism, become property owners, and appear to be deceiving our people." (Guardian, 7 June 1986)
Admitting that he had bought a large farm after independence, but had recently sold it, he even proposed that there should be an emergency conference of ZANU(PF) at which the rank and file should decide whether to replace the leadership.
Nyagumbo did not, however, reveal what he had done with the proceeds from the sale of his farm. Moreover, such are the doubts about the leaders that the workers and youth were not at all surprised to hear nothing more about his astonishing proposal for a conference!
Rather than representing the emergence of a serious socialist left-wing, such outbursts have everything to do with bureaucratic rivalry. Hardly beneath the surface, as the document points out, are the struggles between the different Shona regional overlords in ZANU(PF).
Less than two months before the "admission of guilt" by Mugabe's favourite, this was confirmed when the regional and tribal tensions within ZANU(PF) exploded in parliament.
Ushewokunze, then Minister of Transport and political commissar of ZANU(PF), responded to criticisms of his political and business dealings by launching a diatribe against his political enemies within the party.
In the past identified as a "left" and calling for the formation of Marxist study circles, this leader now accused the Shona Karanga clan of plotting to "pounce on me and kill me" just as (he alleged) they had killed Chitepo, a leader of the guerrilla struggle. The Karangas considered him "a spanner in the works in their jockeying for tribal political control" and had constantly plotted his downfall, he said.
The filth of nepotism, corruption, and mismanagement in the ZANU(PF) government revealed by both sides in the affair brought disgrace to the leadership as a whole. For a time the government was virtually paralysed by the sordid controversy.
Faced with this, Mugabe has sought to maintain his reputation by levering himself above the daily cut and thrust of politics. He increasingly projects himself as a world statesman concerned with the leadership of the Third World and its diplomatic manoeuvres against apartheid South Africa.
The ZANU(PF)-ZAPU deal
The crisis of leadership has raised continual questions over the fate of the protracted unity talks between the ZANU(PF) and ZAPU leaders.
If agreement depended on the desires and ideas of the leadership, no deal would have been possible. The attitude of the ZANU(PF) leadership was shown in the statement of Ushewokunze: "We believe that everything is right in ZANU(PF) and, therefore, we see no need for concessions, compromise, and accommodation." (Sunday Mail, 19 January 1986)
On the other side the ZAPU leaders, rather than fighting for socialist policies in a unified party, see the question as merely one of the "rightful role" of Father Zimbabwe (Nkomo) and themselves in the privileged bureaucracy.
The deal has succeeded not because of what the politicians wanted, but because they have no alternative.
It is reported, for example, that Mnangagwa, the security minister in charge of the CIO, has been the leading advocate of the deal (behind closed doors, of course) after his eyes had been opened to the devastation of Mozambique by the South African-backed MNR.
As the Guardian correspondent commented: "A continuation of Zimbabwe's tragic divisions would only give South Africa on a silver platter a ready-made dissident group with an ethnic base." (17 April 1986)
It is this, and ZAPU's retention of support in Matabeleland in the 1985 elections, which has advanced the discussions. As the document argues, Zimbabwean military involvement in Mozambique will become ever more demanding, making military suppression of Matabeleland an unattractive option for Mugabe.
Yet the deal will have to be a very poor thing, based on the division of party and government positions, rather than a determination to unite. While the ZAPU leadership is trying to let "bygones be bygones" as they seek positions, the evidence of joint ZANU(PF)-ZAPU rallies shows that the Ndebele peasants want a real change.
At a rally earlier this year, Nkala, the former tormentor of Nkomo, was interrupted by the audience of Ndebele peasants who demanded that troops should be withdrawn from their area. (Prize Africa, May 1986)
Problems such as these will surface again and again even after the details of the unity deal are spelt out. Thousands of Ndebele workers, youth, and peasants, have been killed during the military repression since 1982.
In the future both party leaders will try to draw a curtain over the terrible facts of repression. As in the case of the bloody military dictatorships of Latin America, the ZANU(PF) leaders will argue they had to fight a "dirty war" against terrorism and that any methods were justified.
But they had to undertake the bloody repression of Matabeleland because they were not prepared to undertake a socialist campaign to transform Zimbabwean society which would have undercut the dissidents.
As the price for their positions in government, the ZAPU leaders will remain silent on the torture and murders.
If the facts were known to the Shona workers and peasants - and if the revolutionary socialist alternative were understood - the government's repression would be regarded as a national disgrace and a matter for deep shame.
But with the first flush of enthusiasm for the deal these issues will be side-stepped as both Shona and Ndebele workers and peasants welcome the easing of pressures to divide on tribal-national lines.
Previously Marxists had to argue that a deal was possible despite the lack of will by the petty bourgeois politicians. Now the opposite side of the coin will have to be stressed: that on the basis of capitalism the tribal-national divisions will open up with greater force in the future.
Genuine socialists will seize the opportunity of the pause in tribal-national chauvinism to raise the question of workers' unity against the capitalists. It is vital that both Shona and Ndebele workers use this opportunity to initiate steps to develop class unity across regional divisions in the workplace and township.
These tasks can only be carried out if the workers unite to build the trade unions, independent of state control against the policies of compromise and collaboration with capitalism of the bureaucracy in the trade unions and party, and give voice to the ideas of genuine socialism in the party as well.
Economic prospects
The document argues that the economic upturn of 1984-85 would peak in 1986 and then an economic decline would set in basically because of the shortage of foreign exchange.
This has now been confirmed. The most recent report of the Standard Bank (September 1986) talks of "formidable challenges over the next 18 months" during which adverse factors would predominate.
The 5-year development plan announced in April takes no account of the prevailing crisis in world capitalism, and the accumulating factors which will almost certainly produce a new recession or slump internationally, with serious consequences for Zimbabwe, in the period covered by the plan. Its targets, based on continued steady growth, cannot be taken seriously. The overall method of the plan is thoroughly dishonest - there is no balance sheet drawn up to compare what was targeted and what was achieved in the previous 3-year plan.
In all the key questions of economic and social life, in employment, housing, land resettlement, investment etc, the targets of the first plan were sabotaged by the capitalists' command of the economy.
In agriculture, for example, between 1980 and 1985 there has been a decline of 27% in employment (100,000 jobs) despite the value of output rising by at least 50% over the same period. (Zimbabwe News, June 1985) While brick and other building material workers were retrenched, only 13,500 out of 115,000 houses targeted were built.
What progress was made was achieved at the expense of rising inflation and growing debts to local and international capitalists.
Increasingly Zimbabwe also faces the spill-over effects of the general uncertainty of the capitalists in South Africa.
The economy is not only adversely affected by local factors, but increasingly hemmed in by the world market. Even in the course of the recent upturn in the US economy world commodity prices fell dramatically. With recession in the US, they will be likely to fall further.
In many countries of the under-developed world the costs of producing primary commodities are now well above the world prices particularly in sugar and tin, even though starvation wages are paid to the workers.
These factors apply equally to Zimbabwe and will tend to pull the economy into decline even if there is reasonable rainfall.
The coming of a world slump will devastate the economies of the former colonial countries and face the political leaders of these countries with the prospect either of watching whole industries disappearing or being forced to take emergency measures to bring the productive forces under state ownership.
The socialist opposition in the workers' committees, trade unions, and party, face the challenge of preparing the workers and youth for these developments. Faced by such a crisis the working class will have to fight against all the gains of the past being removed, and will have to win the support of the peasants.
But for the working class to succeed a clear program showing the way forward is necessary. The Marxists will have to show how the crisis can only be overcome by the completion of the revolution; by the working class placing itself at the head of the nation against imperialism; by overthrowing capitalism and securing a democratic workers' state.
This would then open the way to a plan of production, the expansion of manufacturing, and the real development of the country with an economy geared to the people's needs, not profit. But within the national boundaries of Zimbabwe the limits of even this achievement would soon be clear - the revolution would have to spread for the gains to be continued, and for a socialist society to be constructed.
Workers' power in Zimbabwe would be a beacon to the workers and peasants of Africa struggling under the one-party dictatorships of capitalism. It would hasten the workers' revolution in South Africa - the only sure defence of a democratic workers' state in Zimbabwe from counter-revolution.
Workers' democratic rule throughout Southern Africa would point the way forward to genuine regional cooperation, developing agriculture and industry, eliminating poverty, and laying the foundations for socialism.
10 December 1986
By "perspectives" we mean an understanding of the most likely economic and political developments ahead, internationally and nationally. Without clear perspectives, the working class cannot be prepared for its historical task of taking power and making an end to dictatorship, poverty, and ignorance.
But the task of working out perspectives is not simple. Government "experts" and the capitalists themselves do not understand the processes at work. They grope in the dark, making big mistakes.
We only have to think of the Zimbabwe government's "expert", Riddell, who predicted in the Transitional National Plan for 1982-85 that the Zimbabwe economy would grow by 8% per year in this period - a total of over 24%. In fact, the economy declined by 2.5% in this period!
As a Ziana correspondent, Ruth Weiss, has admitted, there is a "short-term view of everything, giving rise alternatively to euphoria and pessimism with bewildering rapidity". (Guardian, 23 August 1985)
Looking at developments in society without using the method of Marxism, events may seem completely confused and unpredictable.
For the working class, the method of Marxism is essential in developing the necessary understanding of events. Marxism is sometimes called the "science of perspectives". It gathers together the most conscious and disciplined strugglers, and equips them to mobilise the mass of the workers for the task of social transformation.
Even the most thorough perspectives, of course, cannot predict every detail and every turn ahead. But perspectives can give us a grasp of the underlying processes at work in society. This can prepare the workers for sudden changes, and enable them to cope with new situations.
Through working out the perspectives, the conscious activists become able to explain correctly the tasks of the movement at every stage of the struggle. In this process they can win the confidence of the mass of workers, and make clear the shortcoming of every political current in the movement that opposes Marxism.
Only in this way can Marxism be built into a mass force to transform society.
The perspectives for every country today have to start from an understanding of the world situation.
A problem for Zimbabweans coming to an understanding of the perspectives for their country is the limited amount of information available about what is happening in the world. This leads to a widespread feeling of isolation from developments internationally, and difficulties in understanding how Zimbabwe is affected by these developments.
But there can be no escape from the need for a disciplined internationalist approach to the future of Zimbabwe and the struggles of the workers and youth.
The economy of every capitalist country has become integrated into a single world economy. It is now impossible for any country to withdraw from the world market - no country can possibly be self-sufficient.
This integration is most advanced in the developed capitalist countries, but also dominates political life in the former colonial world.
Landlocked
That Zimbabwe is landlocked is frequently remarked on. What is the importance of this? That Zimbabwe needs access to the sea - in order to conduct overseas trade. Exports and imports in fact make up about one quarter of the total annual value of production in Zimbabwe. Almost all spheres of production rely on some imported components, and therefore depend on the foreign currency earnings provided by exports.
Zimbabwe's exports, presently passing through South Africa's ports, are bound for American steel mills or EEC factories - and in return Zimbabwe's imports of machinery, etc come from the same areas. Economically and politically it is locked into capitalist finance and trading relations as a former colony and an exploited subordinate.
Developments in world capitalism affect the Zimbabwean economy and, through that, the character of political developments. The present decline in world commodity prices, for example, cuts the country's export earnings and, through that, stifles economic growth. The government is involved in decisions about who will suffer the consequences - the capitalists or the working masses.
The present world market was developed very largely during the great upswing of world capitalism after the Second World War. In the advanced countries - though not in the Third World - capitalism during this period seemed to have solved the crisis which had ravaged it during the 1920s and 1930s. Through the power of their organisations, workers were able to win concessions from the capitalists and to secure better wages and higher living standards than they had ever enjoyed before.
The world market is dominated by the giant multinational companies of the advanced capitalist countries, who after 1950 not only expanded production to a higher level than ever before in their rush for profits, but concentrated the ownership of production into fewer and fewer hands.
The world crisis of capitalism
Today - as even the Herald and the Chronicle cannot hide from the workers - the international expansion of capitalism has clearly come to an end. In every country the system has entered a period of small upturns and bigger downturns. Growth has slowed down to a snail's pace even in the advanced countries. In the underdeveloped countries, terrible burdens are being placed on the mass of the people.
The causes of the post-war upswing of world capitalism, and of its present terminal crisis, are explained more fully in other Marxist material.
But the fundamental reason lies in capitalism's inherent contradictions. Private ownership of the means of production, and the rise of the nation-state, played a progressive role historically in developing production far beyond the limits previously attainable. Now private ownership and the nation-state have become obstacles to the development of the productive forces (machinery, labour, etc) and to the development of science and technology.
The key to the development of the productive forces, in the modern world, is new investment. But today, even in the advanced capitalist countries, and even in times of "boom", rather than expansion of productive capacity taking place, only 80% of existing productive capacity is being used.
Capitalist production is based on profit, derived from the value of goods produced by the working-class over and above what they are paid in wages - surplus-value, in short. The motor of production is not social need, but the competitive search for profit by private owners, through producing and selling more cheaply than their rivals. In the modern epoch the form this takes is the clash of the giant monopolies and rival imperialist powers to carve up and re-carve the world market among themselves.
On the one hand, capitalism creates a tendency towards the absolute expansion of the capacity to produce commodities; but on the other hand this expansion is checked by the relative limit placed on the buying power of the working class in order to maximise profit.
The ultimate basis of the world market is the purchasing power in the hands of consumers - who, fundamentally, are the working class. But this is, of necessity, less than the total value of production. Capitalism, in other words, has an inherent tendency towards "over production" - not production in excess of the desperate needs of people for more goods and services in order to survive, but in excess of their ability to pay.
Post-war boom
In the post-war boom, through the freeing of trade between nations, the development of new methods of production, opening of new markets, the massive expansion of credit and state deficit-financing, super-exploitation of the Third World, etc, the advanced capitalist countries overcame these inherent limits for a period - but only to create bigger problems and contradictions which are now coming home to roost.
Because the limits are now again asserting themselves, and it is increasingly difficult for the capitalists to produce and sell at a profit, the spiral of expansion has begun to turn into its opposite. In trying to restore profitability, the capitalists close factories, throw workers out of jobs, and attack their living standards. Whatever the capitalists gain from this in preserved or restored profits, the system loses - because all this serves to cut the market and worsen the crisis.
"Austerity" policies by capitalists and their governments thus make matters worse - while attempts to re-stimulate the economy (which worked during the period of post-war boom) lead to rapidly rising prices of goods rather than sustained new development of the market.
On a capitalist basis, there is no way out of the crisis.
As the crisis bites, cut-throat rivalry among the big capitalist powers intensifies. In place of the former freeing of trade, each capitalist power looks for ways to "protect" its home market against "foreign competition" by putting up obstacles to imports - but this serves to cut the market further. Direct or disguised policies of this kind by the imperialist powers hit particularly at "Third World" countries.
The capitalist class internationally is putting less and less investment into new production and therefore new jobs. Instead they are using their wealth to buy each other out, or to gamble for a quick profit in non-productive "investment" such as property, stocks and shares, currency speculation, etc.
Third World commodity prices are driven down, at huge cost to their economies, by the monopoly power of capitalists wanting cheaper raw materials to increase their profits.
Everywhere, the capitalist class is becoming increasing parasitic on society - while tens of millions are unemployed even in advanced capitalist countries, and hundreds of millions in the former colonial world face the threat of starvation.
It is clear that capitalism is ripe for being overthrown and replaced by a higher, more developed form of society, in which production is organised to serve the needs of the producers. We are living in the period of world revolution - of the international transition from capitalism to socialism; from the system of private ownership dominated by the multinational companies, to a system of planned production under the democratic ownership and control of the mass of working people.
In the advanced capitalist countries after the Second World War the massive upswing of capitalism led to relative class peace. Today, the attacks of the capitalist class are pushing workers into struggle in defence of their jobs, wages, and rights. The capitalists, even in the "democratic" countries, are resorting to harsher and harsher methods of control.
During the post-war boom in these countries a leadership arose in the workers' organisations which maintained, along with the capitalists themselves, that the contradictions of capitalism had been ironed out, and that it could provide better living standards for working people indefinitely into the future. These leaders made comfortable careers for themselves, living in privilege, and isolated from the mass of workers.
Today this reformist leadership is an increasing obstacle for the working class in solving its problems. Capitalism offers no way out. Elected to form a government, and failing to break with capitalism, these workers' leaders carry through not reforms, but counter-reforms. In opposition some preach "socialism" - but when they come into government carry out the policies demanded by the capitalists, and abandon their promises to the workers. This is the inevitable consequence of their unwillingness to lead a struggle to break decisively the power of the monopolies and overthrow capitalism.
In every advanced capitalist country the workers' movement has enormous strength. But to solve the problems facing the masses what is required is a leadership armed with a programme for fighting back against the capitalist class, overturning capitalism, and placing the working class in power. For this, the perspectives and methods of Marxism are essential as a scientific guide to action.
Internationally, the forces of Marxism are still very weak. But in a number of advanced capitalist countries these small forces are already beginning to place their stamp on events - notably the supporters of the Militant newspaper in Britain. On the basis of workers' experience of the crisis, these forces will grow by leaps and bounds.
The perspectives for the advanced capitalist countries are shaped, on the one hand, by the remorseless unfolding of the crisis and, on the other, by the struggle of the working class to reclaim control of its trade union and political organisations and transform them, on the basis of Marxism, into instruments for taking power.
This would open the way to the socialist reorganisation of production, genuine democracy, and a society of plenty.
The former colonial world
All the contradictions of capitalism are a hundred times more acute in the former colonial countries.
There is a cruel contradiction between the enormous natural resources that are available to improve the lives of the people, and the totally inadequate development of these resources. Plundered by the capitalists, these countries are developed just enough to allow them to make a contribution to capitalist wealth in Europe, Japan, and the United States, by exporting a few types of raw materials.
In the 1950s leaders such as Nkrumah preached the idea that once political power had been achieved, everything would be possible. "Seek first the political kingdom," he said.
But political independence has not brought about the economic and social development hoped for by the nationalist leaders. Instead, the peasant and worker masses have remained at the mercy of the world market dominated by the imperialist powers.
In fact, they are suffering even greater impoverishment in the present period of capitalist decline, as the prices of their exports are forced down by the imperialist monopolies, and the prices of their imports (mainly manufactured products) are pushed up.
In Africa, the capitalist system is at its most rotten. Africa is the only continent now facing a drop in food production. Throughout the 1980s it is predicted that, on average, there will be no economic growth at all, despite increasing population.
Millions of people live permanently on the brink of starvation. At the same time the capitalists and state officials line their pockets with aid and state funds, and with the wealth produced by the workers.
The only way to break out of colonial poverty is by developing modern industry. This alone can end the dependence of these countries on a few exports, whose prices are controlled by the capitalist giants.
But the ruling elites in these countries are completely parasitic. Under capitalism, in a world market controlled by imperialism, they cannot carve out new markets for the development of production on a national basis.
Within the limits of capitalism, they cannot carry out any of the basic democratic tasks that are necessary for the development of their countries: providing the peasant masses with land and state assistance; unifying the nation; developing industry; establishing political democracy, etc.
Africa and its peoples were split up by the colonial powers on purely arbitrary lines, leaving a terrible legacy of "balkanisation" (the creation of small conflicting states). Because of the general lack of national development, tribal loyalties remain strong within these states. On a capitalist basis, there is no resolution to these problems.
One-party dictatorships
Finding that reform is impossible within stagnant capitalist economies, leaders of African states defend themselves against the pressure of the masses by suppressing democratic rights. They have instituted one-party dictatorships, many of which in turn have been overthrown by military coupe. These civilian or military dictatorships have used the most savage means to keep themselves in power. Yet so clear are the revolutionary demands of the masses that even dictators basing themselves on capitalism sometimes call themselves "socialist"!
Often these regimes protest against the capitalist market system, because it is dominated by the imperialists and out of their control. But they are totally incapable of mobilising the mass of the workers and peasants to break the grip of imperialism over their countries.
The capitalist class of all countries has a vested interest in the continued exploitation and oppression of the colonial peoples. The multinational companies as well as the "national" capitalist class in each country are united against the struggles of the masses. They are totally opposed to the struggle of the workers and peasants for genuine democracy, which would spell an end to their power.
This means that the struggle for democracy and social development must break out of national boundaries to succeed fully. It has to be linked to the struggles of working people in other countries, and particularly those of the advanced capitalist countries, which dominate the world economy.
Tasks
This process was first outlined by Trotsky over 80 years ago, in explaining the tasks of the Russian Revolution. We can sum up his main conclusions as follows:
In 1917, the Russian Revolution was a confirmation of Trotsky's perspectives. In a backward country, a "weak link" in the capitalist chain, the Russian working class came to power and established a workers' state with control over the key sectors of the economy.
Following this, workers struggled to take power in the more developed countries in Europe. But, with the defeat of revolution after revolution, the Russian revolution was isolated. In the struggle over scarce economic resources, those who staffed the state machine had a crucial advantage. A state bureaucracy grew, headed by Stalin, carrying out a bloody political counter-revolution in which all elements of workers' control of society were destroyed.
Stalin, as the representative of the Russian bureaucracy, preached the false idea that socialism could be built in one country. This was the bureaucracy's way of making clear that they were not interested in world revolution. Instead, more and more they have done everything possible to make peace with capitalism and to sabotage healthy revolutions.
In spite of this, economic development in the Soviet Union has been far more rapid than under capitalism. State ownership and central planning of production made it possible to develop industry and largely eliminate poverty in contrast with the limited possibility of reform under capitalism.
But the period of rapid growth in the Soviet Union is now at an end. Economic growth there is no longer a question of laying down basic infrastructure and industries, but of developing a complex modern economy.
With the complete absence of workers' democracy, corruption, mismanagement, abuse and incompetence among the middle and top officials has led to a general seize-up of the productive forces.
In the Soviet Union, the growth of industrial output during 1981-85 had slowed down to less than half the rate of 1971-75 - in spite of lengthening queues for food, housing and many other essential goods.
The degeneration of the Russian Revolution, accompanied at first by the failure, and subsequently by conscious Stalinist derailing, of workers' revolution in other countries, delayed the world revolution for a whole epoch. The forces of Marxism were defeated by Stalinism, and reduced eventually to tiny handfuls of people.
In the advanced capitalist countries the post-war boom contributed further to the delay of revolution. But in the colonial and former colonial world the masses could not wait either on the re-emergence of Marxist leadership, or for the socialist revolution in the advanced capitalist countries. The terrible burdens imposed by parasitic capitalism and reactionary landlordism weighed them down too heavily.
Huge Struggles
Since the Second World War huge struggles have erupted throughout the colonial world against imperialism, landlordism and capitalism, for national independence and democracy. Capitalism has been overthrown in a number of countries: in China, Cuba, Vietnam, for example - and in Africa in Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique.
The advantages of a planned and state-owned economy have allowed many of these countries to develop, when capitalism would have continued to strangle them. Breaking with capitalism only recently, with a greater legacy of backwardness, subjected to huge external pressure, the governments of Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique, however, find huge difficulties in uplifting the living standards of the masses.
But in none of these was the break with capitalism achieved by a working class leadership committed to socialism and world revolution. In none has the working class secured control over its economy and state.
Instead power has been concentrated in the hands of state officials and military rulers, whose policies are aimed more and more at protecting their own privileged position. Without workers' democracy, and with rulers whose horizons are limited by the state machine on which they rest, these are not socialist regimes.
Nevertheless, even if in a distorted way, these revolutions have confirmed Trotsky's analysis of the colonial world. It has been possible in these countries to move forward in solving the democratic tasks (liberation from imperialism, abolition of landlordism, etc) only by breaking with capitalism. The working class does not directly hold power; nevertheless these are deformed workers' states.
But today no country can escape from pressures to integrate further with the world market. The development of the forces of production is constrained by the limits of the nation-state, even in the most populous and developed economies, capitalist or Stalinist. The resolution of the contradictions, West and East, lies in the struggle for world socialism, based on workers' democratic rule.
Bureaucratic elites
The slow-down in growth in the Soviet Union and other more developed Stalinist states is a serious warning to those in the "Third world" who look to the Soviet Union or China for political and economic assistance. The bureaucratic elites which govern these countries do not support the workers overthrowing capitalism and building workers' democracy anywhere in the world.
Not only would this upset the deals made between them and the big capitalists, but a healthy workers' state would threaten their own rule. It would show to the working people under Stalinist rule that there is an alternative both to capitalism and to the bureaucratic dictatorship in their countries. Thus a move for the overthrow of the bureaucracy would gain an enormous stimulus.
All of the Stalinist bureaucracies would not only oppose a workers' revolution in Southern Africa, but even any strong measures by the existing leaders against capitalism.
As Mugabe has explained, after independence the Stalinist states told him: "Do not rush things - take your time." The conclusion he had drawn from this advice was never to disrupt the economy, and that "nationalisation would lead to that kind of disruption." (Financial Gazette, 1 February 1985)
In reality, the working class in the Stalinist states are facing the task of taking power from their bureaucratic rulers and building workers' democracy - the only basis for continuing the transition to socialism. The movement of ten million Polish workers and their families in 1980-81 provided a clear indication of the political revolution that is building up throughout Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union itself.
We are living in the period of world revolution - in the advanced capitalist countries, in the Stalinist countries and in the former colonial countries. The workers' struggle in Zimbabwe must be understood in this international framework, and led in close solidarity with the working class of other countries, who share the same socialist goals.
If the-working class came to power in one of the major African countries - particularly South Africa, Nigeria or Egypt - and actively built up international support, this would open up the socialist revolution on a continental scale. It would open the way to a Pan-African Socialist Federation, linked to the socialist transformation of the world.
Zimbabwe in Southern Africa
The history of capitalism in Southern Africa confirms Trotsky's analysis of the tasks of the working class in the colonial world (his theory of permanent or uninterrupted revolution). Arising under the shadow of British imperialism, capitalism both in South Africa and Rhodesia came late in the development of capitalism internationally. In a world market dominated by the monopolies, there was no possibility of carving out a secure market for its own regional development.
Capitalist development in South Africa had to be based on a remorseless cheap labour policy of national oppression and migrant labour, sustained by dictatorship viciously hostile to the rights of the majority, seeking to sustain and reinforce tribal division. In Rhodesia's early development this meant forced labour on the mines, farms and public works called "Chibaro".
Politically, these dictatorships were based on the support of white landowners and capitalists, as well as the white middle class and privileged workers, who also made up the state machinery.
Just as South African capitalism has been dominated by Western imperialism, so Rhodesian capitalism developed under the shadow of South Africa. Today the gross national product of South Africa is some 80% of the whole of Southern Africa. In every aspect of the economy and communications, South Africa is overwhelmingly dominant.
About 25% of present-day Zimbabwe's trade is with South Africa.
Historically, Rhodesia's political development mirrored that of South African white minority rule. In fact Rhodesia avoided being included as a fifth province of South Africa in 1922 only by a few thousand white votes.
After the Second World War, reinforced by white immigration from Britain, Rhodesia's tiny capitalist class grew in ambition, seeking, in collaboration with British imperialism, to loose the South African grip by seeking a market in the other countries of Central Africa. This was the main reason for the formation of the Central African Federation (1953-63).
But the break-up of the Federation thrust the ruling class in Rhodesia back into greater dependence on South Africa. In Malawi and Zambia, which did not have the same large numbers of white settlers, the nationalist movements pressurised British imperialism into granting them independence. In Rhodesia, however, far from accommodating black aspirations, the white ruling class followed the South African trend - towards increased racist dictatorship by the local whites. After UDI in 1965, South African domination of the economy intensified.
To end white minority rule in Zimbabwe, and with it to smash the cheap labour system, overcome tribal divisions, end the domination of South African imperialism, and guarantee genuine democracy - what would have been necessary was a struggle of the masses, led by the working class, linked with the struggle of the South African workers, around a socialist programme. But events did not take this course.
Political leadership of the black majority in Zimbabwe was historically in the hands of a black middle-class leadership, closely tied to the missionaries and liberals. These exhausted every possibility for negotiation and compromise before reluctantly concluding that they had to mobilise the masses in order to struggle for a position in government. But even the mass struggles that took place from the 1950s onwards were held back by leaders who never gave up hope of reaching a compromise with British imperialism.
This led to enormous frustrations and tensions in the movement and exposed it to serious defeats. Thus the dreary road of compromise was littered with splits, slanging matches, party violence, and a confusion of policies. Instead of bringing freedom quicker, these policies of compromise laid the basis for much of the bitterness of political life today.
In particular it brought about the ZANU-ZAPU split in 1963. At least in part this represented a revolt among ZAPU's rank and file against Nkomo's conservative leadership - but was increasingly steered onto lines of tribal division.
UDI
Unable to win mass support by offering a clear way forward, the various leaders looked to home areas, and thus to tribalism, for continued support during times of factional struggle.
With the break-up of the Central African Federation, the Rhodesian Front came rapidly to government, representing right-wing farmers, small businessmen, and privileged workers, and reflecting a partial split in the ruling class.
The more liberal wing, basically representing finance capital and manufacturing, believed in maintaining their own rule by a process of gradual concessions towards the black majority, leading to a form of "power sharing" between black and white. The Rhodesian Front, on the other hand, followed a policy of "digging in". They calculated that the disunity of the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe would enable them to stand up against the independence struggle. In 1965 the Smith regime issued its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and looked to South Africa for support.
The black nationalist leadership still looked to British imperialism to hand over power to them. Their problem was that the reformist Labour Party government in Britain defended the interests of imperialism. This meant that the Labour government refused to struggle seriously against the Smith regime which defended capitalist interests in Rhodesia.
With the door to negotiations slammed in their faces, the nationalist leadership was forced to look for a new bargaining lever. With many of their rank and file completely disillusioned with the policies of moderation, the leaders now proclaimed armed struggle.
What they had in mind was a carefully controlled guerrilla struggle, under their own leadership, based on the peasantry and the youth. They had no intention of mobilising the working class on the basis of a socialist programme to overthrow the system.
The young guerrilla fighters, battling against a ruthless enemy, showed the greatest courage and determination. Yet for over ten years they could not weaken the Smith regime into making significant concessions. The reason for these long years of frustration, and the many lives this cost, lay in the policies of the leadership.
Since the leadership rejected the task of mobilising the urban workers and youth for insurrection, it swung to and fro between attempts at negotiations and bursts of activity on the guerrilla front.
The repeated failures of the negotiations, and the stubbornness of the Smith regime, brought about a radical ferment among the guerrilla youth. This, in turn, brought about a radicalisation of the guerrilla leadership, many of whom, to win support, began to use the rhetoric of "socialism".
The guerrilla fighters were strongly radicalised by the experience of FRELIMO in Mozambique fighting a long struggle against the Portuguese, who were firmly backed by British and US imperialism.
These trends within the guerrilla movement, both in ZANU and ZAPU, led to youthful revolts against nationalist leaderships committed to negotiation and compromise. But counter-action was swift and decisive. Some of the young guerrillas were imprisoned, others shot.
To the shame of the leadership, some were even forced to walk over the Victoria Falls bridge to certain execution by the Smith regime.
With Nkomo very reluctant to commit his ZIPRA forces to struggle, the guerrilla war was fought most strongly in the East where ZANU won the backing of FRELIMO. Providing more decisive military leadership, ZANU gained massive support from the peasants who suffered huge losses and atrocities at the hands of the regime.
The end of white rule
After the Portuguese revolution in 1974-5 and the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique, the imperialist powers became much more concerned about their interests in Southern Africa. They now began to worry that a defeat for Smith in the guerrilla war would mean the end of capitalism, as in Angola and Mozambique.
The western governments now, for the first time, put firm pressure on Smith to compromise with the nationalist leaders.
This produced a sharp about-turn by Smith. In March 1976 he proclaimed that there would be no black majority rule for "1000 years". Within months, he was forced by the imperialists to publicly concede to "black majority rule within two years". By this they meant the installation of the puppet Prime Minister Muzorewa in 1979. But, no sooner was he in power, than the imperialist powers were faced with the fact that the "Muzorewa" government was unable to bring the war to an end.
They feared the growing regionalisation of the war would spread the virus of radicalism throughout the subcontinent, and lead to direct intervention by South Africa to support Muzorewa. The continuing exodus of the whites would undermine the social base of the Smith regime, and prepare the collapse of the Rhodesian state despite the support of South Africa.
If the war took this course it was inevitable that, with appalling bloodshed and sacrifice, the whole capitalist system would crumble, and the guerrilla leadership would be driven to bring the economy under state ownership once they came to power.
Independence
The Lancaster House talks were a gamble for imperialism Their aim was to frustrate the democratic and socialist aspirations of the masses, by engineering a "settlement" to end the war on the basis of a bourgeois coalition including ZANU(PF) and ZAPU but based on a bloc of Muzorewa and the whites.
Imperialism put strong pressures on the leaders of the "front-line states" to threaten to close down the ZANU and ZAPU guerrilla bases if a settlement was not reached immediately.
Major concessions were made by the nationalist leadership on the protection of privilege of the capitalists and the whites. The whites were guaranteed 20 seats in parliament. The land the key question of the liberation struggle - was safeguarded against expropriation. Capitalist property generally was protected in the constitution. On the basis of these concessions an agreement was finally reached with imperialism.
The only alternative to this development would have been the mobilisation of the working class. Organised and armed, the working class, supported by the peasant guerrilla fighters, would have been able to bring the swift overthrow of the murderous regime, and capitalism along with it.
But ZANU and ZAPU leaders feared to awaken the power of the proletariat more than to compromise themselves with the capitalist class and the state.
After the Lancaster House agreement everything possible was done by the imperialists to frustrate ZANU(PF) and ZAPU campaigning freely. Nevertheless the election result was a resounding victory for ZANU(PF).
The Mugabe government made promises of reforms to the masses, along with firm guarantees to the capitalists that private property would be respected. It hoped to solve this contradiction by reaping a harvest of aid and investment from the imperialist powers.
A consumer boom, based on the ending of the war, the lifting of sanctions and the workers' achievements in raising wages, followed independence. This upturn made possible several important reforms in education, wages, and health services. It also meant the rapid promotion of an educated black elite to levels of wealth previously enjoyed only by the whites.
However, on the fundamental question of the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe, the land question, precious little progress was made. Also, the total number of jobs, far from increasing, actually declined, particularly in agriculture.
Because the working class did not come to power to transform society, many of the basic problems of Zimbabwe soon reappeared in an even more serious form.
The tribal-national division between Shona and Ndebele, partially overcome in the struggle against the Smith regime, reappeared. Even though Nkomo, while he was in government, said to the surprise of his audience in Matabeleland: "There is no shortage of land for the people." (Herald, 24 November 1981) He - and other petty bourgeois politicians of both parties - exploited the grievances of the people for their own ends.
Instead of leading the people in the struggle against capitalism, Nkomo and the ZANU leaders both blamed the existence of the other party for the lack of social and political progress, recklessly whipping up tribal hostility in the process.
Negotiations between ZANU(PF) and ZAPU were opened to discuss the formation of a single party. But these broke down early in 1982 because of the jockeying for position of the politicians.
Only at this point were the arms caches on ZAPU-owned farms exposed, and most of the ZAPU leaders removed from government. This led to a crisis in the army. Whole battalions broke up and mass desertions weakened the army (although its backbone, the officers and NCOs trained by the old regime, remained).
The "dissidents" became a serious problem, using the bankrupt methods of armed terrorism to fight back against the political defeats of ZAPU and against the growing isolation of the Ndebele people.
Only by understanding the incapacity of capitalism to solve the basic problems of the masses can we understand the bitterness of the national question, and why political "solutions" within a capitalist framework will fail.
The significant manufacturing base of the Zimbabwean economy appears to be in contradiction with the general stagnation and lack of development in "Third World" countries. At the time of independence, because of this base, there were great hopes among the bourgeois that capitalism in Zimbabwe could show the way forward to the crisis-ridden and impoverished states to the north.
The relative development of the economy, however, cannot be seen independently from the South African economy which dominates the whole region.
The development of the manufacturing sector took place most rapidly during the war for independence, in reaction to international sanctions. But the consequence was that the economy became dominated by the South African monopolies. This advanced integration into the South African economy has meant that the Zimbabwean economy generally follows the lead set by the dominant partner.
Recently, this has appeared to be contradicted by the movement of the economy in a direction opposite to that in South Africa. While the South African economy has been in the midst of a sharp downward phase, in Zimbabwe there has been a burst of economic activity. This has given rise to renewed optimism about the prospects for "independent" development in Zimbabwe - yet in reality this trend will be overtaken by the fundamental tendencies of capitalism in crisis
The upturn in Zimbabwe was partly due to the effects of a devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar, which has resulted in better earnings (in local currency) for the same volume of mining exports. But mostly it has been because of a good rainy season with a sharp increase in peasant production.
In Zimbabwe agriculture still makes the greatest contribution to the national economy and to exports. Despite the development of mining and manufacturing, tobacco is still the main single foreign exchange earner. In such a relatively underdeveloped economy, small economic changes, such as good rains or a new investment project, can have quite an important effect.
In 1985-6 the peasants delivered a record 900,000 tonnes of maize to the Grain Marketing Board, which is an increase 10 times greater than the best record prior to independence. Overall the 1985-86 crop delivered to the GMB is 1.8 million tonnes, 80% higher than the poor figures of the previous year, a year of drought.
The fact that Zimbabwe is one of the few countries of Africa which are able to feed their own population, and the rapid increase in peasant production, is causing western journalists to bubble over with excitement at this capitalist miracle which is a "model for Africa".
The dramatic increase in peasant production has come after years of drought, during which production has been very low. The good crops have been the result of large-scale state intervention - the very policies which the IMF have brought to a halt in Africa in the drive to cut budget deficits.
The government provided the peasants with fertiliser, seeds, and the possibility of plugging into a state ploughing scheme. Most importantly, loans to peasants have been made by the state Agricultural Development Bank (some Z$40 million over the last season). The state Grain Marketing Board has expanded its depots into most peasant regions, thus eliminating the "middle men", and ensuring a predictable income from the sale of grain in a reasonable time.
All this is an argument for more state intervention, not for less!
The crucial factor, however, has been the fact that, unlike most of black-governed Africa, Zimbabwe has a manufacturing industry capable of turning out stylish clothes, radios and batteries, bicycles, and most importantly, agricultural implements, seeds, and fertilisers. The availability of these goods locally (without eating into foreign exchange) is a tremendous incentive to the peasantry to expand production for the market.
Thus the upturn in the peasant areas in Zimbabwe results from: organised state support for peasants, and the possibility of peasants buying consumer goods with their earnings from the sale of their products.
In the same way, the prospects for continued agricultural growth are entirely bound up with the prospects for the development of industry. Yet it is here, on a capitalist basis, that the prospects are most limited.
The capitalists themselves acknowledge that Zimbabwe is undergoing only a "moderate upturn" and that manufacturing - the key sector for development - is dragging behind agriculture. The transport equipment industry, for example, has not seen an increase in production at all!
Despite the general upturn in the economy there is, according to the Minster of Industry, Callistus Ndlovu, a crisis in manufacturing. This is not only caused by a lack of confidence in the future by the capitalists. Although by African standards Zimbabwe is relatively prosperous there is a very limited market by world standards, and no good prospects for exports.
It is this, fundamentally, which limits the prospects for local or foreign capitalist investment in Zimbabwe. Even where decisions have been made to invest, the capitalists face the problem of a shortage of foreign exchange to pay for the imported machinery and raw materials needed for production.
Even at the beginning of the upturn, the more intelligent bourgeois commentators admitted that the boom could not last because of the shortage of foreign exchange This shortage will inevitably lead to the recovery faltering, and will result in shortages both of intermediary and consumer goods.
The problem of foreign exchange
The main cause of the cuts in foreign exchange allocations so vital to ensuring continued growth is the growing burden of foreign debt. With the stagnation and decline in world commodity prices, Zimbabwean exports have not been able to earn sufficient foreign exchange to pay off these debts.
Since independence, a surprising Z$580 million has been spent in repaying existing foreign debt. To meet the demands of the foreign bankers, the government has been forced to cut essential spending of foreign exchange on machinery and raw materials.
The Mugabe government strategy is to gamble everything on attracting foreign investment. After imposing a ban on profits and dividends leaving the country, a relaxation was announced, apparently at the insistence of the IMF. The government now hopes that, having won the favour of the IMF, it can ask for further loans to finance the outflow of capital in the form of profits and dividends!
Wriggling in the grip of finance capital, the government is hoping that its demonstration of "good faith" in allowing the export of profits will encourage a big inflow of foreign investment.
As a RAL economic review pointed out: "If the current economic upswing is not to be aborted…the active rather than the passive encouragement of foreign investment now seems to be about the only viable solution." This would ease the foreign exchange problem, as investment would be made in "hard" currencies. Both the government and its capitalist advisors are grasping at a straw!
There has been no significant foreign investment since independence and there is no reason why the capitalists should start investing now.
Although in 1984 there was the first balance of payments surplus since 1979, this "surplus" has been built up on devaluation, the temporary increase in raw materials exports (particularly to the US), and "creative budgeting". According to one bourgeois economist the current account balance is "very much the same as it was at the end of 1983 when a deficit of $450 million was incurred." (Herald, 28 March 1985)
The shortage of foreign exchange, more than any other factor, is marking the limits to the development of manufacturing - the cutting edge of change from an undeveloped to a developed economy.
Prospects for the economy
A recent article in the Financial Times (21 August 1985) exposes some of the reasons for the doubts of the capitalists about the economic future of the country. Bourgeois commentators are worried by the vulnerability of the Zimbabwean economy both in relation to South Africa and in its long-term prospects generally.
The possibility of counter-sanctions by a desperate South Africa with its back to the wall is raised as a question mark over Zimbabwe's future economic prospects. Undeniably there must be some thinking on these lines by the Botha regime. But what has held back the showdown at present is a recognition of mutual economic dependence. As well as the trade between them, South Africa has enormous investments in Zimbabwe, while Zimbabwe desperately needs secure trade routes through South Africa to world markets.
This recognition has led to a brittle but diplomatically "correct" relationship between the two governments, although the growing Zimbabwean military intervention in Mozambique to secure the transport route to Beira against MNR attack shows Mugabe's desperation in trying to break free from the southern stranglehold.
All hopes in an alternative to economic links with South Africa through SADCC and the Preferential Trade Agreement of Southern and Eastern Africa are, however, illusory. The economies of Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi, etc are either insignificant, or devastated by war and low world commodity prices, and provide no realistic alternative market.
Mutual cooperation between them is also constantly threatened by trade barriers and a lack of foreign currency. The crash of the rand has, paradoxically, strengthened South Africa's grip over the region, as its exports are now much cheaper.
A country whose economy is so dependent and dwarfed by South Africa can hardly hope to grow steadily when the economic giant of Africa is a sick neighbour. Already key markets for Zimbabwean manufactured exports (which are encouraged by the Preferential Trade Agreement between Zimbabwe and South Africa) are being cut off by tariff barriers and by the higher value of the Zimbabwean dollar in comparison with the rand. This fall off in exports is not being compensated by significant opportunities on the world market, as the major capitalist powers are either experiencing economic decline or slow growth.
The fundamental weakness of capitalism in Zimbabwe in developing the economy is ironically shown during the present upturn. The basis of this upturn has been the sharp rise in agriculture, even though manufacturing responded by an increase of production of 11%. But key sectors of manufacturing such as metals and transport equipment have gone against this upward trend and declined in 1985.
As significantly, the crisis in world commodity prices is now paralysing the mining industry. The volume of output has declined since 1980. World metal prices have fallen by 13% in 1985 and profits have only been maintained by a corresponding 18% depreciation in the value of the Zimbabwean dollar.
Almost all expansion has been the result of using spare capacity - even though the bourgeois economists realise that investment-led growth is the "only means of achieving real economic growth in the long-term.". (RAL, Sunday Mail, 29 September 1985)
A recent survey showed that over 60% of businesses were making no plans for investment - "an extraordinarily break picture" according to the University of Zimbabwe's department of Business Studies. Overall investment from 1983 to July 1985 was little more than the entire investment made in 1981! (Africa Now, September 1985) By refusing to invest, the capitalists are making sure the upturn will not last.
Capitalism has been unable to provide more jobs and higher incomes for the people as is shown in startling figures on the lack of jobs, low incomes, etc, both before and after independence.
Since the mid-1970s more than 100,000 jobs have been lost in agriculture (mostly after independence), 10,000 in mining, 4,000 in furniture, 10,000 in clothing, and another 10,000 in engineering. (Herald, 2 April 1985) Only a thin layer of educated people have been able gain the privileges of civil service employment, mainly by taking over the jobs of departing whites, rather than in new jobs.
Over the past decade per capita incomes have not increased at all: in 1985 they were little different from when Smith declared unilateral independence 20 years ego, or when independence was conceded in 1979! Despite the enormous political struggles and achievements, the dead hand of capitalism has held back material progress for the mass of the people. The bourgeois economists blame black families for having too many children, rather than pointing to the declining number of jobs.
Even if the most optimistic forecasts are accepted (and these are actually quite unrealistic), the masses would have to wait until the 1990s to get their living standards back to those of the historic peak of 1974. (Financial Times, London, 21 August 1985)
These limits of capitalism which are so clear on the general economic field are showing their effects in political decisions. The July 1985 budget showed that the state, even in times of upturn, is being forced to cut back on the advances made after independence.
Cuts
Large real cuts in spending on agriculture, resettlement, construction, and housing have been made, with smaller reductions in education and health. The investment in the public sector, the keystone of the government's approach to "gradually achieving socialism", dropped in real terms by 3% in the 1985 budget!
Despite these cuts there was a record budget deficit (excess of spending over income) of Z$808 million, and up to 20% of the budget is now allocated to paying back debts and loans. Increasingly, social programs are having to be financed by loans from capitalists at home and abroad.
To lessen state responsibility, local authorities are being given the task of financing new schools, and there have been calls for reducing or eliminating so-called "nonessential" spending on such things as roads and community halls. All this means that the town councils will be under enormous pressure to increase township rents, rates, and charges generally.
As the politicians in the towns come under fire from the workers and their families so they in turn will be beating on the doors of the Ministers to get finance for local government to bail themselves out.
The present upturn is unable to last long. In the coming downturn, inflation will continue, and even increase. Shortages of foreign exchange can reduce supplies of raw materials, spare parts, etc, thus creating shortages of locally-made consumer goods. These are among the factors which will in due course blunt the improvement in peasant incomes and the peasants' desire to sell their products.
With the United States economy slowing down and Europe set to follow, the prospects for continued growth in Zimbabwe are not good. Even with a good rainy season in 1985-86, according to a recent RAL report, growth is unlikely to be much above zero, and a new downturn in 1987 seems certain.
The weak upturns of the diseased capitalist system provide no solution for the basic demands of the mass of either workers or peasants. To provide a decent life for all working people, the only way forward lies in the struggle to end capitalism - to bring the big factories, banks, mines and farms into state-ownership, under democratic workers' control and management. This would provide the basis on which peasants could obtain adequate land, and the inputs needed to develop it.
Political developments since independence have basically flowed along the channels laid down in the Lancaster House agreement, although there have been some new features.
Formally speaking, the Lancaster House agreement established in Zimbabwe a parliamentary democracy based on universal franchise (though with the concessions to the whites in terms of reserved white seats).
At the same time there was an "Africanisation" of the state machinery, through the phasing out of the old white personnel - to be replaced basically by the educated black strata who sat out the guerrilla war in overseas universities.
But in practice, the most important development that has taken place since independence is the diminishing role of parliament, and the increasing concentration of power in the hands of Ministers, etc, and above all in the hands of Mugabe.
This is a result of the gulf between the objective interests the regime serves and the political base it has to try to sustain among the workers and peasants.
The Lancaster House agreement laid the basis for the promotion of the black middle class to positions in the state as junior partners with imperialism. In exchange they agreed to preserve the productive foundations of private ownership: on the land and in the factories, mines, and banks.
The foreign ownership of the means of production which amounts to two-thirds of all capital was not to be tampered with.
These conditions were spelt out in the cold constitutional language of the Lancaster House agreement. But the only political force with the base of social support which could carry them out in practice was the radical nationalist leadership, whose popularity rested on the fact that it had led the guerrilla struggle for power, and had been invested by the peasants, youth and workers with their hopes for achieving a decent life.
The regime is buffeted on the one hand by foreign and local capitalists, determined to sustain their interests, and on the other hand by the uneasy conglomeration of petty bourgeois, peasant, and working-class interests which are its base of support. In a relatively underdeveloped economy beset by the world capitalist crisis it can satisfy neither the capitalists nor the mass of working people.
It is this which explains both the zig-zagging course of policy and rhetoric, and the tendency for the regime to elevate itself above any democratic process and concentrate power in executive hands - a process which will be taken further with the establishment of a "one-party state". This kind of regime, zig-zagging, elevated above the masses, balancing between contending classes neither of which is able to establish its clear supremacy - but based on a capitalist state machine and defending capitalism - is what Marxism refers to as bourgeois Bonapartism.
When the middle-class leadership attacks imperialism - for example, protesting against low prices of raw materials, the growing foreign debts, the lack of real aid, the undermining of an indigenous black capitalist class, and imperialism's support for racism in South Africa - they pretend that they are "at one" with the masses, and putting forward the position of the workers and rural poor.
But they do not explain that these problems cannot be solved within the framework of capitalism, or mobilise a struggle headed by the working class to break with capitalism.
In reality, the middle-class leadership is engaged merely in a struggle with the imperialists over the spoils of the wealth produced by the working class. Without being able to satisfy the demands of the workers, youth, and peasants - or even of the whole of the middle class - they are trying to sustain the support of the masses in a battle over the surplus in order to enrich themselves first and foremost.
Thus they are forced on the one hand to turn to state control and suppression of the very classes to which they look for support. On the other hand, because of their impotence against imperialism, they fight among themselves for the crumbs which fall off the table of capitalism. The splits take place along regional and tribal fines, with a festering of corruption, favouritism, and patronage.
It is this volatile mixture of favouritism and repression which has forced tribal and regional factions to form among the Shona petty bourgeois leaders who head ZANU(PF). The growing disunity at the top has led Mugabe increasingly to take personal command of controversial issues and to take power into his own hands. The leadership increasingly preaches the virtues of a "one-party state" - i.e. of increased dictatorship - as a means of suppressing tribalism and class antagonisms.
Already, the parliamentary formalities are increasingly being dropped and the government rules through emergency regulations.
A number of sympathetic studies of the Zimbabwean state have concluded that the executive and security apparatus enjoys enormous power and has progressively gained more autonomy from parliament, the courts, and the other apparatuses of state.
Repressive powers
The Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) which is part of the "Prime Minister's Office" and directly controlled by Mugabe has been rapidly expanded. Its top intelligence officers are still the whites who organised the defence of Smith's regime against the guerrilla war.
The security legislation used by Smith to attack the nationalist movement and unions has not been abolished but extended. More than 60 regulations made in terms of the notorious Emergency Powers Act and Law and Order Act of the 1960s have been issued on a wide variety of topics. Regulations in terms of the Indemnity and Compensation Act of 1975 which remove any legal constraints on the armed forces were revived in July 1982.
Cabinet Ministers dealing with security masters have exceptional powers to detain, to ban meetings, and use other legal means to suppress opposition. When persons accused of political crimes have been acquitted by the courts, re-detentions are common.
The reports of Commissions of Enquiry into complaints against the security forces have not been made public.
These have been the means by which opposition parties, striking workers, squatters on unused land, and Marxists in ZANU(PF) and the unions etc have been repressed. Rarely has this security apparatus taken action against the old reactionaries - its victims are basically the workers, peasants, and youth who are thought to be political opponents of the regime.
Through using the repressive powers of state, the ZANU(PF) leaders have cleared the way to a one-party dictatorship. But, without a break with capitalism, this will not solve the national-tribal divisions which are festering in Zimbabwe society - but only, after perhaps a temporary period, serve to intensify them.
The national question
It is clear that in Zimbabwe the compromise with capitalism has resulted in painfully slow progress on the land question - the fundamental issue of the Zimbabwean revolution. The postponement of a thorough-going settlement of the land question has fuelled the distrust of the Ndebele peasantry in the Harare government which had also disarmed the ZIPRA guerrillas and failed to provide jobs for the youth.
Such mistrust arose that some youth took up arms against the state. Of course, not all "dissidents" came from this background. Many acts of terrorism have clearly been committed by bandits sent in from South Africa, and in some cases apparently even by state agents trying to create an excuse for police action.
Sabotage of government projects, the killing of ZANU officials etc, brought clown the terrible wrath of the armed forces under the command of the ZANU(PF) leaders. Killings of peasants, torture, detentions and military rule over Matabeleland followed.
In short, the compromise with capitalism led to an enormous sharpening of national antagonism between Ndebele and Shona.
Matabeleland is now bitterly alienated after the deaths of hundreds or possibly thousands at the hands of the armed forces, particularly the 5th Brigade.
The Ndebele minority now interprets its hardships as the result of being a tribal-national minority - they feel nationally oppressed at the hands of the Shona-dominated Harare government. The lack of progress on the land and social questions (there has been no land resettlement in Matabeleland implemented yet) has made the problem much worse as politicians have sought petty advantage in tribal chauvinism. Both parties exploit their tribal base.
The worsening of the national question since independence reveals similar processes to those described by Trotsky in his History of the Russian Revolution. There, the overthrow of the oppressive Tsar's imperial regime, and the aspirations for democracy which this brought into the open, led oppressed national minorities to press towards greater autonomy and their own states.
In similar fashion, the relative unification of the black majority achieved in the struggle against the Smith regime has been reversed since the downfall of the regime. With no solution offered to the social problems through a break with capitalism, the aspirations of the Ndebele masses are channelled through their consciousness of oppression as a "national group". In the future, without a break with capitalism, this could even lead to mass Ndebele support for a state of their own.
From the point of view of the development of the productive forces, Marxism favours the largest possible political units, overcoming the barriers which "nation-states" have posed on economic development - but only through voluntary amalgamation and in no way through coercion. Thus the Russian Marxist Lenin explained that, in conditions of national oppression, Marxism must implacably defend the democratic right of nations to self-determination, including their right to secession and establishment of their own state.
This was not a matter of abstract or moral principle, but a vital part of the programme for working-class revolution. By championing the rights of the oppressed, the Marxists aimed to prevent bourgeois or petty bourgeois nationalists from dividing the working-class, and peddling utopian capitalist solutions for their real material problems.
In reality, by defending the right of nations to self-determination, Marxism aims to unite the working-class of different nationalities in the struggle for democracy and socialism.
At the same time Lenin argued that there could be no concessions to separatism in the unions and working-class parties - the workers internationally have to build and protect their organised unity.
This basic standpoint of Marxism is not to be found in the leadership of either nationalist party in Zimbabwe. However, since ZANU(PF) is the party in power which has carried through the compromise with capitalism and deployed the armed forces against the Ndebele minority, its leaders have to take the main responsibility for the worsening national question.
It is this leadership which meted out brutal repression against the first stirrings of revolt, and which is now attempting to impose a one-party dictatorship on the Zimbabwean people.
Marxism has always strongly opposed the imposition of unity and the holding together of nations by the use of troops, which has the effect of bitterly dividing the workers and peasants.
The turn now by the ZANU(PF) leadership towards unity talks is not because of tender feelings for the Ndebele workers and peasants by Mugabe, but because the military-police methods have been exhausted. Nevertheless this turn opens up a new political situation which is likely to draw workers, peasants and youth into intense political discussion about the way forward.
Elections
Since independence there have been a number of political crises and some reshuffling of the leadership - but none of these changes have defined a new course to solve the political and economic problems of Zimbabwe.
The July 1985 elections were designed by the Mugabe government to be a conclusive victory for ZANU(PF). But they have brought about changes not anticipated by the leadership. Taken as a whole, these changes amount to a turning-point in the post-independence politics of Zimbabwe.
Both ZANU(PF) and ZAPU approached the elections with big illusions. The ZANU(PF) leadership had high expectations that the Ndebele masses would be persuaded or forced to vote for their candidates. Last minute efforts were made to establish an Ndebele-speaking leadership for the campaign in Matabeleland. They expected that ZAPU could be broken by the crushing weight of military occupation and detentions.
On the other hand, the ZAPU leadership had the illusion that the Shona masses would turn away from ZANU(PF) and give a "protest vote" to ZAPU. They thought that the undoubted dissatisfaction of the Shona masses with the corruption, lack of housing, high prices, and fewer jobs would turn them to ZAPU. This, ZAPU members believed, would build a sufficient groundswell for ZAPU to win.
Results
The election results of an overwhelming majority for ZANU(PF) but also of obstinate support for ZAPU in Matabeleland, were the outcome of several different processes taking place.
Before the elections there were signs that the economic upturn, based on the good rains, had brought particular benefits to the peasantry. An upper layer had benefited most, but hope of a better life for all also affected the peasant mass.
The petty bourgeois politicians of ZANU(PF) constantly attacked the "lazy workers", and praised the peasantry for their hard work. They know that the peasantry form their most reliable base of support.
In the towns, on the other hand, the social problems were much more obvious, and the situation was more difficult to control.
As was acknowledged in the Financial Times (11 June 1985), the real challenge to the government did not come from the fragmented opposition parties but from "the growing dissatisfaction among the urban population" - the working class in the cities and towns. The government showed its recognition of this fact by attacking the Marxists in the trade unions and ZANU(PF) in the run-up to the elections.
This discontent among the urban working class was shown in widespread criticism of economic policies, in questions raised in party meetings, and in the angry mass opposition to corrupt or unrepresentative ZANU(PF) councillors.
The potential strength of the working class opposition was shown in the massive marches, especially by the women, against local party leaders in some towns.
The party leadership took this discontent seriously. In some cases ministers were sent to negotiate with demonstrators and promised to look into their grievances. At the same time thuggery and violence by the Youth Brigades was encouraged to intimidate urban people even in areas where the opposition parties had little support.
It was noticeable in the early stages of the election campaign that the urban masses felt voting would change nothing. In the bigger towns, especially Harare, the turnout to register for the elections was very slow. "People seem to treat the vote with levity; and yet thousands of Zimbabweans died for it," complained the Sunday Times (20 January 1985).
This casual attitude towards the vote showed an awareness among the urban working class that power was not in their hands. Most could see there was no real alternative to ZANU(PF). Many felt its victory would lead to a one-party dictatorship which would have to be accepted.
The indifference among the urban people, particularly in Harare, produced a panicky response from the leadership. Every opposition statement, however feeble, produced a thundering reply from party leaders using their newspapers and radios to the full.
In an important tactical switch, Mugabe pulled back from making the one-party state the key question of the election. He also made concessions to persuade people to vote for the ruling party. The workers were given a wage increase of 15% and the government promised that the new Labour Act would operate in their interests.
In the rural areas, discontent threatened from older and traditional people over legal challenges to the lobola custom. To calm this down, Mugabe called the first gathering of chiefs since independence. He promised that fathers' traditional rights over their daughters would continue, and made concessions to the powers of the chiefs.
ZANU(PF) presented itself as the party of order and development and attacked ZAPU as the party of the dissidents.
To make his election victory more credible internationally, Mugabe allowed opposition parties some access to the press. ZANU(PF)'s face towards the Ndebele minority, however, remained truculent and dictatorial. In his personal appearances in Matabeleland, Mugabe promised a tougher policy towards the Ndebele, hoping to force acceptance of ZANU(PF)'s power to rule "forever".
ZAPU approached the elections in a weak state of organisation. Virtually every party organiser had been detained. The reign of terror by the state after the Midlands riots of June 1984 broke ZAPU's organised support in Beitbridge, Chinoyi, and most of the Midlands.
ZAPU's electoral strategy was for a "united front" of all "progressives" to unite Zimbabwe, and the one-party state was opposed. But the leaders put forward no programme for unity so it would not exclude any group! At the same time as calling for a "united front" of all "progressives" it launched bitter attacks on the "fascism" of ZANU, thus deliberately excluding ZANU from among the "progressives".
The "united front" could thus be nothing more than a reactionary anti-Mugabe bloc of all pro-capitalist opposition parties and Smith. Such a mixed bag of sell-outs, racists, and opportunists had no chance of success. Not even the assassination of five leading members of UANC could bring ZAPU and UANC together in an electoral pact. All-in-all there were 258 candidates, mainly from the fragmented opposition parties, fighting for only 80 seats!
In the hysterical atmosphere of party violence, which was only a thin cover for tribalism, ZAPU's supporters outside Matabeleland retreated. In the elections to the district council in the Beitbridge area, formerly a ZAPU stronghold, it did not win a sinale seat.
But in the run-up to the parliamentary elections, District Council results in Matabeleland showed a different picture. Here, with Ndebele in an overwhelming majority, there was a fierce loyalty to ZAPU.
ZAPU candidates were almost universally elected even when voters were threatened with violence if they voted for "The Dissident" - that is, the ZAPU candidate. The government was so embarrassed that the District Council election results were not published for months.
The white elections
The white elections were a victory for the die-hard elements among the whites: Smith's party candidates won 15 out of the 20 seats reserved for whites. The success of anti-Mugabe candidates in these elections revealed a trend which only Marxism - though it did not anticipate it entirely - could explain.
The compromise with the whites, enshrined in Lancaster House and in the policy of the ZANU(PF) leadership, is not a policy equally supported on both sides. There has been precious little "change of heart" among the whites, only a recognition of the current relationship of power. Their acceptance of the policy of "reconciliation" has not changed their attitude towards ordinary Zimbabwean workers and peasants, which remains one of contempt and racial arrogance.
The ZANU(PF) leadership was taken in by flattery, fawning, and offers of gifts to speed their corruption, as evidence of genuine cooperation at a political lever. But the present situation is a graphic illustration of the results of class-collaboration. The white bourgeois and landowners have taken advantage of the "historic compromise" of Lancaster House to secure their own position and preach the most reactionary monetarist doctrines. The results of these policies - higher prices, wage freezes, redundancies and factory closures - are then blamed on the "socialism" of Mugabe!
But the election results have knocked a few potholes into the smooth road of collaboration.
Two political trends among the whites offered themselves to the white electorate: Smith's Conservative Alliance (CAZ) and the "independents".
Smith and his aging cronies launched a campaign blatantly defending capitalism and his past record in putting the interests of the whites first. Undoubtedly part of Smith's strategy was to form an anti-Mugabe bloc in the West, as he stood as a candidate for the first time in Bulawayo.
The "independents", generally the direct representatives of the big capitalist interests, follow a policy of accepting the compromise in order more effectively to combat the socialist aspirations of the Zimbabwean masses. They were enthusiastically endorsed by the ZANU leadership as "genuine non-racialists".
Undoubtedly a factor in the anti-Mugabe vote among the whites was the fear of a one-party dictatorship, of Zimbabwe taking the path of so many African countries of tribal violence and civil war. The whites did not support the idea of genuine democratic rights, but they feared the growth of arbitrary state power would lead to a loss of their privileges.
There are thus some differences in approach to the one party state question. Big capital is cautiously in favour of a one-party dictatorship - if such a government could secure the peace by agreement or by the gun in Matabeleland. It is fairly confident of finding new ways of incorporating white privilege and capitalist interests into the framework of a one-party dictatorship under Mugabe.
The ZANU leadership has encouraged this approach by promising to include a number of white candidates on the ZANU ticket in a future one-party "election".
Faced with the challenge of the whites to his authority, Mugabe fumed but retreated. He said that the 20 white seats entrenched in the constitution "must go immediately". But he did not then seek the support of ZAPU's MPs to abolish the 20 white seats entrenched in the constitution.
With the agreement of ZAPU the 70% "yes" vote in the House of Assembly necessary to abolish the white seats after April 1987 would be reached. This would open the way to forcing through a one-party state with a unanimous vote before April 1990. After this date only a 70% vote in the Assembly is needed to establish a one-party state.
Instead of seeking ZAPU's support, he escalated his political attack on ZAPU in a fresh attempt to solve the "ZAPU Problem".
A turning-point
Not only the white, but the other election results surprised both ZANU(PF) and ZAPU leaders, and set in motion a series of political events which have now resulted in the opening of negotiations between the leadership of both parties.
The underlying political process revealed by the elections has meant that the talks which are now taking place are qualitatively different from the many sessions of talks previously held between ZANU(PF) and ZAPU. The reasons for this change lie in the shattering of the illusions promoted by the respective leaders in the support they would each receive nationwide.
Ironically, the election results confirmed the overwhelming support for ZANU(PF) among the Shona majority - but fell well short of being a conclusive victory. On the face of it, ZANU(PF) made major gains by increasing its vote from 1.7 to 2.2 million between 1980 and 1985, out of an electorate of 2.9 million. This support was based on the hope that Mugabe would implement measures in favour of the masses (socialism), if only the political obstacles in his way could be removed.
But the crushing majority won by ZANU(PF) nationwide could not hide the fact that it could not make inroads into ZAPU's Matabeleland base. Despite a reign of terror in Matabeleland marked by forced attendance at ZANU(PF) meetings, forced buying of ZANU(PF) party cards, torture, massacres and blackmail (all of which served to warn the Ndebele of the dire Consequences of continuing to support ZAPU), the vote for ZANU(PF) was only 12.9 per cent of the Matabeleland electorate.
Significantly, the firmest support for ZANU(PF) came from the Bulawayo area, from Shona businessmen and civil servants attracted there.
The problems within ZANU(PF) were hidden under a barrage of attacks on ZAPU.
But the election results were also a body-blow for the ZAPU leadership Despite considerable urban discontent, a protest vote in favour of the opposition parties did not develop outside Matabeleland as the workers could not see any advantage to them in anti-Mugabe party groupings.
For ZANU(PF) the results confirmed its predominance as the party representing the majority Shona. Muzorewa's UANC is to all intents and purposes dead. ZANU (Sithole) secured one seat, but, despite some support in the south-east, is also breaking up.
For ZAPU the results confirmed the fact the leadership had tried to avoid: that ZAPU is now a party of the Ndebele without the prospect of gaining even a protest vote in other areas of Zimbabwe. ZAPU's support in the eastern two-thirds of the country dominated by ZANU(PF) virtually collapsed, and in the Midlands the party vote was halved from 27 per cent in 1980 to 14 per cent in this election.
The shocks and tremors within the ZAPU leadership were shown when they did not seriously challenge the fairness of the elections. The leadership and activists were faced with the realisation that ZAPU is a tribal-national party of a minority. On this basis there were only two alternatives - either a deal with ZANU(PF) or a hardening regional fine leading towards separatism.
Some ZANU(PF) leaders reported that some Ndebele were already talking of the "Republic of Mthwakazi", and that Matabeleland already felt like a state within a state. But Nkomo calculated that it would be more to his advantage to seek a deal with Mugabe than to encourage separation. The majority of the Ndebele were still against such a direction.
Although fairly soon after the elections Nkomo made overtures to Mugabe, the reaction of the ZANU(PF) leadership was one of intensified repression. By making almost daily threats to ban ZAPU, Mugabe was prepared to take the inter-party struggle to the brink. Any further steps would have driven ZAPU underground and sparked off fresh explosions in Matabeleland.
These extreme policies were the inevitable result of the dilly-dallying on the land question and the lack of progress on all social questions. On the basis of compromise with capitalism no decisive progress was possible.
The appointment of Enos Nkala as Minister of Home Affairs after the election showed how determined Mugabe was to secure the complete surrender of Nkomo, rather than settle for an uneasy deal. Nkala, himself Ndebele-speaking, is a long-standing enemy of Nkomo. He had stood as a ZANU(PF) candidate in Matabeleland and lost his deposit. Yet after the elections Mugabe insulted the Ndebele people by appointing him to settle issues with ZAPU.
A new security apparatus was set up and detentions of ZAPU leaders followed. Nkomo's body-guards were disarmed during a campaign to have him "eliminated".
With hindsight it now appears that the role of Nkala was to deliver Nkomo to the negotiating table bound and gagged. With any remaining national ambitions of Nkomo destroyed, his lieutenants and followers could be brought into the ruling party. ZANU(PF) would then have the mantle of a truly national party.
It is impossible to follow the dynamics of the moves towards a deal without an understanding of the situation in Southern Africa as a whole.
The pressures on Mugabe
A powerful factor in Mugabe's thinking must have been the devastation of Mozambique and Angola by reactionary bands directly supported by South Africa.
Up to 20,000 Zimbabwean troops are now deployed in Mozambique to secure lines of transport and combat the MNR. The tops of the security apparatus have no illusions that a quick and easy victory is likely because of the devastation of the country and the collapse of FRELIMO's authority in many areas. A costly, drawn-out military operation, which is most likely, will drain increasing resources from the Zimbabwean state.
Faced with this prospect, Mugabe had every reason to consider the military cost of repression in Matabeleland.
As a pragmatic politician he was forced to recognise that the military occupation of Matabeleland had not produced the political results he had expected. Continuation of this policy would inevitably invite deeper South African involvement in support of reactionary bands, which would seek the support of an oppressed tribal-national group.
Fighting on these two fronts, it was likely that the army and police would become bogged down and weary. The political implications were dangerous to the ruling elite.
There was an element of risk in the strategy of smashing ZAPU and forcing Nkomo to the wall. There was always the possibility that Nkomo, incapable of providing a socialist solution, could have been driven in the direction of separatism and alliance with South Africa.
But, despite being defenceless, Nkomo had an important card to play - the continued and solid support of the Ndebele for ZAPU. This meant that the unequal partnership of convenience would not have to be a humiliating surrender for Nkomo. Even so, it will involve him in a less powerful position than he had before.
It is reported that the deal will be based on the representation of ZAPU within the leading organs of ZANU(PF) in proportion to its electoral support.
But these practical arrangements will cause new headaches and tensions within the ZANU(PF) leadership. These can be overcome (and then only temporarily) by Mugabe taking increasing power into his own hands, and balancing between the different political-regional factions within ZANU(PF).
The working class and peasantry may wonder at the amazing zig-zags of the politicians. But many will sigh with relief that Mugabe had the boldness to attempt to resolve the tribal-national division of the country.
For all these internal and external reasons it is likely that the deal will be made, despite the formidable hurdles which will have to be jumped.
The incorporation of what remains of the ZAPU leadership into ZANU(PF), under the slogan of unity, will undoubtedly bring a welcome pause to the tribal-national battles. The frenzy whipped up by the ZANU(PF) leadership before and after the elections will now recede. But the poison of tribal prejudice has seeped into the consciousness of some sections of the working class, and certainly remains in the peasantry.
Building "unity" at the top by rearranging party positions and securing the voluntary winding up of ZAPU will bring a temporary pause to the vicious anti-ZAPU campaign which carried all the marks of a crude tribal struggle.
This will remove one of the formidable obstacles to rebuilding the unity of workers in Bulawayo, Harare, and the crucial area of the Midlands.
Problems of one party rule
At the same time it will open up new problems in the ruling party. The incorporation of selected ZAPU leaders into privileged positions, at the expense of ZANU(PF) careerists, has been fought with the greatest energy by sections of the latter.
Even though Mugabe may succeed in over-riding this opposition and "uniting" with Nkomo, this will import all the divisions of the middle-class leadership into a single party.
After a period of celebration and "reconciliation", the petty squabbling among the leaders will resume. Basically the "new" ruling party will consist of ZAPU supporters in Matabeleland, and ZANU(PF) supporters in the East. In the Midlands, where the parties are more evenly divided, there are likely to be fierce battles to determine which local party leadership predominates.
When the unity deal is seen to have solved none of the social problems, there will be a growing realisation that the politicians have looked after themselves very nicely. The workers and peasants will want to put forward genuine leaders of the working people to replace corrupt party hacks.
Workers of ZANU(PF) and ZAPU will be able to see more clearly the need for class policies against their common exploitation, and seek unity with their fellow workers against pro-capitalist leaders. Ndebele workers particularly, will find that the ZAPU leaders have done nothing to secure their interests, and will look for a way forward.
But spontaneous tendencies towards working-class unity can be cut across by the deep-rooted tribal and national divisions by unscrupulous politicians. The national question will not go away just because a single party has been proclaimed, as the Karanga-Zezuru conflicts within ZANU(PF) have demonstrated.
After a temporary pause, it is inevitable that tribal-national discrimination and oppression will resurface. Since capitalism cannot deliver the goods, the competition for land, jobs, and education will follow the old tribal and regional channels.
Only a genuine socialist leadership in the working class can cut across this process, by building and sustaining firm unity among Shona and Ndebele workers on the basis of linking the struggle for decent wages, jobs, homes, education, and land to the struggle for socialism against the pro-capitalist leadership of both ZAPU and ZANU(PF).
The explosive pressures building up from below after the elections can be seen both in the demonstrations which were mounted against councillors in many towns before the elections, and in the near-riots and victimisation of supporters of minority parties by women supporting ZANU(PF).
These demonstrators vented their frustration about their poor prospects and lack of housing on supporters of the minority parties, but also, in some cases, on well-to-do ZANU(PF) members.
The violence was fuelled particularly by the lack of improvement in their lives experienced by ZANU(PF) women: "There is a shortage of houses. Why should they stay in houses when we don't have houses? Their houses will be distributed to party members by the party."
At first the ZANU(PF) leadership encouraged these actions, but soon feared they would escalate out of control and even take a clearer class direction. Appeals for restraint by leaders such as Shamuyarira and Nyagumbo had no effect, however, and in the end the reprisals were stopped only by the intervention of Mugabe himself.
Pressures accumulating
All the pressures of Zimbabwean society are now accumulating at the top. The inadequacies of the leadership will now be seen more clearly as the workers, youth and peasantry see no solution to their urgent problems. Among the most advanced workers there will be a search for the way out of the seizing up of the Zimbabwean revolution.
Those who started out as the leadership of a guerrilla movement, forced to live in modest conditions and often sharing the dangers of war, are now the well-to-do politicians living in luxury and fawned on by the capitalists. Nothing brings this out better than the financial contributions these leaders make to the party.
Immediately after independence party leaders used to contribute $500 a month to the party and in return receive an allowance, but now Ministers earning up to $4,330 a month are only contributing $50 a month.
The outlook of this leadership now reflects its material position of wealth, high salaries, farm ownership and income from businesses. The common complaint among workers is that the leaders preach socialism in the day but practice capitalism at night.
These leaders are increasingly remote from the workers and peasants. Many of them feel closer to the capitalists and wealthy whites in the suburbs where they live, than with the masses. Instead of closing the gap between themselves and the masses, they are increasing their privileges. Many are permanently in debt to the building societies and the banks.
With their privileged position this layer is unable to make a break with capitalist policies. Neither can they mobilise the workers to carry out the transformation of society. They show no real interest in the problems of the workers and peasants. Rather their coming to power has been accompanied by the rise of corruption and nepotism.
The Department of Labour officials are a terrible example of the general contempt and hostility of the state bureaucracy towards the masses. Instead of attempting to solve the problems of workers during disputes, they often call the police in to arrest them.
Within a two-year period, no less than four chief industrial relations officers, one deputy chief, and 42 industrial relations officers resigned to take up positions in private companies. As Shava, the Minister of Labour, was forced to state after these revelations: "One remains wondering whether such officers are not actually agents of the private sector from the outset."
Evidence has come to light of industrial relations officers leaking confidential information to the capitalists, socialising with management, and being unwilling to speak to the workers. The new labour law gives no powers to the workers to expose and correct such pro-capitalist activities.
Equally in the Department of Land and Resettlement, leaders of the co-operatives complain of rudeness and pro-capitalist policies.
With these state policies it is not surprising that the capitalist organisations have no similar complaints!
What is taking place in Zimbabwe is more than the transformation of the guerrilla leadership and educated strata into a privileged bureaucracy. The top leadership is more than privileged and wealthy. Through its growing ownership of farms and involvement in business, it is becoming a junior partner of the big capitalists, hanging onto the coat-tails of the monopoly businessmen and landowners.
In August 1984 the Second Congress of ZANU(PF) adopted a Code of Conduct, supposedly aimed against capitalist elements in the party. Since that time, the Code has hardly even been mentioned, let alone implemented Moreover the method of investigation it proposed, involving secret reports and enquiries, is diametrically opposed to what workers want, which is open discussion and action to discipline those seeking to enrich themselves at the expense of the masses.
The Code of Conduct was not implemented in the selection of candidates for the 1985 elections at local or national level. Instead, among the ZANU(PF) candidates for election were many well-known owners of big farms and transport companies. They had been put forward to the districts and branches as candidates approved of by the central party leadership. Now in Parliament these elements have an unparalleled opportunity for enriching themselves, while the rank and file suffer unemployment and stagnating poverty incomes.
The Code of Conduct is the only concession that has been made to control the growing wealth of the party elite. The idea was that the party top leaders would discipline themselves by getting rid of their farms and companies.
But now it is reported that Cabinet ministers and army officers are refusing even to answer questions on their ownership of farms, transport companies, and firms.
In reality, after five years of independence marked by growing corruption in the party and civil service, the workers are now well aware that they have no control over their political representatives. This feeling is now noticeable right down to the cell level.
A one party dictatorship?
The fundamental force behind the drive towards a one-party dictatorship is the crisis of the system which has failed to deliver the goods: capitalism. The lack of jobs, land, houses, and decent wages - which capitalism cannot provide - is building up politically explosive material.
Faced with these pressures from below which cannot be met, the leadership is balancing between the interests of the workers and peasants and the capitalists. It hopes to maintain the illusion that it gives equal attention to the interests of the exploited and the exploiters.
If capitalism was a growing, wealth-creating system, the demands of the workers and peasants could at least partially be met. Social benefits could be expanded and the explosive material defused. With the masses seeing the prospect of satisfying their basic demands within the present system, the government could tolerate a variety of political opinions without fear of weakening its hold on power.
Bonapartism
But capitalism in the colonial world has been unable to develop the productive forces necessary to provide for the needs of the people. Since independence in Zimbabwe there has been hardly any significant advance in production.
Instead of reorganising production on the basis of state ownership of the banks, mines, big farms and factories, the ZANU(PF) leadership has defended capitalism. The weak productive base has been further weakened by factory closures and the stagnation of the world market.
The ZANU(PF) leadership is aware that the crisis of capitalism is kindling a political explosion. It fears that the frustrated hopes of the masses could turn towards opposition parties, or, more likely, towards internal rank and file opposition movements.
It is these pressures which are forcing the leadership to balance between the monopolies and strengthen the personal rule of Mugabe - all ingredients which make up Bonapartism in Zimbabwe.
The agro-industrial wage dispute shows how, at times, the leadership is forced to make gestures towards satisfying the demands of the workers.
Yet, more importantly, the conflicting pressures are forcing Mugabe further along the anti-democratic path. Political opposition is repressed. The state apparatus is being consolidated not so much against the threats from South Africa, but against the future internal opposition of the workers and peasants.
All these trends taken together are what add up to the one-party dictatorship. The leadership is driven ahead along this road to secure itself in power mainly against the coming socialist opposition. At the same time it hopes that the added state powers will help it to control different factions and Shona tribal rivalries which are festering in the party.
Mugabe presents the one-party state as a solution to the national division of the country. It is this aspect of the propaganda which gains some support for the one-party state campaign. The illusion is being peddled that the problems of national disunity and tribalism can be solved by a one-party state.
The prospect of a one-party dictatorship has been strengthened by the collapse of the minority parties - the UANC and ZANU (Sithole). ZANU(PF) rallies regularly have "confessions" by defectors from other parties. Many of these had high positions in their former parties. The sense of demoralisation in these parties is deepened by the indefinite detention of many party activists.
This collapse, taken together with the deal being negotiated with ZAPU, concentrates all the contradictions between the classes within the ruling party. Already the intense party loyalty being drummed into the rank and file is evidence of inner party tensions.
As the party leadership consolidates its wealth and position and the party forces more diverse elements and members of minority parties into its ranks, so party democrac